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A Thomistic Reading of Small-Scale Uses of Force 
 
Christian Nikolaus Braun 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis makes both a substantive and methodological contribution to 
knowledge. Firstly, it assesses the moral issue of a worrisome increase in the use 
of small-scale force post-9/11 from a Thomistic just war perspective. 
Concentrating on one such use of force, namely the practice of targeted killing, it 
engages in a “renegotiation” of the inherited Thomistic jus ad bellum in order to 
address the moral questions raised by this recent development in military 
conduct. Secondly, the thesis seeks to recover the method of traditional casuistry 
built around the ethics of Aquinas. Employing “Thomistic casuistry” can, it will 
be argued, approximate the analytical rigour of the revisionist just war while it 
does not have to disregard the use of history for moral reflection. In addition, 
“Thomistic casuistry,” as a distinct “third-way” approach to just war, is capable of 
triggering an exchange between Walzerians and revisionists, the two dominating 
contemporary approaches which have faced each other in a “war of ethics within 
the ethics of war.” 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Small-Scale Force post-9/11 – Political Context and  
      Moral Questions 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing US response have proved to be a 
challenge for just war thinking. While terrorism as a threat was no new phenomenon, 
the Bush administration’s declaration of a “Global War on Terror” questioned core 
ideas of contemporary just war. Multiple perspectives were put forward, reaching 
from supporting a “just war against terror” (Elshtain 2003), to dismissing a general 
war against terrorism but supporting a war against Al Qaeda (Bellamy 2005), to 
rejecting the notion of war entirely and defending the law enforcement paradigm 
(Murphy 2014).  
While the academy argued about the appropriateness of a “war” against 
terrorism, however, the Bush administration exhibited no such indecisiveness. 
Besides two “classical” wars against the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq the US 
started a third “war” against individual terrorists. Oftentimes, this latter “war” used 
small-scale military force only, arguably making such operations look more like 
policing than actual war fighting. In consequence, although terrorism had 
traditionally been considered a matter of law enforcement, the new threat of Islamist 
terrorism made just war theorists reassess that assumption. For most thinkers, the 
blurring of the lines between peace and war, between the law enforcement and war 
paradigms, was morally troubling as, it seemed to them, the struggle with terrorism 
“cannot be well governed within either” (McMahan 2012a, 155).  
Arguably, the increase in the use of small-scale force as represented, most 
prominently, in the policy of targeted killing has been one of the most controversial 
facets of the “war on terror”. Debate about the morality of this practice (see, e.g., 
Finkelstein, Ohlin, and Altman 2012) has been fierce and, up until the present day, 
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seems far from being settled. In addition, debate has almost exclusively taken place 
before the horizon of a narrow intradisciplinary divide in contemporary just war 
thinking between Michael Walzer’s (2015) approach and his revisionist critics (see, 
e.g., McMahan 2009) about methodological questions. Oftentimes, this introspection 
has inhibited debate about substantive issues and a convincing attempt to trigger an 
exchange between the two camps remains wanting. Among the morally troubling 
substantive issues caused by targeted killings two particular issues stand out, namely 
those of authority and liability.  
The Question of Authority 
With regard to authority, debate about targeted killings has not sufficiently engaged 
with the issues of the geographical scope of targeted killings, the employment of 
potentially morally problematic means, as well as the convergence of intelligence and 
military agencies. To begin with, the geographical borders of the “global war on terror” 
have been subject to substantial legal debate. Although, this interpretation is highly 
controversial within international law (see, e.g., O’Connell 2010; Sanders 2014; 
Schaller 2015), all post-9/11 US administrations have argued that lethal force can be 
used against terrorists all over the world and they have denied to be bound to formally 
established warzones. Former Attorney General Holder (2012) summarised their 
interpretation as follows: “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in 
Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the 
geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We 
are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to 
country.”  
Such an expansive interpretation amounts to a challenge of conventional 
accounts of political space. Until recently, most arguments originated from an 
understanding of space similar to the Walzerian “legalist paradigm” which cherishes 
the Westphalian principles of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Among 
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just war theorists, Williams (2008, 2015) has been a rather lonely voice in advocating 
a broader conceptual discussion about space, questioning the school’s tradition of 
state-centrism. However, the legalist paradigm’s insignia of statehood have been 
exploited by terrorist organisations. Judged from one viewpoint, Al Qaeda has been 
operating under a “regime of non-state responsibility” (Heinze 2011, 1080) in which 
a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute terrorists operating within its territory. To 
address this phenomenon, states, according to Heinze (2011, 1082), have expanded 
the right to self-defence against non-state actors within another state and, in tandem, 
have applied fewer “normative and legal constraints on using force against states for 
their tolerance of such activity.” As Sanders (2014, 526) laments: “American officials 
have not only claimed to operate under the war paradigm but have also asserted that 
the war has no boundaries. This risks legitimating the use of lethal force anywhere in 
the world.” Treating Sanders’s fear as having already materialised, Gregory (2011, 
239) speaks of an “everywhere war,” arguing that “as cartographic reason falters and 
military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and 
geography have come undone.”  
Related to the question of geographical scope has been a technological 
development, namely the emergence of drone warfare. In particular, two 
technological aspects are relevant to the notion of an “everywhere war:” The drone’s 
capability to strike precisely and on a small-scale, and its capability to loiter. Due to 
the small-scale force drones employ, there is, arguably, a reduced risk of escalation 
toward major ground war (Brunstetter and Braun 2013, 99). With drones, the US has 
been able to kill terrorists in sovereign countries without the prospect of having to go 
to war with that country. As a result, the US can now follow terrorists to places 
previously out of reach. Having this new kind of access, the concept of the battlefield 
has arguably been redefined. The traditional understanding of the battlefield “defined 
by the locatable space of an effective combat zone” was replaced “by the simple 
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presence of the hunted individual who carries with him everywhere a kind of little 
halo denoting a personal hostility zone” (Chamayou 2011, 3).  
Making this hunt for individuals possible was the drone’s second technological 
aspect. Its loitering capacity has enabled the US to carry out surveillance over large 
areas and over extended periods of time, waiting for an opportunity to arise to kill a 
person it determines to be targetable. This marked a major technological leap as the 
US can now follow and combat terrorist activity in real-time. In the military’s jargon, 
the drone is the only weapon system that can find, fix, and finish simultaneously 
(Woods 2015, 3). As a result, the introduction of the drone equalised, or even turned 
upside down, the advantage terrorists had enjoyed over the state. As Kahn (2013, 220-
223) argues, “The terrorist seeks a vivid asymmetry by asserting a capacity to threaten 
anyone, at any place, and at any time. (…) The tactical asymmetry achieved by the 
terrorist has been met by the high-tech war of the West. (…) Replacing the human 
with the technological, we too have claimed the capacity to target anyone, anywhere, 
and at any time.” Following up on the assumption that the drone has given the state 
the edge over the terrorist, the question arises, again, but now in a new context, 
whether “war” is still the correct frame for this kind of warfare. As Kahn (2013, 221) 
notes:  
Jus in bello requires a bellum. Without that, we have moved from the ethos of warfare 
to that of law enforcement. (…) The ethos of policing is perfected when it achieves 
asymmetry. The criminal has no right to use force against those seeking to enforce the 
law. He cannot legally defend himself against the police. Similarly, policing is risky, 
but it is not a practice of sacrifice. If the risk is too great, a police officer can withdraw. 
He can even resign. He acts, moreover, under a strict rule of discrimination; we do not 
speak of acceptable collateral damage with respect to policing. Law enforcement 
targets the wrongdoer and him alone.  
Last but not least, the policy of targeted killing - through drone strikes, 
conventional airstrikes, and commando raids - has been carried out by two actors, the 
CIA and the military. The two institutions’ increasing “convergence” (Chesney 2012) 
is emblematic of the evolution of the “war on terror” and has raised questions about 
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the “right” authority to carry out such strikes. Not only does this convergence enable 
“shadow wars” in the first place, it also provides an account of a surprising continuity 
between the Bush and Obama presidencies. The embrace of paramilitary operations 
by the CIA is directly related to the attacks of 9/11. Before 9/11, the CIA, and the 
United States government in general, had been opposed to targeted killings (Mayer 
2009). The use of the CIA for tasks normally carried out by the military was attractive 
to the Bush administration as a way of surpassing the traditional military chain of 
command. As the CIA answers directly to the president, the agency can act more 
quickly than the Pentagon. As a result, the CIA director became sort of a military 
commander running a war with little oversight (Mazzetti 2013, 13). Soon after, while 
the CIA had the initial lead role in the “war on terror” and has remained a powerful 
player ever since, the Bush administration started to build up the military’s Special 
Forces as a capability that “could provide far greater flexibility” (Scahill 2013, 58). For 
example, the Pentagon can conduct covert operations without host government 
approval and virtually no congressional oversight. As a result of the embrace of 
irregular warfare within traditional wars, the US started to wage two wars at the same 
time – a conventional and an irregular one (2013, 142). However, such “shadow wars” 
(Kibbe 2004, 2012) blur the line between spying operations and traditional military 
conduct and both departments have increasingly become alike (Horton 2015, 120). 
Given this development, it is timely to investigate which institution should be granted 
the authority to carry out targeted killings.  
The Question of Liability 
In their response to the attacks of 9/11 consecutive US administrations have 
considered themselves to be in an ongoing non-international armed conflict and have 
rejected the traditional distinction between civilians and combatants as agreed to in 
the Geneva Conventions. The US distinguishes between civilians, lawful combatants, 
and a newly invented class of “unlawful enemy combatants” (under Obama re-labelled 
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as “unprivileged enemy belligerents”). Individuals judged to belong to the latter 
category are denied the Geneva protections and are considered to be targetable based 
on group membership. That take has been contested as the internationally accepted 
interpretation determines targetability based on active participation in hostilities 
(see, e.g., UNHCR 2010).  
Adding to the question of who is liable to targeted killing, the Obama 
administration employed a controversial understanding of pre-emption which is 
commonly considered to be a part of self-defence. In contrast to the traditional 
understanding which relies on the qualifier of imminence the administration sought 
to redefine imminence as a permanent state in the face of the absence of evidence that 
a potential assailant has no intention to carry out an attack now or at any point in the 
future (see, e.g., Erakat 2014; Trenta 2018). Arguably, the Obama administration’s 
new conceptualisation of imminence sits uneasily between defensive, preventive, and 
retributive uses of force and raises important questions regarding just cause and right 
intention. 
As far as the morality of war is concerned, the debate about the legality of 
targeting individual terrorists resonates within contemporary just war debate. 
Walzerians are arguably close to the argument put forward by recent US 
administrations. While Walzer does not embrace the new interpretation of 
imminence, he (2016) proposes a distinction between insurgent groups like the IRA 
and terrorist networks. While it might make sense to uphold international law’s ban 
on targeting political leaders in the case of insurgent groups, Walzer denies this 
distinction to terrorist leaders. As he (2011) put it in the case of the killing of Osama 
bin Laden: “So the killing of Osama bin Laden was an act of war. He was certainly a 
legitimate target, as the head of an organization that had declared itself to be at war 
with the United States - and delivered a devastating attack.” Emery and Brunstetter 
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(2016) are even closer to the Obama administration, arguing for a limited preventive 
employment of targeted killing.  
Revisionists, in contrast, due to their individualist morality, cannot accept a 
targeting process which considers group membership as sufficient to employ lethal 
force. In contrast, they (see, e.g., McMahan 2005a, 2009) argue for a moral liability 
account; in order to become targetable, an individual must have forfeited her right not 
to be harmed. Importantly, the revisionist account of moral liability is tied to the sole 
just cause of self-defence. McMahan (2009, 8), in particular, objects to a moral 
culpability account which can also allow for retributive uses of force. In sum, moral 
debate about liability to targeted killing is far from being settled and has also taken 
place before the horizon of the “war of ethics within the ethics of war” (Vaha 2013, 
183) between the two dominant approaches to contemporary just war thinking. 
 
1.2 Opportunity for a Distinctive and Original  
       Contribution 
This thesis seeks to make a distinctive and original contribution to the debate about 
the morality of targeted killings as well as assess the methodological divide in 
contemporary just war thinking between Walzerians and revisionists from a “third-
way” perspective. Arguing from a Thomistic understanding of just war, it seeks to 
regulate the practice of targeted killing of culpable unjust individuals and thereby 
address the concerns about authority and liability raised by that practice.  
While there seems to have been a renewed interest in the classical Christian 
just war generally (see, e.g., Biggar 2013a; Elshtain 2003; O’Donovan 2003) and in 
the thought of St Thomas specifically (see, e.g., Cole 1999; Gorman 2010a, b; Johnson 
2014; Murphy 2012; Reichberg 2017) the question of the morality of targeted killings 
has so far evaded the Thomistic just war. In addition, responding to the second major 
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shortcoming, this thesis makes a methodological contribution to just war thinking by 
recapturing the traditional method of casuistry. Such a historical reading of the policy 
of targeted killing is wanting and can provide a distinctive perspective on the ongoing 
“war of ethics” between Walzerians and revisionists.  
Contributing to the Concern about Authority  
The Thomistic just war can provide unique insights about the authority to conduct 
targeted killings and also advance debate toward a better understanding of the 
contemporary disagreement about authority between Walzerians and revisionists.  
Importantly, St Thomas listed the authority criterion in first place. This prominent 
role for authority relates to the classical idea that only sovereign authorities with the 
responsibility for the common good of the political community could wage war or 
bellum. Uses of force by individuals, while justifiable in self-defence, could not rise to 
the level of bellum (Johnson 2014, 31).  
Interestingly, the distinction between public and private uses of force is of 
continuing relevance today. Walzerians, for example, are not too distant from the 
classical perspective. They insist that, in order to be justified, war must be waged by a 
legitimate authority. For Walzerians, as for international law, that authority is 
commonly the nation-state, although resistance movements, when representing the 
political community, can also meet the authority test. Non-state actors like terrorist 
groups, however, which do not have the support of the community, necessarily fail the 
authority test. Given Walzerians’ emphasis on the political community, there are 
curious parallels with the classical conceptualisation (O’Driscoll 2009, 33). However, 
Walzerians do not argue for the classical, pre-Westphalian understanding of the 
sovereign as instituted by God. Rather, they embrace the Westphalian 
conceptualisation of the ruler as representative of the political community who has 
been authorised by that community. In particular, Walzerians uphold the 
Westphalian standard of a state’s right to political sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
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In contrast to both the classical and Walzerian just war most revisionists seek 
to de-emphasise the importance of the authority criterion. Some (see, e.g., Steinhoff 
2007) even argue for abandoning the criterion entirely. In a nutshell, revisionists 
argue that individuals can wage war, too; the authority criterion should not be a pre-
requisite for waging war. Underlying this disagreement are different units of analysis. 
Classical and Walzerian just war thinkers start with the political community. 
Revisionists, however, start with the individual.  
Reassessing the contemporary disagreement between Walzerian collectivists 
and revisionist individualists from a classical just war perspective can provide a 
distinctive, though no neutral, discussion about authority. While Walzerians 
distinguish between two different moralities of war and peace and have suggested a 
distinct third morality of jus ad vim (see chapter 2), revisionists are insistent that 
there is only one morality, namely that of individual morality. In this respect, St 
Thomas’s thinking was arguably closer to Walzerians. As Reichberg (2013, 182) points 
out, Aquinas distinguished between two moralities in the sense that only “public war” 
could constitute a just war whereas private uses of force he considered as “war” only 
in a limited sense. At the same time, however, Aquinas can be read as being supportive 
of Frowe’s critique that jus ad vim as a distinct moral framework besides jus ad bellum 
is redundant; for Aquinas, small-scale uses of force as used in targeted killings are acts 
of war, bellum, when carried out by a sovereign authority.  
Moreover, the Thomistic just war can illuminate debate about the symmetry 
question. For Aquinas, there is no moral problem when a sovereign authority 
justifiably targets a culpable unjust individual without that individual having a chance 
to fight back. In other words, “killing by remote control” (Strawser 2013) should raise 
no moral concern if the use of force is justified. Debate about the so-called 
“convergence issue” can also be advanced by a Thomistic interpretation as what 
matters foremost for Aquinas is that the use of force by representatives of the 
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sovereign authority is just. Who exactly carries out the action is of secondary 
importance only as long as the mission’s justness is not concerned.  
Furthermore, the Thomistic just war can make a contribution with regard to 
targeted killings vis-a-vis the Westphalian principles of political sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. The classical understanding of sovereignty held that in cases of 
grave violations of the natural law a state’s territorial borders should not be allowed 
to function as insurmountable barrier against the establishment of justice. Thus, when 
seeking to regulate the practice of targeted killing there needs to be an answer to the 
question of when small-scale uses of force against culpable unjust individuals on a 
foreign state’s territory, if at all, can be justified. More generally, looking at current 
debate, there have been very few arguments for a classical understanding of 
sovereignty and those which have been made (see, e.g., Coates 2016) do not withstand 
all attacks by revisionist thinkers (see, e.g., Steinhoff 2007). There is thus an opening 
for a nuanced classical perspective on the authority criterion which this thesis seeks 
to provide.  
Contributing to the Concern about Liability 
The Thomistic just war can also make a distinctive and original contribution with 
regard to the question of who becomes liable to targeted killing. Importantly, the 
dominant interpretation of the Thomistic just war embraces a moral culpability 
account in order to determine who is liable to lethal force. However, the account of 
moral culpability, as noted above, is rejected by revisionists who advocate an account 
based on moral liability to defensive force. In particular, revisionists object to the just 
cause of retribution which is inherent to moral culpability. Interestingly, in the 
limitation of force to self-defence, the revisionist argument overlaps with Walzer’s 
legalist paradigm granted one accepts the possibility that the UN Security Council may 
authorise retributive uses of force. At the same time, both the classical and the 
revisionist just war agree that the Walzerian justification for killing in war based on 
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group membership alone can be morally problematic. Arguing that contemporary just 
war debate deliberately dismisses important moral concerns this thesis reflects on the 
contemporary limitation of war to self-defence as well as the differences between 
accounts of moral culpability and moral liability. It concludes that adopting a 
Thomistic culpability account which allows for strictly limited uses of retributive 
targeted killing would constitute a moral advancement.  
Furthermore, by making a clear-cut distinction between self-defence and 
retribution the Thomistic reading of targeted killing is able to avoid a “broadened 
conception of defense” (Kaplan 2015) employed by Brunstetter. As Kaplan notes, 
Brunstetter and Braun (2013, 96) list as just causes for jus ad vim, to which the 
practice of targeted killing would belong, “responding to terrorist bombings, attacks 
on embassies or military installations, and the kidnapping of citizens.” Employing 
force in such circumstances, however, arguably falls under the realm of retribution 
rather than self-defence as the use of force responds to a past wrongdoing. Moreover, 
in the piece written together with Emery (2016), Brunstetter includes preventive uses 
of force within the just cause of self-defence. This thesis argues that clearly 
distinguishing between self-defence and retribution as well as denying the use of 
preventive force constitutes a moral benefit which does not require the introduction 
of such uses of force through the backdoor. 
Importantly, however, while there is a general just cause of retribution, the 
criterion of right intention must also be met in order for targeted killings to be just. 
Arguably, the criterion of right intention has not received sufficient attention in 
contemporary debate. It seems that it is especially hard to grasp for revisionists who 
seem to have little place for this internal criterion which uneasily fits their rigorous 
analytical scrutiny. Having said that, Aquinas has a prominent place for right 
intention. More specifically, right intention, for the Thomistic just war, unfolds within 
an account of virtue ethics. It seems that currently a re-appropriation of virtue ethics 
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is taking place. Besides MacIntyre’s seminal work (2013), there has also been a modest 
revival of the Thomistic just war with regard to the virtues. Besides contributors such 
as Cole (1999) and Gorman (2010a, b), Reichberg (2017) has most recently provided 
an innovative interpretation of Thomistic right intention based on the virtues of 
military prudence and battlefield courage. However, the practice of targeted killing 
has not yet been considered from a virtue ethics perspective. This thesis seeks to 
remedy this shortcoming by taking into consideration recent developments in papal 
thinking on matters such as the death penalty. 
Contributing to the Methodological Debate 
Last but not least, through Thomistic casuistry, this thesis makes a distinctive 
contribution to the debate about the morality of targeted killing specifically and the 
ethics of war generally. While Walzerians employ an untraditional type of casuistry, 
revisionists belong to the school of analytical philosophy and mostly rely on the 
method of “reflective equilibrium.” In contrast to Walzerian casuists, this thesis, in its 
chapter on liability to targeted killing, employs a traditional casuistical analysis which 
does not start from legal but moral principles taken from Thomistic ethics. Reflecting 
on cases of small-scale uses of force carried out by the Obama administration the 
casuistical investigation “renegotiates” (O’Driscoll 2008a) the inherited Thomistic 
just war principles of just cause and right intention with regard to novel 
circumstances. Traditional casuistry provides a distinctive set of tools which can be 
employed to demonstrate that the ethics of war is richer than the contemporary 
narrow intradisciplinary split suggests. In addition, one particular merit of the 
casuistical method is that it shows that some of the substantive disagreements 
between Walzerians and revisionists do not arise from their different methods. 
Consequently, while it cannot resolve the disagreement about the best method, the 
Thomistic just war can provide a platform for an exchange about substantive issues 
such as, for example, the moral equality of combatants. 
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1.3 The Investigation 
As noted above, the significant increase in the use of small-scale force post-9/11 has 
posed serious moral questions which just war thinkers have sought to answer. One 
such attempt, Walzer’s suggestion of a distinct moral framework of jus ad vim, will be 
discussed in the second chapter. Jus ad vim, the chapter notes, has been, like the 
Walzerian just war generally, subject to a revisionist critique. The revisionist critique 
of jus ad vim holds that it is redundant as a distinct third morality besides those of 
war and peace simply because there is only one morality, namely that of individual 
morality. Debate about jus ad vim thus lays bare the tension between Walzerian and 
revisionist approaches to just war and functions as the ideal entry point for the thesis’s 
substantial methodology chapter that follows. This is particularly so because the 
Thomistic just war, although it employs a very different methodology, essentially 
vindicates the revisionist argument that jus ad vim, as a distinct moral framework, is 
redundant.  
As the Thomistic just war is in a unique position to provide a nuanced 
perspective on the methodological disagreement between Walzerians and revisionists 
the methodology chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the respective approaches. 
Moreover, this chapter is the key to understanding the two stage argument the thesis 
makes with regard to the policy of targeted killing. The chapter points out the 
differences between Walzerians’ legalist interpretation of casuistry and revisionists’ 
method of reflective equilibrium. Their main difference is that Walzerians rely on 
historical cases while most revisionists prefer to construct artificial thought 
experiments.  
At the same time, however, both Walzerians and revisionists downplay the just 
war tradition as they do not elaborate on the ideas of previous thinkers. By doing this, 
the competing camps differ markedly from the “historical approach” (O’Driscoll 2013, 
47) to just war. That approach will be introduced through an overview about the 
14 
 
historical method of James Turner Johnson, the most influential contemporary 
historical just war thinker. Presenting the historical approach as a “third-way” in-
between Walzerians and revisionists the chapter demonstrates via the example of the 
moral symmetry thesis that the historical approach can be employed in order to 
refocus debate on substantive questions. Having done this, the status of Johnson’s 
just war as most influential contemporary historical approach notwithstanding, it will 
be argued that the historical approach can take more than one path and Johnson’s 
particular approach to Aquinas, due to its relative neglect of Thomistic virtue ethics, 
does not constitute the best path to determine liability to targeted killing.  
Consequently, the chapter notes that the argument of this thesis unfolds in two 
stages. Firstly, in the chapter on sovereign authority, based on conventional textual 
assessment, questions concerning the authority to execute targeted killings will be 
investigated. Importantly, the argument the authority chapter makes rests on 
Johnson’s (see, e.g., 2014) succinct history of the development of the idea of 
sovereignty. Secondly, due to the crucial role of the virtues with regard to the 
Thomistic interpretation of just cause and right intention, the liability chapter relies 
on a historical approach different from Johnson’s. Therefore, the methodology 
chapter introduces Thomistic casuistry, built around Aquinas’s virtue ethics, as the 
distinct and original methodological contribution this thesis makes. Moreover, the 
chapter seeks to address critics of the casuistical method, arguing that the recapture 
of traditional casuistry can avoid the trap which historically led to the poor reputation 
of casuistry as an intellectual exercise capable of justifying almost any, just or unjust, 
action.  
The chapter on sovereign authority provides a conventional textual analysis 
and subsequent argument about the relative congruence, consistency, and logic of St 
Thomas’s natural law position over that of both Walzerians and revisionists. It seeks 
to answer the question of who has the authority to carry out targeted killings and how 
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far that authority extends. The chapter concludes that a partial recovery of the 
Thomistic understanding of sovereignty, both internally and externally and in 
contradistinction to the Westphalian understanding, is the most ethical way of 
regulating small-scale force.  
Next is the cases chapter which portrays instances of small-scale employments 
of force by the Obama administration. These cases function as the basis for the 
Thomistic casuistical analysis of the question of who is liable to targeted killing. 
Within the casuistical analysis, the Thomistic just war is contrasted with 
contemporary just war thinking. More specifically, the chapter re-assesses today’s 
rejection of retributive uses of force, upheld by both Walzerians and revisionists, as 
well as revisionists’ strict advocacy of a moral liability account. After establishing that 
the policy of targeted killing can have the just causes of self-defence and retribution 
the analysis turns to the criterion of right intention, considering both potential just 
causes from a Thomistic virtue ethics perspective. The chapter concludes that, beyond 
the uncontroversial just cause of self-defence, retributive targeted killings, although 
morally justifiable in principle, must meet the very high standard of right intention 
and are thus highly unlikely to be justifiable in practice. 
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2 Jus ad Vim as Attempt to Grapple with  
    Small-Scale Force 
This short chapter evaluates the concept of jus ad vim as a new moral framework 
within just war thinking advocated by Walzerians in order to grapple with the morally 
worrisome increase of small-scale force post-9/11. It starts off with an overview about 
the rationale behind jus ad vim and, then, assesses the charge of redundancy 
revisionist just war thinkers have made in opposition to it. The chapter concludes that, 
from a Thomistic point of view, jus ad vim, as a distinct moral framework, is indeed 
redundant. However, the increase of small-scale force as represented by the practice 
of targeted killing is a very real moral concern which requires a “renegotiation” 
(O’Driscoll 2008a) of the inherited jus ad bellum principles which this thesis, in its 
subsequent argument, seeks to provide. 
In a new preface to Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer (2006a, xv-xvi) 
introduced a novel moral framework in response to the measures taken against the 
regime of Saddam Hussein prior to the 2003 war. In what he called jus ad vim, Walzer 
pondered over a theory governing the just use of force short of war. In his treatment 
of counterterrorism policies, on which the jus ad vim debate subsequently 
concentrated, Walzer (2007, 484) argues that there is a “different ‘feel’” to such 
operations as they are neither outright acts of war nor of peacetime law enforcement. 
As a consequence, he (2006b, 12) argues that “we can’t stop with just war theory,” 
identifying a need to “maneuver between our conception of combat and our 
conception of police work, between international conflict and domestic crime, 
between the zones of war and peace.” Walzer thus abandons the strict distinction 
between two moralities which he continues to uphold for what he sees as a clear 
dichotomy between war and peace and his “maneuver” between these two moralities 
gives birth to jus ad vim as a distinct third moral framework. A few years later, when 
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President Bush’s third “war” arguably became the preferred way of “war” under 
President Obama through the 44th president’s  embrace of the policy of targeted killing 
the concept of jus ad vim started to gain traction within just war debate.  
Only ten days after the 9/11 attacks, Walzer (2001) distinguished between a 
“metaphorical war” against terrorism and the “real thing,” expecting that the line 
between law enforcement and war paradigms might become blurred. In order to 
demonstrate the difficulty to apply either, Walzer (2006b, 10) provides an example 
which illustrates his idea about jus ad vim. Referring to a US missile strike in Yemen 
in 2001, Walzer hypothetically transfers the strike to Afghanistan, a zone of war where 
the United States was engaged in armed conflict, and to Philadelphia, a zone of peace 
within the US itself. Had the attack happened in Afghanistan, Walzer reasons, it would 
have been justified as “it is part of the awfulness of war that people actively engaged 
on the other side can legitimately be killed without warning.” Had the attack 
happened in Philadelphia, however, Walzer asserts that the law enforcement 
paradigm would have had to be applied: “In Philadelphia, the (suspected) terrorists 
would have to be arrested, arraigned, provided with lawyers, and brought to trial. 
They could not be killed unless they were convicted – and many Americans, opposed 
to capital punishment, would say: Not even then.” With regard to the Yemen attack, 
Walzer (2006b, 11) provides the moral rationale behind jus ad vim as a hybrid 
between war and law enforcement paradigms: 
Yemen is somewhere between Afghanistan and Philadelphia. It isn’t a war zone, but it 
also isn’t a zone of peace – and this description will fit many, not all, of the ‘battlefields’ 
of the ‘war’ against terrorism. In large sections of Yemen, the government’s writ 
doesn’t run; there are no police who could make the arrests and no courts (…) The 
Yemeni desert is a lawless land, and lawlessness provides a refuge for the political 
criminals called terrorists. The best way to deal with the refuge would be to help the 
Yemeni government extend its authority over the whole of its territory. But that is a 
long process, and the urgencies of the ‘war’ against terrorism may require more 
immediate action. When that is true, if it is true, it doesn’t seem morally wrong to 
target Al Qaeda militants directly – for capture, if that’s possible, but also for death. 
Yemen in this regard is closer to Afghanistan than to Philadelphia. 
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Under such circumstances, the concept of jus ad vim might function as justification 
for counterterrorism operations; although legally acts of war, jus ad vim actions 
should not be judged the same way as actual war because the lethal force employed 
resembles neither quantum nor duration of traditional warfare (Walzer 2006a, xiv). 
Walzer’s preference would be that some sort of international policing action would be 
attempted first, but in case such efforts fail, unilateral lethal action would be morally 
justifiable.  
Unfortunately, Walzer never elaborated in any greater detail on his idea of jus 
ad vim. This task has been taken on by a new generation of just war thinkers of whom 
Daniel Brunstetter, either alone (2013, 2015, 2016) or with varying co-authors (Braun 
and Brunstetter 2013; Brunstetter and Braun 2013; Emery and Brunstetter 2016), has 
been the most prolific contributor. Brunstetter’s jus ad vim builds on Walzer’s initial 
idea although he does not consider himself to be a “pure Walzerian” (personal 
communication, October 17, 2017). Despite Brunstetter’s leading role, the account of 
jus ad vim which has most relevance for this thesis is Ford’s (2013). Ford (2013, 65) 
defines vim as “an act of intentional killing of a person who is a culpable unjust threat, 
by a member of a military institution, acting on behalf of a legitimate political 
community which is not at war.” He (2013, 64) speaks of a “hybrid ethical framework” 
drawing from just war principles and the policing paradigm. As to the question why a 
new framework is timely, Ford (2013, 66) suggests three reasons: “The first is to 
require us to make more effective moral judgments about the just and unjust uses of 
lethal force that are already happening outside of the context of war. The second is to 
ensure that the extraordinary permissions to kill that we allow in war do not become 
normative outside that context. The third is to apply stricter and better specified rules 
of engagement for soldiers in situations of conflict short-of-war.” The major 
advantage from a moral point of view, for Ford, is that the new paradigm avoids the 
full destructiveness of war even though it might involve the use or threatened use of 
lethal force. It should thus be seen as an attempt to confine the “dogs of war” (2013, 
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70): “The conventional just war approach suffers from a false dichotomy where the 
use of lethal force by the military is judged through the lens of either no conflict 
whatsoever or all-out war. It seems more reasonable to suggest that situations of 
conflict short-of-war might require a range of moderated responses, including 
military options” (2013, 71). 
While Ford’s conceptualisation concentrates on targeted killing, for Walzer, as 
well as for Brunstetter, the jus ad vim project goes beyond that practice. That is why 
Ford distinguishes between a “broad” and “narrow” account of jus ad vim (2013, 64). 
In contrast to the narrow account, the broad account also allows for actions short of 
war against states, such as “embargoes (stopping ships on the high seas) and the 
enforcement of no-fly zones (bombing radar and anti-aircraft installations)” (Walzer 
2006a, xiv). In line with the focus on actions undertaken by sovereign states, 
Brunstetter and Braun (2013, 98) have proposed the new criterion of “probability of 
escalation” which seeks to avoid a transition of jus ad vim acts to full-scale war 
between states. Since the publication of two initial pieces in Ethics & International 
Affairs (2013) and the Journal of Military Ethics (2013), in co-authorship with 
Megan Braun, Brunstetter has elaborated on the broad conceptualisation which he 
imagines as a larger research project, most recently suggesting the development of a 
jus in vi and jus post vim (2016, 135). It goes without saying that the narrow account 
has a place within the broader take and, in fact, both Walzer and Brunstetter have 
argued about the ethics of targeted killing. Walzer (see, e.g., 2016) has done so without 
explicitly referring to jus ad vim, but Brunstetter (Emery and Brunstetter 2016) has 
embedded his argument for targeted killing in a framework of jus ad vim.  
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2.1 Jus ad Vim and the Issue of Redundancy 
Of the broad and narrow accounts of jus ad vim only the former conceptualisation has 
received critical attention (see, e.g., Coady 2013; Frowe 2016; Enemark 2014; Kaplan 
2015; Plaw and Colon 2015; Rudolf 2014). As a result, debate about jus ad vim has so 
far failed to address critical moral issues arising from the practice of targeted killing. 
Furthermore, debate about jus ad vim has become stuck in a “war of ethics ” between 
Walzerian and revisionist just war thinkers in which both sides disagree about 
substantive and methodological questions. 
Among the criticisms of jus ad vim, Frowe’s (2016) is the most important as it 
applies to both the narrow and broad conceptualisation. Importantly, her rejection of 
jus ad vim follows the just war thinking of the revisionist school (see 3.2). The fact 
that Brunstetter’s (2016) response to Frowe relies on Walzer’s way of arguing 
demonstrates that debate about jus ad vim takes place before the background of the 
general split within contemporary just war thinking. Brunstetter begins his rebuttal 
by situating the conversation about jus ad vim within that wider debate. He asserts 
that Frowe’s understanding about the use of force derives from a worldview that is 
“fundamentally” (2016, 131) different from his. In particular, he takes issue with the 
revisionist claim that there is no moral difference between the state of war and the 
state of peace. Brunstetter further rejects the rights-based liability account which 
revisionists propose instead (2016, 131). Unsurprisingly, as revisionists only accept 
one morality, Frowe (2016, 122), in her critique, detected an unnecessary 
concentration on the question about whether a specific use of force counts as war.  
With regard to method, the fundamental differences between the two 
competing camps are also apparent in the two papers. Brunstetter’s starting point, 
following Walzer, have been real cases of force short of war (2016, 131). Frowe, in 
contrast, does not need to consider history in order to make an attempt at proving 
Brunstetter wrong. Instead, she (2016, 121) resorts to a thought experiment in order 
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to arrive at a state of reflective equilibrium. As part of her substantive critique, Frowe 
(2016, 119-120) criticises Brunstetter for considering the ad bellum principles as a 
“one-off judgment” which only needs to be met at the onset of war while, correctly 
interpreted, must continuously be re-assessed as long as the war lasts. Most 
importantly, she argues that jus ad vim as a distinct moral framework besides jus ad 
bellum is “redundant;” the existing jus ad bellum framework can appropriately judge 
uses of force short of war (2016, 123-126). However, despite Frowe’s partly 
substantive critique it seems that, overall, the conversation between the two authors 
has been rather narrow as a consequence of the “confusingly polarized” (Clark 2017, 
331) state of contemporary just war. 
The Thomistic understanding of just war can make an important contribution 
to the debate about jus ad vim because it sides with neither Walzerians nor 
revisionists all the time. As this section points out, while the Thomistic just war sides 
with Walzerians that there is in fact a moral difference between war and peace it, at 
the same time, must embrace the revisionist view that jus ad vim as a distinct third 
moral framework is redundant. With regard to the question of whether it does make 
a moral difference whether a use of force is carried out in times of peace or in times of 
war St Thomas’s thinking was arguably closer to Walzerians than to revisionists. As 
Reichberg (2013, 182) points out, Aquinas distinguished between two moralities in 
the sense that only “public war” could constitute a just war whereas private uses of 
force he considered as “war” only in a limited sense. That is why Aquinas, in his 
seminal definition of a just war (ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1), gave a prominent role to the 
authority criterion which limited the right to wage war to the sovereign who has been 
entrusted with the responsibility for the common good of the political community. 
Furthermore, Aquinas distinguished between “general war” (bellum publicum) and 
“particular war” (bellum particular). The former mode of war St Thomas 
(…) contrasted to a ‘particular war’ (bellum particular), which designated force that 
was used by or directed against private individuals. It could be just or unjust, 
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depending on the case. Individuals engaged in gang violence (rixa), or criminals 
resisting arrest would be waging an unjustifiable ‘private’ war; inversely, ‘a judge who 
does not refrain from giving a just judgment despite fear of an impending sword’ is 
cited in the same passage (q. 123, a. 5) as an instance of an individual undergoing a 
just private war. The same could be said of any private individual who made 
proportionate use of force in defending himself from the attack of thieves or other 
malefactors. Bellum generale, by contrast, designated the condition whereby one 
‘multitude’ (that is to say, the fighting force of an independent polity) contends against 
another such multitude on the battlefield, and in the process each considers the other 
its external enemy. For Aquinas, this was bellum in the most proper sense of the term. 
(Reichberg 2013, 188) 
In consequence, the revisionist argument that any individual has the authority to wage 
war (see 4.2), from a Thomistic perspective, is mistaken.  
At the same time, however, Aquinas can be read as being supportive of Frowe’s 
critique that jus ad vim as a distinct moral framework besides jus ad bellum is 
redundant; for Aquinas, small-scale uses of force as used in targeted killings are acts 
of war, bellum, when carried out by a sovereign authority. In other words, medieval 
thinkers like St Thomas did not make the modern distinction between military and 
police uses of force. If executed on behalf of a sovereign authority any use of force, 
externally or internally, just or unjust, would be an act of war. Following from this 
logic, a distinct moral framework of jus ad vim is indeed redundant. The Thomistic 
just war thus vindicates the revisionist critique.  
Importantly, while Aquinas would have used the term war for today’s police 
uses of force this does not mean that such a domestic war was subject to the same 
proportionality and discrimination calculations as war between political 
communities. The reason for this is that domestic violence carried out by individuals 
usually does not even come close to the magnitude or duration of war between 
political communities. While there may be instances of domestic war like sedition 
which may call for a more permissive interpretation of the amount of force that can 
be employed such cases are exceptional. More common, during the days of St Thomas, 
was the domestic employment of force through the imposition of the death penalty. 
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For Aquinas, the death penalty constituted an act of war carried out by a sovereign 
authority against a culpable wrongdoer. In fact, one particular reading of Aquinas 
which concentrates on a punitive reading argues that St Thomas imagined the death 
penalty as the domestic parallel to war between political communities (Murphy 2012, 
177). The death penalty, however, if executed after a trial that established the guilt of 
the wrongdoer was the most discriminate of employments of force as only the 
wrongdoer was targeted and there was no risk that innocent people would be harmed. 
In addition, in order for the death penalty to be deserved, the crime committed had to 
be very grave. Otherwise, a less severe punishment would have been obligatory. It goes 
without saying that a trial which determines the right punishment takes place without 
the heat of battle of wars between political communities. Aquinas thus accepted that 
in the latter type of war the use of force had to be less discriminate. In other words, 
while both forms of force, domestic and external, constituted acts of war, they would 
not necessarily be subject to the same rules of conduct. As a result, while from a 
Thomistic perspective the concept of jus ad vim is redundant the question of how 
small-scale uses of force, which have increased worrisomely since 9/11, should be 
governed still needs to be answered.  
 
Conclusion 
This short chapter has demonstrated that one of the first attempts to regulate the 
worrisome increase in small-scale force post-9/11, namely Walzer’s jus ad vim, is 
redundant not just from a revisionist point of view, but also as seen from a classical 
just war perspective. For Aquinas, the actions Walzer initially suggested as falling 
under jus ad vim such as the imposition of no fly zones, intercepting ships on the high 
seas, or the policy of targeted killing clearly would have been acts of war. The reason 
for this is that those are uses of force carried out by a sovereign authority. However, 
because such employments of force are small-scale and look very different compared 
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to a major ground war between states, instead of a new distinct moral framework, a 
re-assessment of the established jus ad bellum principles in light of new 
circumstances is needed. This thesis, in its substantive chapters on authority and 
liability seeks to provide this re-assessment for the policy of targeted killing. 
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3 Thomistic Casuistry and the “War of  
    Ethics”1 
As thinking about the morality of war has evolved over many centuries different 
approaches have been employed by a diverse group of scholars. Contemporary just 
war debate has mostly been split into two competing camps. On the one hand, one 
finds Walzer’s casuistical approach which has arguably been the most influential 
interpretation of just war in the second half of the twentieth century. On the other, 
one encounters the revisionist just war which has the explicit goal to reveal the flaws 
of the Walzerian theory and develop a better one. Walzer, in return, makes no secret 
about his disdain for the revisionist just war which prefers to rely on artificial thought 
experiments. Such ahistorical reasoning, Walzer criticises, cannot be reconciled with 
the way he and his predecessors have worked and that, in addition, has little practical 
relevance. As a result of their fundamental methodological disagreements, both 
camps hardly engage with each other’s substantive work and a narrow intra-
disciplinary divide has developed, the “war of ethics.” 
This chapter takes a closer look at the debate between Walzerians and 
revisionists and contrasts their methods with the historical approach to just war as 
suggested by its most prominent contemporary advocate, James Turner Johnson. On 
the one hand, while Walzerians, like the historical approach, reflect on historical cases 
engaging with the ideas of previous thinkers is only of marginal interest to them. On 
the other, most revisionists reject both of these core elements of the historical 
approach. Having these differences in mind, the following section presents the 
                                                             
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in Braun, Christian Nikolaus. 2018. “The Historical 
Approach and the ‘War of Ethics within the Ethics of War.’” Journal of International Political 
Theory 14 (3): 349-366. Further parts will be published in Braun, Christian Nikolaus, and Jai 
Galliott. 2019. “Jus ad Vim and the Question of How to Do Just War Theory.” In Force Short 
of War in Modern Conflict: Jus ad Vim, edited by Jai Galliott. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
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historical approach, which itself comes in different variations, as a third way of 
reasoning in-between Walzerians and revisionists capable of providing a distinct 
perspective. Then, through a discussion of the moral symmetry thesis, the arguably 
hottest topic in the “war of ethics,” it will be demonstrated that revisionists succeed in 
their critique which holds, against Walzerians, that the moral symmetry thesis is 
ethically indefensible. However, the historical approach also establishes that, in order 
to arrive at this judgement, it is not necessary to resort to analytical construction. 
Rather, the historical approach makes evident that the root of Walzer’s problematic 
argument lies in his limited interest in the just war tradition.  
The following section, then, introduces the method this thesis employs in the 
chapter that determines liability to targeted killing. Arguing that Johnson’s 
interpretation of the historical approach partly misses the transcendental element of 
Aquinas’s virtue ethics this section introduces a distinct reading of the historical 
approach which it calls Thomistic casuistry and which seeks to remedy this 
imperfection of Johnson’s just war. Consequently, this section paves the way for the 
second stage of this thesis’s moral argument with regard to targeted killing. While the 
first stage of this thesis’s substantive argument, the chapter on sovereign authority, 
relies on Johnson’s reading of the Thomistic just war and provides a conventional 
analysis rooted in close textual assessment and logic, its second stage, the chapter on 
liability as manifest in the criteria of just cause and right intention, relies on Thomistic 
casuistry. The reason for this two-stage argument is that, with regard to sovereign 
authority, textual analysis is the most effective way to contrast the Thomistic 
conceptualisation with the revisionist and Westphalian understandings and, 
following from that, make an assessment with regard to the authority to conduct 
targeted killings. In this regard, Johnson, as arguably pre-eminent historian of the 
just war, provides the most succinct history of sovereignty on which the authority 
chapter can build its argument.  
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As far as liability to targeted killing is concerned, however, due to the key role 
of the virtues in Aquinas’s ethics, this thesis parts with Johnson’s reading of St 
Thomas and introduces Thomistic casuistry which is also its original contribution to 
the methodological aspect of just war thinking. In addition, the chapter points out 
how Thomistic casuistry can avoid potential shortcomings of the traditional 
casuistical method. St Thomas’s account of the virtues, it will be argued next, can also 
be helpful with regard to the heated debate about thought experiments in 
contemporary normative political theory. The final section of this chapter provides a 
discussion and response to criticism brought against the historical approach generally 
and to potential criticism of Thomistic casuistry in particular. Concluding with an 
exploration of the concept of just war tradition the chapter argues that despite 
fundamental disagreements between various just war approaches, the tradition is 
broad enough to have a place for all of them. 
 
3.1 Walzer’s Just War 
Over the last four decades, Michael Walzer has arguably been the most influential 
advocate of just war thinking. Walzer’s seminal work, Just and Unjust Wars, first 
published in 1977, remains widely read today and its arguments have triggered 
considerable debate. In the following, Walzer’s understanding of just war will be 
appreciated as his method, in addition to his moral argument, caused a revisionist 
critique which aimed at revealing the logical flaws in his theory. In the preface of his 
book, Walzer emphasises that the way he sees the morality of war is unlike the way 
political or moral philosophers see it. For him, the condition of war is so dire that it 
seems irreconcilable with the enterprise of philosophical reflection. In consequence, 
Walzer “expresses ignorance about the foundations of ethics” (Boyle 1997, 85) as, in 
his own words, his “main concern is not with the making of the moral world but with 
its present character” (2015, xxii). In his opinion, it is the here and now that matters 
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and if he were to contribute to the debate about the foundations of ethics, he would 
probably get lost in that debate. As a result, he describes his book as one of a “practical 
morality” as he does not directly engage “the most profound questions of moral 
philosophy.”  
In addition, he argues that the correct method for practical morality is 
casuistical. Walzer seeks to consider historical cases in order to derive judgements 
and justifications from them, emphasising the value of the experiences men and 
women make during war (2015, xxii-xxiv). In particular, Walzer objects to the 
approach of international lawyers who, no matter the circumstances, uphold the 
“legalist paradigm,” built around the core principles of states’ rights to political 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Discounting the work of lawyers as “utopian 
quibbling,” Walzer (2015, xxiv-xxv) argues that “Legal treatises do not, however, 
provide a fully plausible or coherent account of our moral arguments, and the two 
most common approaches to the law reflected in the treatises are both in need of 
extra-legal supplement. (…) The lawyers have constructed a paper world, which fails 
at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us still live in.” According to 
Walzer (2015, 86), morality demands that the legalist paradigm cannot be sacrosanct 
and that there must be certain “rules of disregard.” It is his work as moralist to 
consider when the legalist paradigm should be abandoned. Arguing for exceptions to 
the legalist paradigm, Walzer’s practical morality does not associate itself with any 
one school of morality (Glennon 2013, 118). Rather, according to Glennon (2013, 120), 
Walzer suggests a “philosophical hopscotch” which integrates various approaches, 
including one of individual rights which gives rise to the rights of states, as well as 
utilitarianism.  
Having noted Walzer’s criticism of the legalist paradigm, however, he himself 
at times employs a legalist reading of the just war as he takes the legalist paradigm as 
his default position. As a result, he has an uneasy relationship with the classical just 
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war which precedes the legalist paradigm and is the historical source of the laws of 
war. In particular, arguably due to his background as democratic socialist political 
philosopher, Walzer seems to have little interest in engaging with the mainly Christian 
roots of the just war (Brown 2018, 205). As Walzer (2015, xxvi) puts it himself:  
My own work, then, looks back to that religious tradition within which Western 
politics and morality were first given shape, to the books of writers like Maimonides, 
Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suarez – and then to the books of writers like Hugo Grotius, who 
took over the tradition and began to work it into secular form. But I have not attempted 
a history of just war theory, and I quote the classical texts only occasionally, for the 
sake of some particularly illuminating or forceful argument. 
Importantly, these Christian beginnings emphasised that positive law, although 
doubtlessly important, was subject to the higher natural law (Biggar 2013a, 15). 
Although Walzer objects to lawyers’ literal treatment of the legalist paradigm and he 
considers positive international law as “radically incomplete” (2015, xxvi) critics 
charge that Walzer builds his account around the bedrocks of the legalist paradigm 
and the domestic analogy which subsequently “do the opposite of what his opening 
preface suggests” (Rengger 2005, 150). While Lazar’s (2017a, 38) view that Walzer’s 
“central commitment is to provide moral foundations for international law as it 
applies to armed conflict” is perhaps too narrow, nonetheless, in parts of Walzer’s 
reasoning, international law takes on the function of a “frame” (Johnson 2014, 5) 
through which he sees the moral world. At times, the frame of international law leads 
him to argue against some of the most important and arguably commonly accepted 
moral principles such as the requirement to discriminate between the guilty and the 
innocent as he does in his controversial argument for the moral equality of 
combatants. 
Unsurprisingly, Walzer’s just war theory has been critiqued as being under the 
threat of falling into the traps of conservatism and relativism. The trap of 
conservatism entails that Walzer removes the critical function of just war in that he 
starts his assessment of the morality of war from the vantage point of the current state 
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of the legality of war. At the same time, however, Walzer’s just war theory may be 
considered to be relativist in the sense that his moral argument follows the 
development of the legality of war and thus emphasises changes in international 
society over moral principles (O’Driscoll 2008a, 96-98). To sum up, while Walzer 
reasons from “historical illustrations” he does engage with the historical just war 
tradition in a limited way only. In contrast, he takes the legalist paradigm as his 
starting point and either defends or argues for exceptions to it.  
In addition, Walzer also seems to commit what Coates (2016, 28) has called 
the two principal forms of casuistry’s abuse, the problem of being either too deductive 
or too inductive. The problem of being too deductive, related to the general critique of 
Walzer’s casuistry discussed above, means that principles are articulated before 
turning to circumstances and the consideration of circumstances that follows makes 
no contribution to the principles as such. This “abuse” can be encountered in Walzer’s 
very embrace of the legalist paradigm, a set of principles and rules he takes as his 
baseline for moral analysis. As a result, at times, his “historical illustrations” seem to 
be illustrative only, merely serving the function of justifying the legalist paradigm’s 
conclusions. It seems that he had already arrived at those principles before he even 
considered the historical circumstances, one possible example being his argument for 
the moral equality of combatants which puts him at odds with both the classical and 
the revisionist positions.  
Traditional casuistry, however, as Coates (2016, 28-29) notes, is an 
“‘experiential’ method” in which the cases are more than mere embellishment; “(…) it 
is a way of articulating, testing and refining principles in light of a moral experience 
shaped by changing social and historical circumstances.” The exact opposite takes 
place when Walzer’s casuistry is too inductive. In this type of abuse circumstances are 
given excessive weight resulting in a willingness to sacrifice well-established moral 
principles (2016, 29). The prime example for this type of reasoning is his argument 
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for a “supreme emergency” (Walzer 2015, 250-267). Here, Walzer, due to the 
particular threat posed by Germany during parts of WW II, is willing to abandon one 
of the just war tradition’s core precepts, namely the idea of non-combatant immunity. 
The argument for supreme emergency, too, can be reconciled with neither the 
classical nor the revisionist just war. Finally, Walzer’s casuistry, in contrast to 
traditional casuistry, does not reason from a paradigm case. Historical casuists took a 
case whose solution had been commonly accepted as either correct or incorrect as 
their point of reference and compared it to novel cases that seemed morally dubious. 
Walzer, in contrast, takes the legalist paradigm which itself has been the product of 
reflection about historical circumstances as his starting point for moral analysis.  
 
3.2 Walzer’s Revisionist Critics 
Walzer’s interpretation of the just war has been challenged ever since he first put 
forward his argument in 1977. While four early critics (Beitz 1979; Doppelt 1978; 
Luban 1980; Wasserstrom 1978) caused “cracks” in his theory, during the last twenty 
years, according to Walzer’s most prominent revisionist critic today, Jeff McMahan 
(2012b), the cracks “have widened into gaping crevices.”  The revisionist account has 
been put forward by philosophers working within the analytical tradition who have 
meticulously scrutinised Walzer’s argument. In particular, they accuse the Walzerian 
just war of having “so far failed to articulate a rigorous, detailed, theoretically unified, 
and plausible account of the resort to war” (McMahan 2014, 242).   
Most revisionists would describe themselves as working on the ethics of war, 
rather than, as Walzer does, on just war theory. Their main concern is to write novel 
philosophy on war-related issues such as the ethics of harming, the duty to save, or 
political authority. Relying on Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium, they take 
Walzer’s just war idea as the ruling theory that must be checked for logical 
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incoherence with the goal of constructing a better theory. In Lazar’s (2017b, 114) 
words, analytical philosophers  
(…) develop moral arguments by taking our considered judgments about the 
permissibility of actions in particular cases and trying to identify the underlying 
principles that unify them. We then take those principles and test how they apply to 
other cases, real or hypothetical. If the principles generate conclusions that conflict 
with our considered judgments about those cases, then we must revise either the 
principles or our judgments. As our project evolves, and we revise our principles in 
light of our judgments and our judgments in light of our principles, we approach 
reflective equilibrium (the underlying standard of epistemic justification is 
coherentist).  
In order to arrive at the state of reflective equilibrium, most revisionists rely on 
thought experiments quite different from the “historical illustrations” Walzer employs 
in his type of casuistry. Frowe (2014, 4) describes the ostensible merits of “simple” 
and “fantastic” cases as follows: “They are simple so that we can more easily isolate 
the variables that influence our intuitions about whether a person may use force in a 
given case, and more easily compare and contrast the cases with each other. They are 
fantastic so that we can cover a wide range of situations and thus more thoroughly test 
our intuitions and principles.” This “theoretical bias against the historical or 
contingent” (Coates 2016, 9-10) is the direct result of their abstract methodology. As 
Frowe (2014, 4-5) clarifies, revisionists see the practicality of philosophy “not solely 
in its ability to churn out answers to particular real-life cases. (…) philosophy’s 
practicality can sometimes lie in its ability to clarify our ideas and our thinking before 
we get to the level of real life, and this is often best achieved by being one or two steps 
removed from real-life cases. Stripping away the detail can enable us to identify 
general principles that can be obscured by the intricacies of historical cases.” 
The primary target of revisionists is the prominent role Walzerians award to 
the state. Rejecting the domestic analogy, revisionists allocate moral responsibility for 
killing in war to individuals, not states. They hope to discredit Walzer’s just war theory 
which they describe as “a very state-based, collectivist approach to war” and argue for 
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a “reductive individualism” which is reductivist as a result of the assumption that the 
rules which regulate killing in war are the same as those regulating interpersonal 
killing outside of war (2014, 13). The central argument of reductivism is that there 
exists only one set of moral principles which applies all the time, rather than distinct 
principles for different moral domains such as war and peace. Put differently, while 
Walzer starts by thinking about war, revisionists start by thinking “about the ethics of 
killing outside of war, then apply those principles to the case of war” (Lazar 2018, 35). 
Revisionists are likewise individualists due to the claim that moral theory must 
concentrate on individuals rather than collectives such as, for example, nation states 
(Frowe 2014, 13). Having said that, it should be noted at this point that not all 
revisionists are reductivists. Noteworthy exceptions are, for example, Lazar (2010) 
and Renzo (2013) who are both revisionists and exceptionalists. Revisionists argue 
against central claims of Walzer’s theory including the logical separation between the 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the moral equality of combatants, and the immunity of 
non-combatants.  
 
3.3 Walzer’s Response to Revisionists 
In some respects, the differences between Walzer’s “traditional” just war and the 
revisionists are those between political philosophy and moral philosophy approaches 
(Lazar 2017a, 41). Walzer (2014, 104) is proud to acknowledge this as his “(…) subject 
has always been politics; I have tried to respond to the political issues of my time; I 
have joined the arguments that my fellow citizens were engaged in. And I mostly 
haven’t worried if my responses didn’t add up to a coherent theory.” For Walzer, 
today’s just war debate falls into two camps. First, his camp which considers just war 
theory to be about war and, second, the revisionist camp which considers just war 
theory to be about moral philosophy. Walzer sees little practical significance for what 
McMahan calls the “deep morality of war.” Due to mainly consequentialist reasons, as 
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McMahan (2006, 40) acknowledges himself, his deep morality might have to retreat 
behind the laws of war and the former might only take on the function of guiding the 
individual conscience. Following from this concession, Walzer as advocate of a 
practical morality delegates much of the revisionist just war theory to the academic 
ivory tower. Walzer feels uneasy about this type of academic discussion so different 
from the way he himself works. “Many of these theorists take the view that issues of 
this sort can be delineated most clearly and addressed most conclusively in contexts 
far removed from war and even in hypothetical and elaborately constructed cases that 
have no historical or practical reference at all. So they have no need to read, say, 
military history; the debate is focused elsewhere, and all that is necessary is to read 
the works of the other participants in the debate” (Walzer 2015, 336-337). The 
problem, in Walzer’s view, is that it is the philosophical purpose only that matters to 
these theorists and that it is the “cleverness of the design” (2015, 337) that counts 
rather than addressing moral questions soldiers face in war.  
In order to figure out the rules, they may start from the cases, playing with them, 
changing their details, even inventing possible and impossible variations that test our 
understanding of the rules as they are, or as they might be, or should be. But these 
theorists have no commitment to the actual cases until they know the applicable rules, 
and hypothetical cases will do just as well in figuring things out – perhaps better, since 
they impose no reality constraints on their designers. (2015, 337) (…) And I worry that 
theorists who focus on these kinds of cases aren’t thinking about war at all. They are 
not interested, or not sufficiently interested, in what actually happens on the 
battlefield and what it feels to be there. (2015, 344) 
Elsewhere (2006c, 43) Walzer was even more explicit about his rejection of 
revisionist’s analytical construction, referring to McMahan’s illustrations as “a little 
too fine for my head.”  
In consequence, Walzer’s passionate defence against revisionists mainly 
seems to rest on the claim that their thinking is of no practical use. As will be pointed 
out later, such an impractical understanding, Walzer is right to note, violates one of 
the two key precepts of just war thinking as it has been understood historically. 
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However, and ironically perhaps, despite Walzer’s strong objection to revisionist just 
war thinking, his own reasoning has a major similarity with his critics, namely the 
violation of the second pole of the historical tradition, its inherently historical nature. 
As noted above, Walzer himself acknowledges that his interest in the origins of just 
war argument is limited and adopts the legalist paradigm as his moral baseline.  
Given the fundamental disagreement between Walzerians and most 
revisionists about the usefulness of history for moral analysis it seems impossible to 
achieve a methodological reconciliation. As the analytical just war seeks to discover 
the moral truth it has no interest in dealing with real-world cases and resorts to 
abstract thought experiments instead. Attempts to make the methodological crevices 
between the camps less deep, although praiseworthy, will not lead very far. For 
example, Thaler (2016) who distinguishes between productive and unproductive 
hypotheticals has made such an attempt. The problem with such bridging accounts, 
however, is that both sides would have to compromise parts of their core assumptions. 
In order to arrive at productive hypotheticals revisionists would have to make their 
cases more like real-world cases while casuists would have to simplify their 
presentation of cases. The conclusion thus must be that both camps will have to agree 
to disagree about method. Having said that, however, despite various disagreements 
about method these should not be taken as reason not to participate in debate about 
substantive questions. 
 
3.4 The Historical Approach as “Third-Way” 
Walzer’s casuistical method shares one of the two pillars of the historical approach, 
namely the emphasis of historical circumstances and the lessons which can be drawn 
from these. It is this pillar of a “close linkage of decision-making and concrete action” 
(Reichberg 2018, 65) which most revisionists lose when they elaborate on unrealistic 
36 
 
thought experiments. Unsurprisingly, in contrast to revisionists, classical thinkers 
like St Thomas did not seek to develop detailed rules of appropriate conduct. 
Aquinas’s economy on rules, as Coates (2016, 10) notes, was not at all a sign of 
underdevelopment. Rather, it was the direct expression of an understanding of just 
war that stressed the contingent in decisions taking place in the heat of battle. That is 
why Aquinas developed a sophisticated virtue ethics account that enabled soldiers to 
habitually act in accordance with the virtues, making a highly developed set of specific 
rules unnecessary. As Reichberg (2018, 65) points out, 
(…) the reflection was inherently practical in the sense that it was meant to inform the 
conscience of individuals who, in one way or another, had contact with war. Hence, 
Aquinas situated his analysis of just war within a concrete treatment of the moral 
virtues, and his Dominican predecessor Raymond of Peñafort elaborated a just war 
casuistry (…) that was specially geared to the needs of the confessional. (…) Neither in 
Grotius nor in his predecessors do we find a purely deductive approach to the 
normative issues of war (with an imaginative modelling of cases replacing historical 
reflection), as has become prevalent today in philosophers of the analytical school.  
It does not surprise, then, that one of Aquinas’s three just war criteria, the 
criterion of right intention has arguably been neglected by revisionists. While one 
does not have to go as far as Coates (2016, 11) who considers right intention as St 
Thomas’s most important just war principle, the difference between the revisionist 
understanding and that of Aquinas is striking. Revisionists basically see the 
requirement of right intention as making sure that the end of the war is in line with 
just cause, implying that right intention is redundant as distinct principle (2016, 11). 
Unsurprisingly, Frowe (2016), in her revisionist treatment of jus ad vim, does not 
address the criterion of right intention at all. The classical just war of St Thomas, 
however, linked the belligerents’ moral dispositions to the idea of just cause. 
Consequently, Coates (2016, 11) argues that, first and foremost, justice in war is 
determined by the moral dispositions of the belligerents. “Virtues and vices, rather 
than rules and principles, are the real determinants of the moral outcome of war. They 
represent the moral capacities (or incapacities) of belligerents. They are the moral 
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habits or powers which make up the moral character of the individual and which 
incline or dispose the moral agent to act in certain ways. Neither just conduct nor 
unjust conduct can occur without such empowerment.”  
As Coates (2016, 12) notes, analytical or reflective moral approaches oppose 
moral dispositions on principle as the stress on the moral character of the agent 
clashes with the emphasis on reflective and rule-based moral reasoning. Simply put, 
for revisionists, only a mind without moral dispositions is capable of rational 
reasoning. The problem with analytical just war theory, for an advocate of the 
historical approach, is that war is no reflective activity. War as an unforeseeable 
endeavour is unsuitable for imposing meaning on it from outside through abstract 
reasoning (2016, 13-14). As Coates (2016, 14) quotes Aristotle: “Acts that are foreseen 
may be chosen by calculation and rule, but sudden actions must be in accordance with 
one’s state of character.” In line with St Thomas who stressed the functions of the 
intellect and the will, Coates (2016, 15) stresses that moral agency is both cognitive 
and volitional. Thus, even if a person knows the right action this does not necessarily 
mean that he or she acts accordingly. Consequently, the moral agent needs rightly-
ordered virtues so that she wills the right that her intellect has discovered. The 
analytical just war, due to its reliance on rules, neglects the function of the will. 
Revisionists assume that reason has a self-motivating power (2016, 15).  
While Walzerians share the historical just war’s concern for the contingent 
they do not fully appreciate the second pillar of the historical approach, namely its 
engagement with the ideas of previous thinkers. Most revisionists go much further 
than that by openly admitting that they see little value in engaging with the work of 
past thinkers generally and the work of religious thinkers in particular. Consequently, 
despite the differences between the “traditional” Walzerian and revisionist just war 
approach both have something in common that sets them apart from the historical 
approach. As O’Driscoll (2013, 49) points out, Walzer’s theory which has no 
prominent place for the history of just war has been carried on by revisionist just war 
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theorists who seek to avoid engaging the historical development of the tradition, 
pursuing a more analytical approach regarding its principles. While Walzer justifies 
his theory through real-world examples and shuns revisionists for their reliance on 
artificial thought experiments he, too, is subject to the charge of neglecting history 
through his marginal interest in the just war tradition. Put differently, his “practical 
morality” is built around an analytical understanding of the role of history which 
differs markedly from the historical approach which seeks to create continuity 
between past and present.  
The historical approach, as found in the work of thinkers like Joseph Boyle, 
John Kelsay, Cian O’Driscoll, Gregory Reichberg, Nicholas Rengger and, most 
prominently perhaps, James Turner Johnson, holds that “the best way to acquire a 
deep understanding of the ethical categories invoked in relation to war is to study their 
formation and usage over time. By revealing the historical range and content of these 
categories, this form of inquiry both attunes us to their particularities and equips us 
to adapt them to contemporary circumstances” (2013, 50). Here, thinkers do not 
consider the work of their predecessors to hold limited value only but fully engage 
with it. In Johnson’s (2007, 4) words, “To reflect morally on war is to enter the 
historical stream of moral reflection on war and seek to learn from it, not seek to 
escape it to some more abstract level.” Walzer, in contrast, seeks to “divorce just war 
past from just war present” (O’Driscoll 2013, 50).  
Importantly, this does not at all mean that inherited principles may not be 
challenged: “The point is that cultivating a sense of the past need not enslave us to it. 
Rather, the hope must be that it will bestow upon us a deeper, more variegated 
perspective on the challenges we face today” (Brunstetter and O’Driscoll 2018, 2). For 
example, St Thomas Aquinas, the key figure in the systematisation of classical just war 
thinking, came to his conclusions about whether any war could be just through 
dialectically linking his own position to the particular opinions of his predecessors. As 
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Reichberg (2018, 60) notes, thinkers like Aquinas started with historical thinking 
about the ethics of war before analysing particular issues for their own sake: “The 
classical theorists of just war understood that our reasoning about the rights and 
wrongs of war would only be as good as the premises that form our point of departure. 
On their view, theoretical reflection would be strengthened through the examination 
of positions articulated by earlier thinkers. Thereby set in motion was a comparative 
hermeneutic in which earlier positions were reviewed, not so much out of historical 
interest, but rather for the didactic purpose of grounding sound reasoning about 
issues of contemporary import.” For classical thinkers, as well as for today’s advocates 
of the historical approach to just war, this approach had several benefits: “it widened 
the range of available premises and thereby directed the theorist’s attention to issues 
that might otherwise go unnoticed, it facilitated self-reflection by bringing into greater 
relief the theorist’s own cherished assumptions, it showed how a single premise could 
be drawn towards very different and even opposing conclusions, and it explained the 
appeal of errors that were operative in contemporary practice, thereby enabling their 
persuasive refutation” (2018, 60). It is quite indicative, then, that, as Reichberg (2018, 
64) points out, classical just war thinkers did not consider themselves theorists. Even 
Grotius, the first thinker to actually do so, differed markedly from the attitude of 
today’s analytical thinkers: “Yet, unlike Descartes, who several years later would seek 
to construct a new science of ‘first philosophy’ from scratch, Grotius was at pains to 
demonstrate that his juridical science of war and peace was not a construct born of 
his own mind, but rather a discipline that emanated from a set of pregiven norms (jus 
naturae – natural right) that had already been acknowledged by a broad array of 
Greek, Roman, and Christian thinkers.”  
Seen from the perspective of the historical approach the problem with Walzer’s 
just war is not that he employs a “philosophical hopscotch” (Glennon 2013, 120). In 
fact, St Thomas who, in his influential summary of the just war consensus of his day, 
articulated a tradition “which had been shaped by philosophical, theological, and 
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political thinking on natural law, by military thought and practice, by legal traditions 
reaching back into Roman law, and by accumulated experience in the government of 
political communities” (Johnson 2013a, 25). Rather, the problem resides with his 
limited interest in the development of the just war tradition. Likewise, although 
revisionists come to conclusions similar to earlier advocates of the just war as, for 
example, in their insistence that there can be no moral symmetry, their thinking, 
nonetheless, is difficult to square with the historical just war. Claims (see, e.g., 
McMahan 2012b) that revisionists are recovering the older tradition are thus valid 
only to the extent that they reach the same or similar conclusions as the ancients.  
The historical approach to just war reasons differently. For example, 
Johnson’s approach which, not unlike Walzer’s, relies on a casuistical analysis of 
historical circumstances demonstrates that there is value in considering the work of 
previous thinkers. Johnson (1979, 98-99) describes the moralist’s task as one of 
“keeping faith,” “that the moral life of the individual in one of these religious traditions 
must be one in which ethical guidance comes from the effort to keep one’s reflections 
and decisions faithful to those of others who have gone before and whose examples 
are remembered by the believing community as normative ways of doing the will of 
God.” It must be noted that while Johnson is speaking for the Christian moralist here, 
for him, the task remains the same for moralists operating within secular moral 
communities. In fact, in the same article (1979, 109-114), Johnson explains how the 
just war tradition constitutes such a moral community. In his historical work, 
Johnson takes the medieval consensus on just war as his starting point and 
investigates how the unfolding of history required changes to the inherited tradition. 
Regarding his own just war argument, Johnson goes back to Aquinas’s summary and 
investigates what can be learned today from the wisdom of the medieval consensus. 
In his own words (2009, 246), his work “has been focused on the tradition that has 
developed and carried this idea historically and the implications to be drawn from this 
tradition of just war for present-day reflection and, maybe, practical decision-
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making.” “(…) my historical investigations are about moral traditions and their 
implications in particular historical situations, and my efforts at applied ethics 
proceed by extrapolating from how just war tradition was applied in such historical 
situations to how its meaning should be understood in present contexts” (2009, 247). 
As Kelsay (2009, 180) notes, for Johnson, thinking about ethics is “fundamentally 
historical” while his “type of practical reasoning,” at the same time, does not deny a 
place to moral principles and rules. While such reasoning at times may seem like an 
attempt at “commanding the headwaters of tradition” (O’Driscoll 2008b), Johnson 
fears that neglecting the history of just war argument leads to a moral loss.  
 
3.5 The Historical Approach as Trigger for Substantive  
       Debate 
One of the main points of disagreement between Walzerians and revisionists is about 
the question whether the concept of a moral equality of combatants is ethically 
defensible. Calling it “perhaps the strangest rule of war” (2015, 346), Walzer 
essentially argues that in war it does not make a difference whether or not the cause a 
soldier is fighting for is just. Following the laws of war, Walzer holds that during war 
just and unjust combatants are each other’s legal and moral equals. In his own (2015, 
36) words: “It is the sense that the enemy soldier, though his war may well be criminal, 
is nevertheless as blameless as oneself. Armed, he is an enemy; but he isn’t my enemy 
in any specific sense; the war itself isn’t a relation between persons but between 
political entities and their human instruments. These human instruments are not 
comrade-in-arms in the old style, members of the fellowship of warriors; they are 
“poor sods, just like me,” trapped in a war they didn’t make. I find in them my moral 
equals.” Once in a state of war, a state of exception during which a different morality 
applies, soldiers, as instruments of their collective, are mostly liberated from the 
moral responsibility to judge the justice of his or her collective’s war.  
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Revisionists are unwilling to let soldiers off the moral hook so quickly. They 
argue that soldiers fighting for the unjust side cannot be the moral equals of soldiers 
fighting for the just side based on the determination of just cause. Starting from the 
principle of individual self-defence, the only instance for which individuals may resort 
to lethal force, revisionists reason that the only legitimate just cause for war is self-
defence. In consequence, if a state goes to war without having been attacked, it lacks 
just cause and there are thus no legitimate targets for its soldiers. McMahan 
essentially argues that unjust combatants who kill just combatants commit a crime 
equivalent to murder in everyday life. It goes without saying that revisionists arrive at 
the rejection of the moral equality of combatants by employing their particular 
method.  
As will be pointed out shortly, the moral equality of combatants, although 
defended by Walzer, was alien to classical just war thinkers. The root of this 
divergence lies in Walzer’s interpretation of the just war. Due to his limited interest 
in engaging with the just war tradition he follows the legalist paradigm as his default 
position and incorrectly seems to equate legal and moral equality. Revisionists have 
uncovered this morally problematic simplification. Having said that, however, in 
order to detect the problematic nature of this argument it is not necessary to resort to 
the mostly ahistorical way of reasoning the analytical camp employs. Rather, as the 
next section demonstrates, a historically aware just war aligns with its revisionist 
critics on the issue of the moral equality of combatants. 
3.5.1 The Historical Approach and the Symmetry Thesis 
A historical reading of the just war essentially vindicates the revisionist position on 
moral symmetry but also shows that, in order to prove Walzer wrong, it is not 
necessary to resort to analytical construction. Before demonstrating how Walzer’s 
employment of the legalist paradigm vis-à-vis the moral equality thesis is problematic 
a few words must be said about the inherent connection between just war argument 
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and positive international law. Both are “historically conditioned realities” which, on 
their own, “provide particular perspectives for reflection, policy, and action relating 
to world order, but at the same time they interact with each other” (Johnson 2017, 
453). As far as the (legal) equality of combatants is concerned, there were important 
historical reasons for thinkers like Vitoria and Grotius to argue for what Johnson 
(1975, 20) has called a state of “simultaneous ostensible justice” in which, due to the 
difficulty of determining whose side’s cause was just, both sides’ belligerents should 
fight in strict observation of jus in bello restraints. These thinkers “renegotiated” the 
just war tradition in the direction of granting equal rights to combatants on both the 
just and unjust side. As Johnson (2017, 458) notes, “Grotius’s thinking on the 
consensual limits to conduct in war was, for practical purposes, the beginning of the 
idea of a law of armed conflicts as rooted in European cultural standards.” However, 
what these thinkers did not do is break with the conviction that objectively at least one 
side had to be in the wrong. Put differently, they paved the way towards legal equality 
while continuing to deny the notion of moral equality.  
Consequently, Walzer loses something by taking the legalist paradigm as his 
starting point. Upholding that paradigm without revisions in his argument for a moral 
equality of combatants, he seems to equate legality and morality. As Reichberg (2018, 
71-74) demonstrates, Walzer’s claim that the moral equality thesis is part of the 
classical just war is thus mistaken. There was, in fact, a group of classical thinkers, the 
so-called camp of “regular war,” which argued for a logical separation between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. However, these thinkers cannot be considered as advocates of 
the just war.  
What, then, should be made of Walzer’s seeming equation of legality and 
morality vis-à-vis the moral symmetry thesis? Given that Walzer set out to argue for 
a “practical morality” it seems that the relationship between legality and morality in 
his work is a result of his pragmatic account of just war. Rather than being a result of 
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his downplaying of previous thinking Walzer might be read as making this choice for 
a deliberate philosophical reason. In particular, it seems that Walzer, in his defence 
of the moral symmetry thesis, is stressing a key element of the just war tradition, 
namely the reminder that even one’s enemy never ceases to be a human being. This 
concern for the “poor sods” like, for example, German soldiers who were forced to 
serve in the Wehrmacht although they despised Hitler’s ideology, seems to undergird 
Walzer’s reasoning. Those soldiers were “trapped in a war they didn’t make” and the 
result of acting in accordance with their conscience would have been the death 
penalty. It is this sensibility to the moral conundrums of war which leads Walzer 
towards his embrace of the moral equality of combatants.  
Importantly, the classical just war was not at all dismissive of the reasoning 
which lets Walzer arrive at the moral symmetry thesis. For classical thinkers, granting 
equal rights to both the just and unjust side, on first look, amounted to a violation of 
natural right (ius naturale). However, Aquinas, centuries before Vitoria and Grotius, 
acknowledged that “the dictates of human positive law (lex humana) do not entirely 
overlap with those of natural law (lex naturale)” (Reichberg 2017, 240). As a result, 
St Thomas could imagine cases in which unjust combatants, while still contributing 
to an act of injustice, were morally blameless and should thus not be prosecuted. In 
other words, while there could never be a moral equality as advocated by Walzer, there 
might be, depending on the circumstances, reason to grant equal rights. “That said, 
the fact that Christian tradition maintains a basically moral, punitive justification of 
war and of killing does not preclude it logically from endorsing laws of war that accord 
equal legal rights to all combatants. The justification for this is at once practical and 
moral: namely to stop the conduct of war from spinning out of all moral control, and 
so to limit its evils. This does not imply the logical impossibility that the same 
belligerency can be both just and unjust at the same time” (Biggar 2013a, 196). 
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Furthermore, the manoeuvring between natural law and human positive law 
which gave rise to the legal equality of combatants is a testament to the historical 
connection between just war thinking and statecraft. In contrast to revisionists who 
concentrate on individual rights, a classical thinker like Aquinas was “far more 
interested in political duties and obligations of the individual in society than in the 
political rights and privileges to which the individual lays claim” (Crofts 1973, 166). 
The foremost goal of statecraft was the common good which meant that the sovereign, 
who had the responsibility of accomplishing that goal, had a very special role.  “Within 
this frame specialists in moral thinking, along with specialists working from other 
perspectives, may (and should) offer advice, but final judgment rests with the 
sovereign, because the responsibility for the good of the community rests on him (or 
her or, in rare cases, them)” (Johnson 2013b, 24). Unsurprisingly, given the objection 
of many revisionists (see, e.g., Fabre 2008; Steinhoff 2007) to the sovereign authority 
criterion, they lose the connection between just war and statecraft emphasised by 
classical just war thinkers. Walzer, in this regard, is closer to the classical 
understanding. He continues to argue for the criterion of “legitimate authority” 
although, of course, his conceptualisation of the criterion differs from the classical 
understanding.  
To sum up, for the classical just war there may be reasons to grant equal rights 
to combatants on both the just and unjust side, but they would not face each other as 
moral equals. Thus, the historical mode of just war sides with revisionists regarding 
the moral equality of combatants. On top of that, putting this agreement on a broader 
basis, the historical mode of just war can be read as giving support to the revisionist 
idea of a distinction between a “deep morality of war” and the laws of war. For 
example, McMahan (2006, 40) implies that the laws of war may have to be “action-
guiding” while the “deep morality” may have to be limited to functioning as “a guide 
to individual conscience.” There are thus curious parallels between the revisionists’ 
manoeuvring between the “deep morality of war” and the laws of war on the one hand 
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and classical thinkers’ distinction between lex naturale and lex humana on the other 
although both sides are very much at odds with each other in terms of methodology. 
 
3.6 Recapturing Traditional Casuistry for Just War  
        Debate 
The following section prepares the ground for the method this thesis employs in its 
chapter on liability to targeted killing. Importantly, traditional casuistry integrates 
both pillars of the historical approach and, by following a number of fixed steps, 
approximates the analytical rigour of revisionists. While both Walzer and Johnson 
argue casuistically in the sense that they reflect on historical cases it will become 
apparent that traditional casuistry is quite a different way of reasoning.  
The method of casuistry has a long history during which it both dominated 
moral discourse but also fell out of favour for considerable periods of time. It is no 
ethical theory in the sense of Kantianism or utilitarianism because it neither tries to 
advance a comprehensive account of ethics nor does it constitute an account of how 
ethical decisions are ultimately grounded (Strong 2000, 330). Rather, it is a method 
“grounded in the wisdom of the Jesuits in the Middle Ages, the clinical experiences of 
modern bioethicists, and the practical judgments of plain persons” (Tremblay 1999, 
492). Particularly since the 1960s, caused by developments in medical ethics, 
casuistry has had a revival of which Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars was one part. 
Jonsen and Toulmin (1988, 257) provide a definition of casuistry as “the analysis of 
moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based on paradigms and analogies, 
leading to the formulation of expert opinions about the existence and stringency of 
particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that are general but 
not universal or invariable, since they hold good with certainty only in the typical 
conditions of the agent and circumstances of action.”  
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Casuistry starts with the morphology of a case, “the interplay of circumstances 
and maxims.” The circumstances are the “who, what, when, where, why, how, and by 
what means” of a case. Circumstances, however, do not constitute a case’s core. That 
position falls to a case’s maxims, “brief rule-like sayings that give moral identity to the 
case.” Such maxims can be expressed in several ways as for example through ethical 
principles, rights, duties, or virtues (Strong 2000, 331). As Jonsen (1991, 298-99) 
explains, it is the work of the casuist to, besides identifying the maxims present, judge 
which maxim should govern the case and, eventually, whether the maxim needs to be 
adapted or replaced. For example, the discussion of the criterion of just cause will 
start with the maxim that self-defence is the only just cause. This is the maxim which 
seems to have ruled the arguably commonly accepted Yamamoto paradigm (see 
section 5.1). The discussion then moves on to less clear cases questioning whether the 
maxim still rules under different circumstances or whether it needs to be adapted. As 
this thesis revisits the Thomistic just war, the principles for the casuistical analysis 
will be taken from Aquinas’s account of Christian ethics. Granted, taking Christian 
moral principles as baseline of analysis will inevitably lead to the charge of moral 
particularism. However, it seems questionable that there can ever be morally 
“neutral” interpretations in the first place and, arguably, just war debate would benefit 
from a conversation between its different participants. For a thoughtful discussion of 
the relationship between religious and secular approaches see Biggar (2013b, 49-50). 
The next step is to line up cases in a certain order, the taxonomy of cases. The 
casuist starts the taxonomy with the so-called paradigm case. This case’s resolution is 
accepted as either morally appropriate or rejected as clearly wrong. “This would be a 
case in which the circumstances were clear, the relevant maxim unambiguous and the 
rebuttals weak, in the minds of almost any observer. The claim that this action is 
wrong (or right) is widely persuasive. There is little need to present arguments for the 
rightness (or wrongness)” (Jonsen 1991, 301). The use of a paradigm case shows that 
casuistry is not a deductive approach of the kind of applied ethics approaches such as 
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principlism (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 1994) which simply apply moral 
theories to cases. In contrast, the argument is developed through a comparison of the 
paradigm case with other, less clear, cases. In this sense, it is more of a “bottom up” 
inductive process which employs a settled paradigm case in order to make judgements 
regarding novel cases (Calkins 2014, 4).  
Having said that, however, the type of casuistry this thesis employs is not the 
“‘hard-core’ intuition-based ‘new casuistry’” which, as Arras (1994, 1002) argues, 
Jonsen and Toulmin initially advocated and that “has little, if any, use for either 
principles or higher level theory.” Rather, this thesis returns to traditional casuistry 
which seeks a balance between general moral principles and particular circumstances. 
In other words, the type of traditional casuistry this thesis employs “(…) acknowledges 
the importance of virtue and character, with special emphasis on practical wisdom 
and judgment. It melds these insights, though, with a recognition of the importance 
of cases and context in moral thinking, in a process that offers better concrete 
guidance to those who must ‘practice philosophy’” (Tremblay 1999, 492). In this sense 
casuistry “is synonymous with practical reasoning” (Jonsen 2005, 53) and thus 
conforms to the inherently practical nature of the historical just war idea. Jonsen, in 
his definition of practical reasoning, hints at the tension between general principles 
and circumstances any casuist must grapple with: “Practical reasoning is a phrase 
used in Western moral philosophy to designate the intellectual process whereby an 
agent deliberates and decides about a particular course of action. Since moral decision 
and action is formulated in the light of some sort of general principles, applicable to 
all similarly situated agents, particular agents must determine how those general 
principles apply to the specific situation in which they will act.” For example, the early 
Church, where Jonsen situates the beginnings of casuistry, had to distinguish between 
“counsels of perfection,” encountered in the word of Jesus, and “moral imperatives” 
listed in the Decalogue. In fact, the Christian just war tradition is the very result of 
such a casuistry. For example, St Augustine’s reflections on just war were aimed at 
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reconciling Jesus’s teaching on nonviolence with the Decalogue’s demand of love of 
neighbour. While there is no room here to provide a detailed history of casuistry it 
must be noted that the canonists and theologians of the medieval period, including St 
Thomas, relied on multiple sources regarding the general principles that had to be 
reflected upon in the light of current circumstances: the Bible, the Church Fathers, 
decrees of Church councils, and the theory of natural law (2005, 56).  
A contemporary illustration of a “renegotiation” of inherited moral teaching in 
the light of novel circumstances can be found in the Catholic debate about the 
question whether divorced believers who remarry should be allowed to receive Holy 
Communion. Pope Francis has arguably broken with prior Church teaching which 
held that marrying a second time after having been divorced constitutes the grave sin 
of adultery which makes the respective person unworthy of receiving the Eucharist. If 
certain conditions have been met, the pope has been interpreted to argue that 
remarried believers should not be denied Holy Communion. This decision, 
controversial within the Church, asks for a close investigation of the circumstances of 
each remarried person. At the end of such a casuistical analysis it may be concluded 
that the principle of the inviolability of marriage should not stand against reception 
of the Eucharist. For traditional casuistry, balancing general moral principles and the 
demands of particular circumstances is fundamental and requires “intellectual 
ingenuity,” which constitutes “the heart of any casuistry” (2005, 58). That is why St 
Thomas Aquinas, arguably one of the intellectual fathers of the later method of 
casuistry (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, 123), distinguished between natural law and 
human positive law, a distinction which, as was noted above, resulted in the argument 
for a state of “simultaneous ostensible justice.” 
Next in the taxonomy belong cases that are not as clear as the paradigm case 
and allow for second thoughts about the rightness or wrongness of the action taken. 
In each case under consideration, the casuist raises the question whether the changes 
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in circumstances require an adaptation or even replacement of the maxims identified 
initially. It goes without saying, then, that the cases under consideration must be 
portrayed in sufficient detail. Particularly instances of the use of lethal force and the 
decision-making leading up to them are often complex. Simplifying the portrait of 
cases has a negative impact on their purchase in moral evaluation. Having completed 
the taxonomy, the casuist, then, can reach the verdict. Approaching the conclusion, 
casuistry pays attention to the “kinetics” of a case. The casuist tries to identify the 
“moral movement” the case imparts on other cases (Jonsen 1991, 303). In order to 
detect this movement, it is crucial to consider the interplay between maxims and 
circumstances as the relevance of a maxim depends on the circumstances of the case.  
Referring back to Jonsen and Toulmin’s definition of casuistry, the recent 
increase in the use of small-scale force seems to resemble a “moral issue.” As, seen 
from today’s perspective, the use of force short of war seems to lie somewhere between 
police and military work it seems morally dubious. What is needed, therefore, is a 
casuistical analysis that considers the general moral principles of just war vis-à-vis the 
novel circumstances of an increased use of force short of war; a “renegotiation” of jus 
ad bellum. Casuistical analysis leads the way in three particular instances of moral 
dilemmas, all of which are relevant to small-scale force: “occasions when rules are 
unclear, when conflicting rules pull us in opposite directions, or when we must 
ascertain degrees of moral culpability” (Miller 1996, 4). With regard to the first 
instance, “casuists ask how a general, commonly acknowledged rule is to be 
interpreted and applied within a particular set of circumstances” (1996, 18). For the 
policy of targeted killing, questions that need to be answered include who is liable to 
this sort of lethal action and how, if justified, this action should be carried out. With 
regard to the second instance, “we are concerned not with interpretative ambiguity, 
but with the need to settle a conflict between rules that are quite clearly understood. 
The casuist’s task, then, is not to specify a duty, but to order or rank competing 
obligations” (1996, 25). One practical consequence for the regulation of targeted 
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killings that arises from this aspect is the question of whether to allow for a limited 
use of retributive action which the legalist paradigm forbids and analytical just war 
thinkers reject. With regard to the third instance, “casuists also seek to determine 
conditions in which individuals are to be held morally accountable for their 
behaviour.” In short, casuists “seek to assign blame and merit” (1996, 32). For the 
assessment of the practice of targeted killing this means that, with regard to 
determining liability, there will have to be a distinction between the moral culpability 
of, let’s say, Osama bin Laden as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and, further 
down the chain of authority, Al Qaeda members without a direct involvement in 
terrorist plots. Likewise, regarding the decision-making process of the Obama 
administration, there will have to be a distinction between different degrees of 
command responsibility.  
 
3.7 The Argument for Thomistic Casuistry 
As this thesis’s casuistical analysis derives its moral principles from Thomistic ethics 
it is situated within the Christian just war generally and Catholic Social Thought 
specifically. Having said that, this thesis accepts that there might be other Thomistic 
interpretations of uses of small-scale force. For example, the conclusion of this thesis 
that a morally justifiable regulation of targeted killings should allow for some limited 
retributive force will probably be rejected by parts of the Catholic Church, an 
institution that takes pride in revering St Thomas as one of the Doctors of the Church. 
Given the method of casuistry this thesis adopts with regard to liability, with its stress 
on circumstances, the issue of more than one possible reading of Aquinas may be 
addressed in the words of McKenna (1960, 648): “General rules of conduct can be 
established readily enough. Circumstances, however, alter cases, in the sense that 
varying concrete facts bring into convergence varying combinations of principle. In 
judging cases, then, moralists often disagree sharply on the weights they assign to the 
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relevant facts. Where this is true, it is more accurate to speak of a Catholic view than 
the Catholic view.” In fact, judged from the Catholic point of view, the issues of war 
and capital punishment are not doctrinal issues for which the Church speaks with a 
single voice. The then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (2004) in his position as prefect for 
the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith illustrated this point as follows: 
Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For 
example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of 
capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would not for that reason be 
considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the 
Church exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and 
mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up 
arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be 
legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying 
the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia. 
3.7.1 Johnson’s Secular Historical Approach 
Beyond the particular conversation in Catholic Social Teaching about the morality of 
war there is also more than one way of following the historical approach. Having 
presented that approach mostly through Johnson’s particular interpretation, that 
take, too, is only one possible reading. This thesis both relies on and parts with 
Johnson’s just war. The reason for this is that Johnson’s reading of Aquinas is a mostly 
secular one which does not fully appreciate the theological aspect of Aquinas’s virtue 
ethic. As Johnson (1984, 6-7) puts it himself: “(…) while certainly debate on morality 
and war may go on within Christian theological ethics or the ethics of any other 
religion, debate in the public sphere should be in terms of the values of the larger 
society.” Consequently, Johnson seems to underestimate the teleological nature of St 
Thomas’s account of the virtues as inherent in the theological virtue of charity. Some 
of his critics (see, e.g., McCarthy 2011, 276) go even further than that, criticising 
Johnson for “his lack of virtue ethics.”  
Although the latter critique seems too harsh there can be no doubt that 
Johnson emphasises the cardinal virtues over the theological ones. While Johnson is 
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correct that for St Thomas the cardinal virtue of justice was the primary concern of 
just war he seems to lose that virtue’s connection to the highest virtue of charity. More 
specifically, in Johnson’s thinking, McCarthy (2011, 277) detects an “absolutist view 
of justice, specifying justice in just lethal force, and, in the process, eliminating any 
moral reservations about the use of lethal force itself.” However, while Johnson is 
correct that for St Thomas justice was the main concern for waging war, human action, 
for Aquinas, is always subject to the exigencies of the theological virtue of charity, too 
(see section 3.7.2). Johnson, in contrast, seems to consider the virtue of charity only 
as proof for his argument that the Christian just war does not start from a 
“presumption against harm:”  
Clearly, Ambrose and Augustine began with the duty of love to protect the innocent, 
not with a presumption against doing harm, even to an enemy. They reasoned that the 
duty to protect the innocent permitted use of force against the wrongful attacker up to 
the level needed to prevent the attack from succeeding, though it must not exceed this 
level, since the evildoer is himself considered to be someone for whom Christ died. 
Thus the consideration of restraint in the use of force arises only after the duty to use 
force is recognized, and restraint follows not from a presumption against harm but 
from the same duty of love directed toward the evildoer. (1996, 28) 
By starting from Aquinas’s summary of the medieval consensus about the 
morality of war Johnson employs an understanding which, although it marked the 
confluence of several secular sources like, for example, Roman law and the code of 
chivalry, also had a significant transcendental element to it. As a result, because 
Johnson seeks to provide a secular argument, his reading has at times an uneasy 
relationship with the transcendental aspect of Aquinas’s thinking. For example, his 
(e.g., 2014) argument on authority emphasises that the classical Thomistic 
understanding perceived of the sovereign as having been instituted by God, an 
understanding abandoned after Westphalia when the sovereign was imagined as the 
representative of the people. In consequence, when Johnson asks what contemporary 
debate can learn from the medieval consensus he seems to at least implicitly accept 
the transcendental aspect of statecraft as advocated by Christian thinkers which is 
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why this thesis can employ Johnson as jumping-off point for the first stage of its moral 
argument vis-à-vis sovereign authority. At the same time, however, while Johnson 
(2014, 13-14) emphasises that, for St Thomas, the sovereign as minister of God had to 
acquire the necessary virtues his subsequent discussion concentrates on the cardinal 
virtue of justice and seems to de-emphasise the theological virtues. Likewise, his 
argument about just cause and right intention almost exclusively concentrates on the 
cardinal virtues.  
This thesis seeks to remedy this imperfection of Johnson’s historical approach 
by introducing Thomistic casuistry which is built around a comprehensive account of 
Aquinas’s virtue ethics. Reflecting on the use of small-scale force by employing 
Aquinas in all of his complexity necessarily requires a thorough engagement with the 
theological virtue of charity. As far as St Thomas’s just war is concerned, connected to 
the aspect of a sovereign’s character formation, virtue ethics seems most relevant with 
regard to the determinations of just cause and right intention. That is why, as 
indicated above, this thesis proceeds in two stages. Firstly, it provides a textual 
analysis of the Thomistic conceptualisation of sovereign authority in conversation 
with both the revisionist and the Westphalian understanding. Following Johnson’s 
account of the Thomistic understanding of sovereignty this thesis’s third chapter 
demonstrates that revisionists’ scepticism toward or even rejection of the authority 
criterion is unwise and ill-founded. At the same time, the chapter argues that the 
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty is too restrictive as far as the morally 
justifiable use of small-scale force is concerned. Secondly, deviating from Johnson’s 
interpretation, this thesis employs Thomistic casuistry.  
3.7.2 Bolstering Casuistry with Thomistic Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is the name that has been given to the modern revival of Aristotelian 
ethics, an ethics St Thomas incorporated into his Christian account. “Virtue ethics is 
a branch of normative ethics that holds the virtues or characteristic habits of 
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excellence of the soul as its highest value. As a normative approach, virtue ethics 
advances habits that both identify the person as a moral agent and motivate the 
individual to become a better human being. In this sense, virtue ethics is unusual in 
emphasising the character of the decision-maker rather than the rules or theories of 
moral decision-making” (Calkins 2014, 73). 
As touched upon above, virtue ethics is teleological. In other words, it insists 
that there is a purpose to human life. This purpose, for Aristotle, is to live according 
to reason which leads to happiness defined as human flourishing. St Thomas, adding 
the Christian aspect, holds that the human telos is happiness defined as unity with 
God. In order to achieve this telos, the individual requires the habitual practice of 
moral and intellectual excellences or virtues. Two types of virtues can be 
distinguished, moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Moral virtues constitute an 
excellence of character while intellectual virtues lead to a preference for truth over 
falsehood. Working in unison, both types of virtue form reason, the key for achieving 
happiness. In other words, character and perception mutually shape one another 
(McCarthy 2011, 277). This has direct relevance for casuistry as, as Calkins (2014, 73) 
notes, the use of virtue ethics leads the casuist toward a conscientious consideration 
of circumstances. Moreover, virtue ethics can help resolve recent debate about the 
appropriateness of artificial thought experiments cherished by analytical 
philosophers which will be considered below. As McCarthy (2011, 296) writes:  
It is apparent that the criteria and rules of just war theory neither interpret nor apply 
themselves. In general, rules need virtues since they alone lack the ability for good 
moral judgment and for sustaining moral activity. Our character shapes how we see 
and describe situations, which then determine judgments and decision. Thus, the 
judgments of what is morally relevant, such as in just cause, and what each criterion 
consists of, such as sovereign authority, are both shaped by our character. 
As a result, it seems that the method of casuistry can be strengthened by the 
use of virtue ethics. As noted above, carrying out “good” casuistry, to a large extent, 
depends on how the method is employed by the particular casuist. Casuistry, it seems, 
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it always subject to the abuses Coates points to. In order to avoid those shortcomings, 
the use of virtue ethics, arguably, provides the solution. Simply put, if it can be 
ensured that the casuist acts in accordance with the virtues, she will do “good” 
casuistry. As Keenan and Shannon (1995, 227) propose, virtue ethics may function as 
“framework for the morally responsible exercise of right reasoning through the case 
method.” What this thesis attempts, thus, is, to borrow Calkin’s phrase, a “virtue-
imbued” type of casuistry: “The two approaches can combine in such a way that the 
individual is perfected by means of the practical examples provided by cases. Here, 
the end(s) of virtue (the telos) is furthered by means of comparisons to previous 
incidents where judgments were more or less correct. More important to the overall 
thrust of ethics, the person making the judgment is helped in this way along the road 
to personal perfection” (Calkins 2014, 161). 
Having laid out the basics of virtue ethics, St Thomas’s particular 
conceptualisation and how it relates to the morality of war will be considered in the 
following. This section will be kept brief because the details of Aquinas’s virtues ethics 
and how it relates to small-scale force will be discussed in the chapter on liability to 
targeted killing. As Gorman (2010b) points out, Aquinas’s three just war criteria of 
sovereign authority, just cause and right intention constitute the basics of his just war 
thinking but, in order to fully comprehend the Thomistic just war, one must consider 
his account of the theological and cardinal virtues as well. Put differently, the virtues 
constitute the key to St Thomas’s moral philosophy.  
Like any human action, the use of force, too, must be duly ordered by the 
virtues in order to be good (2010b, 17). In other words, human beings can reach their 
telos only if they freely choose to lead a life that is in accordance with the virtues 
(2010b, 24). For St Thomas, “genuine moral action can only proceed from a 
harmoniously ordered soul in which reason, will, and desire are united in pursuit of 
the good” (2010b, 39). If this is the case, one’s desires and actions will automatically 
advance the common good. Following from that, in cases where war is the result of 
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the “rightly-ordered desire to do good” it must be considered virtuous (2010b, 40). 
That, in fact, is why his treatment of the just war is placed in the Secunda-secundae of 
the Summa Theologiae, the section known as the “treatise on the virtues.” This section 
of the Summa investigates the theological (faith, hope, charity) and cardinal virtues 
(prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) all of which are necessary to achieve the 
telos of one’s life. The most basic distinction between the cardinal and theological 
virtues is that the former category provides the necessary foundation for earthly 
human action while the latter orients man to his supernatural end of beatitude.  
Happiness, for Aquinas, is two-fold. The cardinal virtues constitute the part that is 
accessible to human beings according to natural principles while supernatural 
happiness or beatitude can be obtained only with God’s assistance. In consequence, 
the theological virtues “transcend” the cardinal virtues because they lead human 
beings to their final end which is union with God. In Aquinas’s account, both types of 
virtues are not at odds with each other. Rather, the theological virtues perfect the 
cardinal virtues.  
Aquinas by no means diminishes the importance of the natural virtues for leading a 
decent, well-ordered, and happy life, but he does suggest that even the most virtuous 
person cannot, by his or her own power, obtain supernatural happiness. (…) Any 
conception of morality which does not recognize God as both the origin and end of all 
human acts is necessarily incomplete. Modern attempts to secularize just war theory 
by basing it strictly on humanitarian principles or values that have no reference to God 
are, from a Thomistic perspective, misguided attempts to comprehend human 
morality, since they lack the necessary lodestar for making moral judgments. (2010b, 
61) 
3.7.3 Virtue Ethics and Thought Experiments 
Debate about the usefulness of thought experiments dates back further than the 
recent disagreement between Walzer and his critics. For example, Shue (1978) put 
forward a general scepticism towards the use of artificial cases in ethical reasoning. 
Although this thesis shares most of Shue’s concerns, it does not deny the usefulness 
of this method per se. Thaler’s (2016) distinction between productive and 
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unproductive hypotheticals seems to be a helpful one in this regard. After all, critics 
of this thesis might argue that Hersh’s (2016) “unofficial” account of the bin Laden 
raid (see 5.5.2), which this thesis uses for moral reflection, constitutes a thought 
experiment, too. Nevertheless, even if the raid did not happen as Hersh claims, the 
scenario appears to be sufficiently realistic to consider it a productive thought 
experiment. That is why this thesis can employ it in its casuistical analysis as if it in 
fact had taken place without having to take a stand in the debate about its accuracy.  
However, when ethical debate resorts to unreal thought experiments such as 
the following on “justified self-defensive rape” taken from Steinhoff (2013, 149) it 
seems reasonable to argue that these cannot advance moral argument. 
Innocent Jenny, naked in her bedroom, is attacked by Serial Killer, who has broken in. 
He too is naked. Jenny, who is a doctor, is currently treating her vaginal infection with 
a potent new ointment, which has the side-effect of killing any man who whose penis 
is exposed to it long and severely enough, something best achieved by sexual 
intercourse. While the killer is trying to strangle her, they are wrestling on the ground, 
she gets on top of him, and he gets his hands on her throat and squeezes. In her 
desperation, she shoves the aggressor’s penis – while the aggressor explicitly says “No” 
– into her vagina and starts to move up and down while the man still strangles her. 
But suddenly the ointment works, the man goes into shock and dies. Jenny is safe.  
Unproductive thought experiments have already featured in the debate about jus ad 
vim. When Frowe (2016) criticises the concept for being redundant based on thought 
experiments that are highly unlikely to occur in the real world, there seems to be little 
appreciation of the moral dilemmas decision-makers face in war. In addition, Frowe’s 
way of reasoning employs the just war as a “moral slide-rule” in order to gain a water-
proof reading of the justice of and in war. However, as Thaler (2014, 531) points out, 
despite the need for rules and principles whose observance can be checked, far-
fetched analytical construction lacks practical relevance. Consider the thought 
experiment Frowe (2016, 121) employs in her article: 
Grenade: 
Bully wants to painfully pinch Victim’s arm. Victim can dissuade him from doing so 
by throwing a small object at Bully that will slightly wind him. However, the only small 
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object Victim has is a grenade. When the grenade deflects off Bully, it will detonate 
next to innocent Friend, killing her. 
Provoke: 
Bully wants to painfully pinch Victim’s arm. Victim knows that if he resists, Bully will 
become so enraged that he will kill innocent Friend. 
Frowe’s example seems so distant from the reality of war that it cannot offer practical 
guidance for decision-makers who have to decide about, let’s say, whether or not the 
bin Laden raid should be carried out. Therefore, this thesis investigates cases that 
actually took place or, as in the unofficial account of the bin Laden raid, are very 
realistic, despite the oftentimes messy circumstances that surround them. 
Unproductive thought experiments run counter to this purpose and have no place in 
this thesis. As Thaler (2014, 531) succinctly summarises: “An excessive stress on 
analytical construction, as it is prevalent in some circles of moral philosophy, distracts 
us from the task of appraising the various factors that need to be accounted for if Just 
War theory is to play a role in critically evaluating warfare. Neglecting this task is a 
mistake.” 
It should be emphasised that traditional casuistry by no means rules out the 
use of thought experiments per se. In fact, thought experiments have been used by 
casuists for many centuries. For example, the penitentials of the Middle Ages, one of 
the cornerstones of the development of casuistry, at times, relied on fictitious cases to 
lead the deliberation process of the confessor (Jonsen 2005, 56). Even more 
importantly for this thesis, St Thomas (ST, II-II, q. 96, a. 6) himself employed thought 
experiments in his reasoning: 
If a case arises wherein the observance of a law would be hurtful to the general welfare, 
it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an 
established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed. This is good for public 
welfare as a general rule, but if it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of 
certain citizens who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss if the gates were 
not opened to them. And so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the 
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letter of the law, in order to maintain the common good, which the lawgiver had in 
view. 
Given the tension between productive and unproductive thought experiments 
the question arises how to determine when a particular thought experiment does not 
advance moral debate. Interestingly, the key to this determination can be found in the 
employment of virtue ethics, in particular in the virtue of prudence. The classical 
understanding of prudentia entails much more than the idea of mere caution 
associated with prudence in much of today’s reasoning. For Aquinas (ST, II-II, q. 47, 
a. 2), prudence was “right reason applied to action.” Prudence perfects the rational 
capacity to choose actions that will lead to genuine flourishing, it combines the 
intellectual perception of speculative principles with the practical knowledge of 
particular circumstances (Gorman 2010b, 70).  
Thus, in cases where the use of thought experiments seems doubtful, if no 
practical knowledge can be derived from them, the prudent casuist will abandon 
them. It is to be expected that advocates of unproductive thought experiments will 
object by making an argument along the lines that virtue ethics generally is subjective 
and thus liable to abuse. Admittedly, a healthy scepticism toward virtue ethics and its 
internal character is understandable. The suggestion of a prudential determination 
about the usefulness of thought experiments should thus be understood as a call for a 
middle ground between Walzer’s seemingly outright rejection of such ways of 
reasoning and the use of entirely unrealistic thought experiments. 
 
3.8 Addressing the Downsides of the Historical  
       Approach 
It seems fair to say that historical approaches have somewhat fallen out of favour in 
contemporary moral debate (O’Driscoll 2013, 47). O’Driscoll (2013, 53) provides a 
fairly comprehensive list of criticisms against the historical approach: 
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The historical approach is vulnerable to four primary lines of critique. The first is the 
notion that a reliance on history is indicative of a conservative approach, one that is 
unduly impressed by established authorities and familiar ideas. The second is the 
related concern that deference to the historical record will perpetuate or at least 
encourage, rather than treat or transcend, humanity’s propensity to regard military 
force as a solution to practical problems. The third is the refrain that the study of the 
remote past is an ivory tower pursuit that has little connection to the real world. The 
fourth critique relates not to the integrity of the approach per se, but to certain 
tendencies evident in the manner by which its proponents have applied it. 
With the first line of criticism, O’Driscoll has in mind the traditional moralist’s 
problematic resort to “the wisdom of a preselected canon of great texts” (2013, 53). 
An overreliance on one particular author or a particular train of thought might come 
with the taste of “subservience to the experience of the past” (2013, 53) as the 
authority of these authors might merely be the result of their work having been 
influential over the centuries. As if O’Driscoll were specifically pointing to a Thomistic 
reading of the just war he writes: “For instance, why hark all the way back to Thomas 
Aquinas, or some other such long-dead figure, we might ask, when looking for an 
answer to a contemporary problem, such as how to think about the ethics of drone 
warfare?” (2013, 54). Such argument, critics will object, does not constitute progress. 
Rather, it only reproduces the thought of past thinkers (2013, 54). In an earlier draft 
of his article, O’Driscoll (2011, 17) referred to Reichberg’s (2004) article titled 
“Preemptive War: What Would Aquinas Say?”, written in response to the controversy 
about the 2003 Iraq war, whose title, although not necessarily its content, suggests 
that the essay does merely look at pre-emptive war through the eyes of one prestigious 
past thinker.  
The second line of critique is closely connected to the first. Through her 
reliance on past thinkers, the traditional moralist is unable to overcome the use of 
force as a legitimate tool of statecraft. “The operative idea appears to be that, rather 
than taking our problems on their own terms and thinking through them for 
ourselves, we should adopt a more deferential approach, and yield to the instruction 
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of our illustrious predecessors. The problem here, of course, is that these illustrious 
predecessors are the same tragic figures that Immanuel Kant denigrated as ‘sorry 
comforters’ who enabled rather than restrained the brutality of war” (2013, 55). An 
example for this line of critique might be taken from Johnson’s (see, e.g., 1996, 30-
33) work. As he takes the medieval consensus of just war as his moral baseline, he has 
criticised the US Catholic Bishops for their attitude towards the use of force which 
Johnson identifies as “presumption against war.” Johnson argues that the classical 
just war started from a “presumption against injustice” instead and was thus more 
permissive vis-à-vis the use of force. The intellectual father of the bishops’ pastoral 
letter, J. Bryan Hehir (2000, 32-33) agrees with Johnson that the bishops deviate 
from classical just war teaching. However, he considers this a welcome development 
indicative of human progress toward the use of force. Analytical philosophers, due to 
their scepticism regarding the use of history, do not face this problem (O’Driscoll 
2013, 56). 
The third line of criticism holds that focusing on the argument of particular 
past thinkers prevents the moralist from giving contemporary moral issues their due 
attention. “For example, if one is busy researching the intricacies of Grotius’s Rights 
of War and Peace, one is precluded from doing other, presumably more useful things, 
such as contributing to debates about how to respond to the tumult of the Arab Spring 
and North Korean saber-rattling. Constantin Fasolt puts it beautifully when he writes 
that history ‘teaches human beings in a school whose doors are shut. (…) Outside the 
world is surging. Inside, history demands attention’” (2013, 56). The example 
O’Driscoll provides for this shortcoming is a debate between Elshtain and critics of 
her book Just War Against Terror which, according to O’Driscoll (2013, 57), 
“ultimately came to resemble a narrow examination of the finer points of Book 19 of 
Augustine’s City of God.” Such a “narrowly historical approach,” for O’Driscoll, is 
indicative of the approach’s “tendency toward scholastic navel-gazing.” 
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The final line of critique O’Driscoll lists is the tendency that the historical 
approach tends to portray the history of just war reasoning as “a single developmental 
narrative” which is presented as the one and only narrative (2013, 57). In essence, this 
narrative amounts to Johnson’s influential history of just war. In addition, this 
narrative is then presented as the sole point of entry for those trying to ethically assess 
the conundrums of war (2013, 58). “These scholars, captured by their own myths, and 
forgetful of the act of abridgement that they have effected, have then gone on to seal 
off the tradition they have just created by arguing where its boundaries properly lie 
and what historical thinkers fall within and beyond them. The result is the 
claustrophobic narrative just described” (2013, 58). The result of this phenomenon is 
that the historical approach to just war is conservative in nature. The field only 
“repeats and reproduces itself at the expense of fresh thinking” (2013, 58), a critique 
the revisionist just war camp will readily accept. 
In response, O’Driscoll (2013, 59-61) provides a “qualified defense of the 
historical approach” which can be supplemented by some aspects specific to the 
Thomistic just war. Starting with the first line of critique, O’Driscoll (2013, 59) notes 
that the historical approach does not necessarily have to be conservative. Referring to 
historian Richard Evans, O’Driscoll notes that history does not have to function as a 
refuge from contemporary conundrums. Quite the contrary, “the main purpose of the 
modern historian is not to seek familiarity in the strange, but to uncover the strange 
in the familiar.” Furthermore, as O’Driscoll (2013, 60) goes on to argue, the historical 
approach does not always defend established authority. Rather, history can also be 
used to challenge established authority by questioning some of its precepts which may 
today be considered as fixed, but had not at all been fixed in the past. The historical 
approach, quite the contrary to being conservative, can actually “be invoked in the 
service of rupture and revolution,” considering issues “with fresh eyes.” This thesis is 
built around this defence. It concludes that the contemporary state of just war 
thinking with its limitation of just cause to defensive uses of force is too restrictive 
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when it comes to the issue of the just employment of small-scale force. Seen from a 
Thomistic angle, sovereign authorities, under certain circumstances and in a duly 
restrained manner, may morally resort to retributive uses of force, too. The use of 
history is thus anything but conservative here. Quite the contrary, given the 
contemporary, seemingly unassailable, consensus to only allow defensive force the 
plea for limited retribution might seem “revolutionary.”  
Regarding the second argument, O’Driscoll (2013, 60) points out that looking 
at contemporary issues through the eyes of a particular past thinker does not have to 
be “an act of deference to those who have gone before us” which affirms that 
humankind will never be able to abandon the use of violence. The thought of previous 
thinkers can function as a springboard from which to start the evaluation of 
contemporary questions. The issue one faces here is the essential question of how a 
particular moralist regards human nature and the nature of moral action as it relates 
to just war reasoning. The idea of human progress that inevitably leads toward peace 
on earth which arguably underlies this line of critique is commonly associated with 
Kantian idealism. This idea markedly contrasts with the philosophical outlook of a 
Hobbesian pessimism which essentially regards human beings as naturally self-
interested and unable to overcome violence individually. On a spectrum that has 
Kantian idealism and Hobbesian pessimism as its outer limitations, Gorman (2010b, 
298-299) suggests St Thomas’s account of “classical Christian realism” as middle 
ground approach:  
(…) Aquinas offers a realistic portrait of human affairs that recognizes the perils of 
human vice and sinfulness, while at the same time acknowledging that virtuous human 
action can have a positive impact in our fallen world. Aquinas’s outlook on the human 
condition perhaps can best be described as classical Christian realism, since it is 
grounded in a rational understanding of reality and elevated by the revealed truths of 
the Christian faith. (…) For St. Thomas, human beings are not completely depraved 
and self-interested by nature, nor are we innately good and inclined to peace and 
progress. Rather, in Aquinas’s view, our natural inclinations need to be ordered by 
reason and sustained by grace, or else we are likely to fall into error and sin. 
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Aquinas’s view of human nature has important individual and social 
implications. At the level of the individual, he teaches that real human flourishing does 
not come about unless a person chooses to follow the commands of reason and to act 
virtuously. On a larger scale, Aquinas’s understanding of human nature indicates that 
progress toward a more peaceful and stable international order is possible if world 
leaders act virtuously with an eye to the common good, but such progress certainly is 
not inevitable, and given human’s propensity to violence and sin it appears that the 
possibility of creating an ideal world order is highly improbable, if not delusional.  
Thus, taking a Thomistic approach as point of departure, this thesis does not deny the 
possibility of human progress vis-à-vis the use of force while emphasising that the use 
of violence remains a necessary tool of maintaining and (re)establishing a 
tranquillitas ordinis. 
The third line of critique which assumes that the remote study of the past 
cannot provide practical guidance is, to some extent, a misunderstanding of what the 
historical tradition is supposed to do (O’Driscoll 2013, 60-61). Relying on John Tosh 
for this point, O’Driscoll argues that history can in fact be taken as “‘a set of counter-
images’” instead of a mere mirror. Consequently, the traditional moralist can find in 
history a different point of view that “‘enables us to look at our own circumstances 
with sharper vision.’” This thesis’s Thomistic approach can withstand this kind of 
critique as it is not at all a project of “scholastic navel gazing.” Rather, it reflects upon 
the contemporary moral problem of the expanding use of small-scale force by taking 
Aquinas’s ideas not as a mirror, but as “a set of counter-images” which provides 
practical guidance for the regulation of targeted killings. 
The fourth line of critique, for O’Driscoll (2013, 61), is more difficult to address 
as it does not relate to the historical approach per se, but to how this approach has 
been employed by just war thinkers. Through reducing the just war tradition to a 
single narrative that is portrayed as the one and only starting point of analysis the 
field has been unnecessarily restricted. O’Driscoll, in his own work (see, e.g., 2018), 
seeks to remedy this shortcoming by going beyond the established Christian starting 
point of the tradition, extending it to a “systematic treatment of Greco-Roman ideas 
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of just war” (2013, 62). While O’Driscoll is correct in pointing out that the first just 
war thought predates the Christian just war, however, this does not mean that a 
particular Christian interpretation cannot incorporate precepts of non-Christian 
pedigree. In fact, the Thomistic just war does not fall into this trap as it combines the 
best of both worlds. St Thomas’s just war is unique in the sense that while it rests on 
the Christian tradition it, at the same time, relies on an Aristotelian foundation. As a 
result, the Thomistic account of small-scale force, while firmly Christian in outlook, is 
not narrowly focused on the reduced narrative O’Driscoll laments but actually reaches 
out to the classical world. 
 
3.9 Addressing the Applicability of Aquinas and  
       Probabilism 
Like any method, casuistry has been criticised for its methodological shortcomings. 
In the following, two particular objections will be considered. To begin with, giving St 
Thomas a prominent role in this thesis’s casuistical analysis inevitably leads to an 
ostensible contradiction. As Jonsen and Toulmin (1988, 369) note, Aquinas was a 
systematic theologian, not a casuist in the style outlined above. In particular, 
Aquinas’s treatment of the just war was not written as “an isolated piece of casuistry” 
(Reichberg 2017, 14-15): 
St. Thomas, by contrast, took care to situate his “Quaestio de bello” within a systematic 
treatment of the virtues. Hence, far from proposing a free-standing decision procedure 
by which to judge particular cases, his aim was rather to situate lethal force in relation 
to the virtues that alone can make it an acceptable practice in human life, and 
inversely, to indicate in this connection what vices are especially to be avoided. The 
idea, in other words, was to examine what moral dispositions ought to be cultivated 
by persons engaged in war. Enfolding casuistry within a typology of the virtues 
represented Aquinas’s attempt at merging the legal teaching of his day (chiefly canon 
law but with elements from civil law as well) with the virtue perspective of Plato and 
Aristotle – duly transformed to fit the exigencies of the Christian message.  
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Is it not, then, that St Thomas’s basis in systematic theology conflicts with 
casuistry’s idea of being led by the cases? No, quite the contrary, as Jonsen and 
Toulmin note (1988, 123), not only did St Thomas in fact reason casuistically at times, 
his thinking is also inherently connected to the development of casuistry through 
concepts like “natural law,” “natural reason,” “conscience,” “prudence,” and 
“circumstance,” all of which were key elements of his thinking. Shytov (2001, 77) even 
goes as far as to point to Aquinas as having made the most important contribution to 
the development of high casuistry. In fact, St Thomas’s “disputed question” method, 
while arguably not as sophisticated, like casuistry, tried to balance general principles 
and particular circumstances. Indeed the very school of international ethics 
associated with St Thomas, that of natural law, is built around the idea that general 
moral principles must be interpreted in light of circumstances. While the precepts of 
natural law are self-evident, the question how to apply them in a concrete situation is 
debatable (2001, 45). And the conclusions of such debate, as Boyle (1992, 115) points 
out, “depend not only on moral principles and conceptual analysis but also on 
empirical judgments and interpretations that are not simply a function of one’s basic 
normative outlook.” In addition, it should be noted that while this thesis’s argument 
for Thomistic casuistry is its original contribution as far as method is concerned it 
does also, in the chapter on sovereign authority, employ Aquinas in a more 
conventional analysis rooted in close and careful textual assessment and logic. In a 
sense, the argument of this thesis, working in two stages, can thus be perceived as a 
testament to the richness of St Thomas’s thinking which can be employed in more 
than one way. 
Furthermore, integrating Aquinas’s virtue ethics into the casuistical method 
can help address the objection that caused casuistry’s historical disrepute. Casuistry’s 
fall from grace was mainly caused by the doctrine of moral probabilism. The 
Dominican Bartolomeo Medina defined this doctrine as follows: “It seems to me that, 
if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is 
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more probable” (as cited in Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, 164). In other words, 
probabilists held that a “reasonable doubt as to a law’s validity is sufficient to discredit 
its claim” (Smith 1999, xxv). As a practical consequence, casuistry in the light of 
probabilism led to verdicts which, for its critics, were entirely arbitrary. The most 
influential of casuistry’s critics was Blaise Pascal who, in his satirical Les Lettres 
Provinciales, mocked the distortions of casuistry through the doctrine of probabilism. 
It seemed that casuistry delivered a “lax treatment” of sinners and thus had lost its 
capacity to render morally just judgements: “King Louis XIV, it was said, would abjure 
his mistress on Holy Thursday, confess to his Jesuit confessor on Good Friday, take 
Communion on Easter Sunday, and bring back his mistress on Easter Monday” 
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, 233).  
The modern casuist Kenneth E. Kirk acknowledged the problem that casuistry 
can, if carried out light-heartedly, result in mere situation ethics. However, as Smith 
(1999, xxv) explains, Kirk stressed that probabilism is not necessarily a bad practice. 
Rather, if “doubt about the right thing to do” is “real” in a given situation, the issue 
should be accepted as an issue of doubt. Kirk (1999, 269-270) developed two main 
safeguards against probabilism. The first is to require that the doubt must be 
“genuine,” “not a passing fancy or prejudice.” Kirk required at least one “probable 
opinion against the law in cases where it is proposed to wave it” “‘based on some fact 
or argument whose force even conscientious consideration cannot weaken.” In other 
words, the question whether or not to allow probabilism depends on the seriousness 
of the doubt. This takes the discussion back to the argument made above that a casuist 
needs to be virtuous. For Kirk, “To perform the task of casuistry well, the casuist must 
be someone of good character, the kind of person who will recognize a moral claim for 
what it is” (Smith 1999, xxix). What shines through here is the educational aspect of 
casuistry which aims at developing the conscience of members of society (Shytov 
2001, 79). In addition, even if the casuist reasonably concludes that the rules need to 
be changed in a given case based on probabilistic grounds she is still bound by general 
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moral principles. Secondly, Kirk points out that in 1679 following a merely probable 
course had been limited by Pope Innocent XI to cases in which no vital interest was at 
stake. This limitation, Kirk (1999, 387) noted, had been accepted by most casuists but 
Pascal decided to ignore this change in casuistical practice.  
Thus, being aware of the danger of falling into the probabilistic trap, this thesis 
can go ahead with its casuistical analysis of cases featuring the use of force short of 
war. In cases where the verdict argues for a change of rules the argument will have to 
be founded on serious moral doubts, not mere “fancies” as Kirk called the probabilistic 
musings of casuists who fell into the probabilistic trap. In order to do this, special 
emphasis will be given to the virtue of prudence which, if employed correctly, cautions 
against an embrace of the most opportune solution available at the moment.  
 
Conclusion: E Pluribus Unum – The Diversity of Just  
                         War Tradition 
Having distinguished between three pathways to just war, one might ask whether 
there is still reason to treat them, despite their fundamental disagreements, as 
belonging to one tradition. As O’Driscoll (2008a, 91-92) summarises the core of the 
debate about the existence of a singular tradition, “(…) a review of the literature on 
the just war tradition reveals many diverse views on which assumptions, conditions, 
and commitments are key to, and definitive of, this tradition. Where one account of 
the just war tradition privileges a particular normative orientation as the sine qua non 
of the tradition, others will stress a certain historical origin as key, or a given chain of 
transmission as essential.” In consequence, some authors (see, e.g., Walker 1993, 
106), given the diversity of just war thinking, seem to reject the notion of a just war 
tradition. For them, it seems, the differences in the various approaches to just war are 
so great that one cannot refer to them as belonging to a singular tradition.  
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However, Coates (2016, 5) notes that traditions of thought are never univocal 
as a tradition that speaks with one voice ceases to be a tradition. Put differently, it is 
necessary for a tradition to pronounce differences within a shared identity. In fact, as 
O’Driscoll (2008a, 109) argues, regarding the just war there seem to be enough 
commonalities between different approaches that classifying them as belonging to 
one tradition is justified; in his words: “many just war theories, one just war 
tradition.” This common ground, he (2008a, 115) argues, is built around the existence 
of “a common moral vocabulary and mode of reasoning, historically associated with 
the idea of just war, and an interpretive community engaged in arguing about how 
best to make sense of it.” Johnson (1995, 148) provides an image that helps grasp the 
idea of a single just war tradition:  
(…) my own position is that we should speak of just war tradition, not simply one 
doctrine or another, understanding the tradition to include a number of related 
streams of thought that are reflected in the diversity of perspectives found in current 
just war debate. (…) I like to describe just war tradition as a whole by the metaphor of 
a river flowing through its delta toward the sea. The common stream forms, separates, 
and forms again, with the main flow now being carried by this channel, now by that 
one. When all its parts are understood together, just war tradition represents a cultural 
consensus on when war is justified and what limits should be observed in fighting 
justly. 
Johnson (1984, 1) argues that the just war tradition constitutes a consensual tradition 
in Western culture about the permissibility and restraint of war. Being of Christian 
origin, the tradition became secularised in the centuries that followed. In other words, 
the tradition’s Christian values stopped to exist as specifically Christian ones, being 
understood today as general part of Western culture (1984, 5). He (1995, 149) 
identifies several particular streams of thought that combined in a cultural consensus, 
best summarised by Aquinas, about the justification of war: theology, philosophy, 
chivalric custom and military practice, canon and civil law, and precedents that 
governed the relations between princes.  The consensus, however, he goes on to argue, 
broke down under the conditions of modernity and the various streams that had 
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combined in the consensus started to become increasingly distinct again. In 
particular, the legal stream became the dominant one while, for example, the 
theological stream fell dormant until the twentieth century (2013a, 25). For 
contemporary just war debate Johnson (1995, 149) identifies four particular streams 
that together form the “broader just war tradition:” “In the military sphere, manuals 
of warfare prescribe acceptable conduct in battle and stipulate rules of engagement 
for specific conflicts. In the legal arena, the corpus of international law guides the 
relations of States. In the theological domain, theorists like Paul Ramsey and the 
authors of the 1983 pastoral letter of the American Catholic bishops pronounce on 
war conduct. And in the academy, philosophers like Michael Walzer and Elizabeth 
Anscombe reflect on the relevance of the tradition to current challenges.” 
Writing in 1995, Johnson could not foresee the emergence of the revisionist 
just war and its unique approach. Revisiting Johnson’s distinction between the four 
particular streams of the “broader just war tradition” it seems that the academic 
stream has split further into the two rivers of Walzerianism and revisionism. While 
these two streams have serious disagreements about method and substance they both 
share the just war’s core of the “dual theme” (Johnson 1984, 2) of permission and 
restraint. In consequence, both camps have a place within the broader just war 
tradition. One of the objectives of this thesis is that, while concluding that a 
methodological reconciliation between the two camps seems impossible, there is no 
reason why there should be no exchange about substantive issues. Furthermore, this 
thesis demonstrates that substantive just war questions can be illuminated in a 
valuable and distinctive way via traditional casuistry. The recapture of casuistry is 
thus both about showing that what lies between the Walzerian and revisionist 
approaches is not some barren wasteland, but a rich and productive field to which 
they can and should both contribute, but which is also effectively tilled with a 
distinctive set of tools supplied by the casuistical method. 
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4 Sovereign Authority and Small-Scale  
   Force 
Introduction 
Until recently, just war thinkers of various schools more or less unanimously argued 
that the authority criterion of just war had been neglected in contemporary debate. 
Today, however, it seems that the question of authority has moved to the forefront of 
debate as a host of publications indicates (see, e.g., Benbaji 2018; Brown 2011; Fabre 
2008, 2012; Finlay 2010; Heinze and Steele 2009; Kutz 2005; Lang 2009; Parry 2015, 
2017; Reitberger 2013; Schwenkenbecher 2013; Steinhoff 2007; Williams 2013; 
Wrange 2017; Zehr 2013).  
The reason for this revival is directly linked to the debate between Walzerians 
and revisionists. While the former camp, starting from a Westphalian legalist 
perspective, argues that it is the state that is ethically privileged, most revisionists 
deny this perspective, considering the individual as the crucial unit of moral analysis. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the assessment of inter-state conduct, the revisionist 
just war commonly “deploys a generally conventional account of sovereign authority, 
indebted to a stereotypical Westphalian position” (Williams 2013, 65). This 
Westphalian position holds that states have a right to political sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and limits the justified use of force to self-defence. Both 
Walzerians and revisionists thus, at the same time, cherish an understanding of 
authority which is markedly different from the classical, pre-Westphalian 
understanding of sovereign authority which neither supported the two foundational 
Westphalian principles nor the limitation of legitimate force to self-defence. This 
chapter argues that there is a moral gain in recovering parts of the classical 
understanding of the authority criterion for the policy of targeted killing of culpable 
unjust terrorist threats. 
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Within the ethics of war at least five terms have historically been employed to 
refer to the authority criterion which arguably caused confusion, namely legitimate 
authority, proper authority, right authority, competent authority, and sovereign 
authority (Reitberger 2013, 67). This chapter refers to the authority criterion by using 
Johnson’s term of “sovereign authority.” The merit of this term is that it binds 
together two crucial parts needed to come to terms with matters of authority vis-à-vis 
questions of war and peace. As Philpott (1995, 354-355) notes: 
Precisely because of its complex historical evolution, finding a definition encompassing 
every usage since the 13th century is a pipe dream. However, there is a broad concept – not 
a definition, but a wide philosophical category – which unites most of sovereignty’s past, 
and with which we can begin: authority. Authority is “the right to command and 
correlatively, the right to be obeyed.” It is legitimate when it is rooted in law, tradition, 
consent or divine command, and when those living under it generally endorse this notion. 
Legitimate authority is crucially different from power, which is raw, pure, physical and 
direct. (…) Even at its most monarchical and dictatorial, even in the case of the absolute 
law-giving monarch of Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes, sovereignty is conferred by some 
notion of right which provides a basis for assent other than coercion. 
Narrowing down the understanding of sovereignty this way does not, however, 
constitute an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of authority within the just 
war tradition. Making such an attempt in one single chapter would indeed be an 
illusionary task. This chapter concentrates on the major fault line hinted at above and 
assesses what can be learned from this debate with regard to targeted killings.  
In terms of outline, the chapter begins with A. J. Coates’s argument with 
regard to what he refers to as “legitimate authority.” Coates is one of very few 
contemporary just war thinkers who defend a classical reading of the authority 
criterion. Unsurprisingly, Coates has been subject to various critical appreciations. 
One particularly succinct case of such critique, Uwe Steinhoff’s rebuttal, will therefore 
be summarised next. In what follows, Steinhoff’s rather narrow revisionist critique of 
Coates is put on a broader foundation by considering Cécile Fabre’s cosmopolitan 
account of authority.  
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After having provided this overview about contemporary just war debate the 
chapter turns to the classical just war as represented in the work of St Thomas. Firstly, 
the philosophical foundation of his work on politics and just war will be explored. 
Once this foundation has been established the chapter turns to the pre-Westphalian 
conceptualisation of sovereign authority and contrasts this understanding with the 
modern understanding. After having appreciated the differences between these two 
conceptualisations the chapter will be in the position to consider the critique Steinhoff 
and his analytical colleagues have put forward against Coates specifically and against 
the classical just war generally. As it turns out, the origin of their disagreement goes 
back to their different units of analysis. Finally, the chapter provides the first stage of 
the thesis’s argument with regard to the regulation of targeted killings, arguing, based 
on careful textual assessment and logic, that a partial recovery of the classical 
understanding of sovereign authority is the most ethical way of regulating small-scale 
uses of force. 
 
4.1 The Authority Criterion in Contemporary Just War  
       Debate 
4.1.1 A. J. Coates’s Defence of “Legitimate Authority” 
Coates (2016, 139) starts his argument with the notion that the criterion of “legitimate 
authority” has been neglected in recent just war debate. Reflecting on the issue of 
terrorism, Coates argues that instead of focusing on the crucial question of the 
authority to use force, contemporary thinkers have instead wrongly concentrated on 
the issue of non-combatant immunity. In essence, Coates’s argument is that the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is one that only applies during 
war which he considers to be a conflict between two or more legitimate authorities. As 
terrorists are no public authority and thus no legitimate one they are unable to wage 
war and the question of non-combatant immunity is thus irrelevant in the 
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confrontation with terrorism. Simply put, for Coates, terrorist acts are crimes, their 
killing murder and by no means acts of war. As a result, he (2016, 140) objects to the 
moral intuition that terrorist attacks on police officers are less despicable than 
assaults on civilians: 
In normal circumstances a reverse reaction is discernible, the murder of policemen 
provoking greater not less moral outrage than the deaths of ordinary civilians (hence, 
perhaps, the retention in the United Kingdom of capital punishment for the murder of 
policemen long after its abolition for the murder of ordinary members of the public). 
Only if we are prepared to concede that the terrorist has belligerent status and that the 
soldier or police officer has lost his or her immunity from attack by virtue of acting in 
a state of war is the uneven reaction to the deaths of soldiers and civilians justified. 
Coates holds that the authority criterion is the single most important and “logically 
prior principle” in the moral assessment of terrorism. In the discussion of the 
authority criterion that follows, Coates recalls the “much more morally demanding 
principle” (2016, 142) of authority as advocated in classical just war thought. 
Elaborating on St Thomas in particular, Coates compares and contrasts the classical 
understanding of authority with “the narrowly legalistic interpretation of legitimate 
authority” (2016, 140) he identifies as the main source of the criterion’s contemporary 
neglect. The following presentation of Coates’s argument concentrates on his 
substantive argument, for the moment leaving aside his references to Aquinas as the 
Angelic Doctor’s take on authority will be considered in a separate section.  
Building on the classical understanding, Coates (2016, 140-141) points out that 
the just war tradition sought to maintain and establish peace by emphasising the 
authority criterion. One way of doing this was to limit the recourse to arms to those in 
authority defined as those who had the responsibility to ensure the common good of 
the political community. In other words, only public employments of force were 
deemed to be justifiable while private uses of force beyond self-defence were 
considered illicit per se. Importantly, Coates detects a parallel between medieval 
times when just war thinking was first systematised and today’s terrorist threat which, 
in his opinion, calls for a reappraisal of the classical take. As Coates points out, the 
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medieval rationale behind the stress of public authority was to rein in the abundant 
private use of force by multiple actors at the time. Given today’s terrorist threat as well 
as what he calls “the proliferation of self-constituted revolutionary movements” 
(2016, 141), Coates finds considerable moral value in the idea of denying the 
justifiability of private uses of force from the start. In his own words (2016, 141): “To 
insist on the public monopoly of the use of force remains a fundamental step in any 
process of pacification, and securing that monopoly is a precondition of civilized 
society.”  
While emphasising the public nature of the use of force Coates, at the same 
time, detects an abuse in how this idea evolved which in turn contributed to the recent 
neglect of the authority criterion. He (2016, 141) laments that the criterion has been 
employed in “merely utilitarian or pragmatic terms,” meaning that the criterion has 
come to be understood in terms of the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty. In 
the discussion that follows, Coates (2016, 142-143) points out how the classical 
understanding of authority understood as responsibility for the common good applied 
both internally within a ruler’s own political community but also entailed a 
responsibility for the common good of all political communities. The authority 
criterion was thus much more demanding and irreconcilable with the Westphalian 
idea of the inviolability of state borders. Coates (2016, 141) concludes that the 
authority criterion “(…) has become a most undemanding and largely formal 
principle, which invests any state whose government is in effective control of its 
territory with the right to war. War-making, or the competence de guerre, is seen 
simply as a formal requirement or accompaniment of state sovereignty.” The problem 
that follows, for Coates, is that due to the fact that the authority to wage war has been 
taken for granted with regard to the modern state the criterion has fallen dormant to 
such an extent that it is not properly engaged vis-à-vis today’s non-state threats. As a 
result of the stress of the formal nature of authority, the criterion’s demands have been 
reduced and a greater permissiveness in the use of force can be detected (2016, 142).  
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Importantly, while stressing what he sees as obvious benefits of the authority 
criterion, Coates does not deny that authority can be abused. If one were to uphold an 
overly strict reading of the authority criterion, Coates (2016, 144) acknowledges, the 
denial of any use of force to non-state actors can be morally problematic if it is used 
in order to justify “all de facto government and leads to political quietism.” However, 
Coates is quick to stress that the classical just war tradition did not advocate such 
repression. “A much more radical understanding of the principle is possible, and it is 
one that seems to be required by the just war tradition, given that the vis coactiva and 
the right to war are vested in the state as a political community and that powers are 
entrusted to rulers or governments as agents of that community. If that is so, the 
private appropriation of power by the government of a state undermines its legitimacy 
and establishes, at least in principle, the right of resistance” (2016, 144-145). The 
essence of Coates’s (2016, 145-147) following discussion of the right of resistance is 
that while the just war tradition does not deny the justifiability of resistance against 
established authority it approaches the issue with some considerable caution, 
emphasising prudential concerns. This interpretation, in Coates’s eyes, contrasts 
markedly with today’s bias in favour of resistance and revolution which he detects in 
both the theoretical debate and international affairs.  
Furthermore, in cases where the right of resistance is employed to justify 
revolutionary warfare, Coates points to a non-consistent employment of other just 
war principles. Coates criticises that contemporary just war thinking seems to relax 
moral criteria for revolutionary agents while fully holding state agents to account. He 
(2016, 147-149) demonstrates his argument in a discussion of the principle of non-
combatant immunity as it has been presented in recent thinking about revolutionary 
warfare. Due to sympathy with the weak side, namely the insurgents, Coates accuses 
the “apologists of revolutionary war” (2016, 147) of sacrificing otherwise sacrosanct 
just war principles. Coates warns against such an interpretation because revolutionary 
warfare, due to its specific nature, seems hard to restrain: “Modern revolutionary 
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warfare is countervalue warfare in its purest form, a war directed against an entire 
society with all its attendant institutions (that is, instruments of repression and 
control). The likelihood of its remaining limited, therefore, is always remote, and its 
tendency to become total wellnigh irresistible” (2016, 149). 
With regard to the importance of the authority criterion understood as 
responsibility for the common good, Coates (2016, 150) allocates particular 
importance to the criterion with regard to revolutionary war. Unfortunately, in his 
opinion, contemporary thinkers have de-emphasised or even abandoned the criterion 
in favour of the determination of just cause. The problem he sees in this development 
is that the criterion of legitimate authority is effectively muted, taking on “a form of 
self-authorization” (2016, 156). The possible result, in Coates’s eyes, is a situation of 
anarchy vis-à-vis the use of force where any agent may opt to use force, a situation not 
unlike the one in the Middle Ages described above which led to the development of 
the authority criterion in the first place.  
Crucially, Coates has not only been criticised for the position he adopts, but in 
fact his warning against self-authorisation has been at the very core of the 
cosmopolitan/revisionist argument in favour of abandoning the authority criterion 
entirely. It is to this school of just war the discussion turns to now. 
 
4.2 The Cosmopolitan/Revisionist Idea of Authority  
Arguably, with the rise of the cosmopolitan/revisionist school the above-noted de-
emphasis of the authority criterion has reached previously unknown heights. 
Steinhoff (2007, 7-22) provides a unique entry point to this debate as he is outspoken 
about his disdain of the classical just war and, furthermore, builds his chapter around 
an explicit rebuttal of Coates’s argument. 
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4.2.1 Steinhoff’s Rebuttal of Coates 
Steinhoff builds his discussion around an explicit rejection of classical just war 
argument which Coates seeks to recover partly. As he (2007, 2) states in the 
introduction of his book, “In the course of this enquiry I shall treat traditional just war 
theory, which goes back to the Catholic Church fathers Thomas Aquinas [sic] and 
Augustine and has been further developed by other thinkers. This theory will be 
discussed, yet by no means adopted; rather, some of its central points are rejected 
here.” With regard to the criterion of “legitimate authority” in particular, Steinhoff 
(2007, 3) leaves little doubt about his opposition towards the classical just war and 
the latter’s granting of the right to war to public authority only. “(…) the view that such 
rights are attributable only to the state and its representatives, but not to the 
individual, is pre-Enlightenment and pre-modern, namely medieval, or modern in the 
bad sense of belonging to a metaphysics of the state and having certain totalitarian 
tendencies.”  
In contrast to the classical understanding, Steinhoff (2007, 3) provides his 
take which, in a nutshell, summarises the cosmopolitan/revisionist argument on 
legitimate authority. “(…) I shall argue, contrary to the tradition of just war theory, 
that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has the right to declare war 
on others or to the state, provided only that the individual proceed responsibly in his 
or her decision processes, that is, that one proceed in circumspect and rational 
consideration of relevant information and moral aspects. This is merely a 
thoroughgoing application of a perspective which is enlightened, liberal and oriented 
to individual rights, a perspective which I am at pains to adopt throughout.” 
Steinhoff (2007, 7) starts off his discussion of “legitimate authority” by quoting 
Coates’s argument that the authority criterion has become the most neglected of all. 
He goes on to state that Coates insists that war can only be waged between legitimate 
authorities which he describes as “a view which, as far as I can see, has found no 
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second exponent in the long tradition of just war theory.” As terrorists, for Coates, are 
criminals rather than combatants with no greater war-time rights of harming, 
Steinhoff quotes Coates’s conclusion that the authority criterion takes on a particular 
importance in the confrontation with terrorism. Having provided this basic summary 
of Coates’s argument Steinhoff (2007, 8) immediately jumps into rebuttal mode. 
Accusing Coates of an “uncanny realm of double standards,” Steinhoff first takes issue 
with Coates’s suggestion that terrorism equals the use of force by “‘illegitimate 
authorities.’” Employing a realistic thought experiment, Steinhoff is unwilling to 
accept the idea that legitimate authorities cannot commit terrorism. “If Hamas - or 
better yet – if unorganized single fighters in the Gaza strip blow up an Israeli tank 
(which, according to international law and the laws of war, is a legitimate action 
against soldiers of an occupying power, or at least no war crime), it is terrorism; if 
Sharon, elected democratically, has helicopters fire into groups of Palestinian civilians 
(according to international law and the laws of war unequivocally a war crime), it is at 
once something completely different” (2007, 8).  
With regard to moral debate, Steinhoff charges that Coates neither explains 
why nor how the authority criterion should be considered to be “‘logically prior’” to 
the criterion of non-combatant immunity. Steinhoff asks whether Coates intends to 
completely leave it to those in authority to decide who can be targeted which would, 
if completely thought through, reduce the authority criterion to an “enabling act” 
(2007, 9). “If, therefore, the legitimate authority says: ‘I hereby declare that the 
children of our enemies are combatants; therefore, let us first bomb the 
kindergartens, the children’s homes and clinics, for then our enemies will be 
demoralized and knuckle under’, is that alright then?” (2007, 8). Furthermore, 
Steinhoff (2007, 9) flatly rejects Coates’s argument that an attack on an armed soldier 
or policeman in his function as representative of the political community should be 
considered more reprehensible than an attack on an unarmed civilian as an 
indefensible moral intuition. 
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Having pointed out these two ostensible flaws in Coates’s argument Steinhoff 
examines further possible rationales for defending the classical authority criterion. 
He begins with the emphasis of authority as a means of decreasing the occurrence of 
war through limiting the outbreak of private violence which Coates upholds in his 
argument for the public monopoly of force being a pre-requisite of civilised society. 
For Steinhoff, the problem with this argument is that while the public monopoly of 
force may be a precondition for civilised society, the breaking of this monopoly has 
historically proven to be “an indispensable precondition for democratization” (2007, 
9). Again providing an illustration: “This depends on what one means by ‘civilized’. If 
Louis XIV had succeeded in monopolizing the violence in his state, we might today be 
dealing with an absolutist French neighbour, with Louis XXI instead of with Jacques 
Chirac; and if the British had succeeded in enforcing the public monopoly of the use 
of force, the USA would perhaps still be a colony of Great Britain” (2007, 9).  
In addition, also speaking against Coates’s pacification argument, for 
Steinhoff, is the fact that while the authority criterion may reduce the number of 
conflicts within society, it does not decrease violence taken as a whole. In other words, 
while the criterion might reduce the number of actors justified in fighting it does not 
rein in the use of force by legitimate authorities. “In fact, the greatest crimes in human 
history have been committed by states or empires, not by subnational terror groups 
or guerrilla movements” (2007, 10). 
A further problem for Steinhoff is that Coates seems to confuse society and 
state in his argument that modern revolutionary war resembles pure countervalue 
warfare as it necessarily descends into total war. Steinhoff denies this assertion by 
arguing that it is a mistake to equate society and state as it might well be that the state 
acts against society. “The revolutionary movements in El Salvador and Nicaragua, for 
example, by no means fought against the society, but rather represented it; nor did 
they wage a total war – the governments did that (…)” (2007, 10). Moreover, Steinhoff 
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takes issue with Coates’s assertion that the classical just war criterion of authority was 
much more demanding than the one employed today. Alluding to Coates’s point that 
legitimate authority has disadvantageously been equated with state sovereignty in the 
Westphalian system and thus lost its stringency, Steinhoff considers this a wrongful 
reading of history “as in fact medieval theorists for the most part subsumed legitimate 
authority to the sovereignty of the ruler” (2007, 10).  
In addition, Steinhoff makes an attempt to reveal the basic flaw of 
inconsistency in Coates’s rejection of revolutionary movements. Given that Coates 
accepts the right of resistance in cases when a government turns against society, “he 
of course also admits that a revolutionary movement can itself be a public force that 
is, force legitimized by the community” (2007, 11-12). Once more resorting to a 
thought experiment (2007, 12): “In other words (and with particular regard to the 
question of terrorism), if, for example, the community that stands behind the 
members of the Israeli army is a legitimate authority and can therefore make the 
Israeli soldiers agents and executives of public force, why should the community that 
stands behind the members of, say, Hamas not be such a legitimate authority, making 
the Hamas fighters the agents of publicly legitimized force?” 
Next, Steinhoff laments that Coates, even though he so forcefully insists on the 
authority criterion, does not clearly delineate the scope of the principle. While 
Steinhoff applauds the fact that Coates does not make the frequent “error” of 
democrats to consider democracy as a cure-all, the problem that unfolds is that the 
essence of the authority criterion remains unclear (2007, 12). What it comes down to 
for Coates, according to Steinhoff, is “that a legitimate authority is one which is a 
legitimate (whatever that may precisely mean) representative of a community and, in 
addition, one which abides by the law (whatever the law may actually be) that is valid 
for interstate or intercommunity relations” (2007, 12). With such a definition, 
however, Coates, in Steinhoff’s eyes, contradicts himself. As principles such as just 
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cause and non-combatant immunity are enshrined in international law, Steinhoff 
reasons, Coates cannot uphold the claim that the authority criterion is logically prior. 
Quite the contrary, legitimate authority depends upon these criteria: “An actor who 
enters armed conflicts without just cause and without respect for the principle of non-
combatant immunity does not have legitimate authority. Hence, the question of 
legitimate authority would be settled with reference to the criterion of non-combatant 
immunity, and Coates’ criticism of the neglect of the former in favour of the latter 
would contradict his own previous statements” (2007, 12). 
After having dissected the ostensible contradictions in Coates’s interpretation 
of the authority criterion Steinhoff (2007, 18-20) finally turns to the source of Coates’s 
argument, namely the classical just war. In essence, he identifies the “anti-
individualist and collectivist prejudice” (2007, 18) of medieval thought as the origin 
of the classical authority criterion.  
The idea that a single individual has the right to defend his or her rights against those 
who do not respect them and, if necessary, may do so with violence and against the 
state, and, moreover, that he or she has the right to violently punish rights violators, 
even if they appear in the form of a right violating state, was alien in the Middle Ages 
– just as alien as the idea of individual rights. Medieval, too, is the considerable dose 
of metaphysics necessary for thinking that a community can have the right to punish, 
but that a single individual cannot have such a right. Whence can the community have 
such a right if it does not derive it from the individuals who come together to form the 
community? In contradistinction to the church fathers, the view of a liberal theorist 
such as John Locke is, in any case, that a community can only have the rights which 
its members transfer to it. There is no miraculous increase of rights by representation. 
(2007, 18-19) 
Next, Steinhoff turns against the pacification argument, namely the idea that 
those invested with the responsibility for the common good of the community have 
the right to use force in order to prevent a situation in which anyone may employ force 
according to his or her liking. “For medieval thinkers ‘civilized living’ consisted 
perhaps not least in a situation in which authorities supposedly appointed  by God 
told the subjects, at whose expense they were living, what to do and what not to do. 
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That such thinkers should set the highest value on the principle of legitimate authority 
is perhaps due more to their own self-interest than to their care for the public. But, 
whatever the motivation of these anti-liberal thinkers might have been, the fact is that 
thinkers like Locke have a good answer to this conjuring up of an allegedly ‘very real 
threat of anarchy’” (2007, 19). 
This ostensible answer Steinhoff derives from John Locke who argues along 
the lines that the individual right to use force against an unjust ruler need not lead to 
anarchy as the criterion of just cause still applies (2007, 19-20). This argument, in 
turn, leads Steinhoff (2007, 20) back to his accusation against Coates of employing a 
double-standard because the latter “explains that the state can function as a militant 
defender of international law and that it draws its legitimization to wage war precisely 
from this role as the defender of law. He does not admit to the objection that nobody 
can be a judge (and, it must be added, an executing officer) of his own cause.”  
The conclusion Steinhoff (2007, 20) draws from his reflections on Coates’s 
argument on legitimate authority provides a basic summary of the revisionist school’s 
take on the criterion which will be considered next in more detail. “Contrary to just 
war theory, individuals – or more or less unorganized groups, for that matter – do not 
need the mediation of a representative (as in Catholicism) in order to gain legitimate 
authority for waging war; rather, they bear this authority themselves. If, under certain 
conditions, a right to war comes into operation, it is, or is based upon, an individual 
right.” 
4.2.2 The Broader Cosmopolitan/Revisionist Argument 
Fabre (2008, 2012) provides the most concise formulation of a 
cosmopolitan/revisionist just war approach. One particular advantage of her 
contribution, as far as authority is concerned, is that, in contrast to many members of 
her school, she does not concentrate on analytical construction but employs historical 
illustrations. Fabre (2008, 964) starts her argument by describing the status quo of 
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the Westphalian understanding of “legitimate authority:” “(…) the requirement of 
legitimate authority confers the right to resort to war on states and coalitions of states 
– to wit, on sovereign political organizations with the power to enforce laws within a 
given territory.” She adds that as a consequence of decolonisation the right to war has 
also been granted to political movements engaged in wars of liberation against 
oppressive rulers. However, this in historical terms very recent development does not, 
according to Fabre, diminish the “central aims” (2008, 964) of the Westphalian 
authority criterion, namely to justify the use of force as a defence of states’ rights to 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty. These “still rather statist overtones” 
(2008, 964), according to Fabre, have been challenged recently by a revival of the 
cosmopolitan tradition whose core precepts she defines as:  
(a) individuals are the fundamental units of moral concern and ought to be regarded 
as one another’s moral equals; (b) whatever rights and privileges states have, they have 
them only in so far as they thereby serve individuals’ fundamental interests; (c) states 
are not under a greater obligation to respect their own individual members’ 
fundamental rights than to respect the fundamental rights of foreigners. According to 
cosmopolitans, individuals’ basic entitlements are independent of political borders, 
and states have authority to the extent that they respect and promote those 
entitlements. (2008, 964) 
Given this definition, it should come as no surprise that cosmopolitans, due to their 
stress of individual morality and scepticism toward the state, are considered to belong 
to the revisionist school. The overall goal of Fabre’s argument is to advocate the 
abandonment of the authority criterion based on cosmopolitan grounds (2008, 965). 
Interestingly, as Fabre is willing to acknowledge, her argument has “Lockean 
undertones” (2008, 965), undertones already encountered in Steinhoff’s work. 
Having said that, she emphasises that her argument also partly departs from Locke.  
With Locke, I will argue (a) that a state is legitimate to the extent that it protects its 
members’ fundamental rights; (b) that a people may resort to war to overthrow an 
illegitimate state; (c) that individuals acting alone have the right to go to war against 
unlawful foreign belligerents. Unlike Locke, however, I do not claim that a state is 
legitimate if, and only if, it rests on the people’s consent. Nor do I restrict the conferral 
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of the right to wage a (civil) war on a whole people, through a levée en masse. Finally, 
my arguments in support of my Lockean conclusions are drawn from the 
contemporary literature on cosmopolitanism (…) (2008, 965) 
In her argument, Fabre (2008, 968) questions the assumption of the 
Westphalian authority criterion that in order to wage war the agent must be a political 
community built around communal political ends, namely those of territorial integrity 
and political sovereignty. Fabre rejects this argument, claiming that non-political 
groups and individuals can have the right to wage war. This argument stands against 
claims such as Coates’s that a sovereign authority is a necessary pre-requisite for a 
functioning and peaceful political community. Bartelson (2010, 82) refers to this 
traditional argument as “double bind.”   
(…) the cumulative consequence of past efforts to justify war with reference to 
legitimate authority has been to create a double bind between conceptions of political 
authority on the one hand and the use of force on the other. Therefore, if we want to 
make some historical sense of the just war tradition, we ought to conceive of the 
relationship between legitimate authority and the use of force as a two-way street: not 
only does the justification of war require legitimate authority, but this authority has 
frequently been legitimized with reference to the violence and disorder that would 
ensue in its absence. 
Cosmopolitans oppose this two-way street argument. Fabre’s basic justification for 
abandoning the established authority criterion is that communal goods such as 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty are only the accumulation of individual 
goods and thus there is no moral value to communal values as such; they are only 
precious as an extension of the rights of individuals. Consequently, for cosmopolitans 
the right to war is less limited, going beyond the defence of accumulated individual 
rights as expressed in the communal rights of the Westphalian standard. The right to 
war thus also falls to those individuals who must defend their rights to a, in 
cosmopolitan terms, “minimally flourishing life” (2008, 969) as expressed in basic 
human rights. Simply put, “it is not necessary, for an entity to have the right to wage 
a war, that it be a legitimate authority” (2008, 969).  
87 
 
4.3 St Thomas on Authority 
4.3.1 The Basics of Thomistic Political Philosophy 
The following discussion is indebted to Koritansky’s (n.d.) treatment of St Thomas’s 
political philosophy as it adopts logic and structure of his argument, referring to other 
voices only as a matter of additional clarification. Direct references to Aquinas’s 
writings will be, due to space concerns, used sparingly. At the outset, it must be said 
that this section can provide only the most basic of overviews of Thomistic political 
thought. Therefore, the main concern in this section will be the formation and 
functioning of temporal government. This is an important assertion to make as St 
Thomas in contrast to, for example, Aristotle whose thought he partly adopts, was a 
theologian who, while providing an ethical framework for humankind’s earthly 
existence, never lost sight of the final goal of human life, namely beatitude or perfect 
happiness in the world to come. In other words, Aquinas’s thinking on temporal 
government must be seen as an “interim ethic” (Weigel 1987, 358) in which 
government takes on the responsibility for establishing and maintaining the natural 
goods of earthly life, thus providing the basis for human beings so that they can strive 
for their supernatural perfection. As Scully (1981, 414) notes, “This tenet of Christian 
faith and reason, which permeates the thought of St. Thomas, plays a significant role 
in his political philosophy, allowing, as it does, for elements of a spiritual and moral 
character within society and the individual person that transcend the power and 
authority of the State.” 
For St Thomas, the Church takes on a crucial task in guiding mankind to 
beatitude. However, the relationship between state and Church has often been uneasy 
with each side attempting to take over control within the affairs of the other. The 
Angelic Doctor (ST, II-II, q. 60, a. 6) himself argues that “The secular power is subject 
to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is 
not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are 
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subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the 
temporal authority.” Although important for Thomistic thinking, addressing the 
complex relationship between the “two powers” lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For a widely cited discussion of this topic see Eschmann (1958). In what follows, 
discussion concentrates on the power of worldly government while humbly adding the 
caveat that, for St Thomas, things are more complex than presented here.  
4.3.2 Human Nature and Natural Law 
A good point to start reflection on his political philosophy is Aquinas’s doctrine of 
natural law which takes a central role in his moral and political teaching (Koritansky 
n.d.). For St Thomas, God created the world and endowed each and every element 
with a certain nature, its essence. Importantly, a thing’s nature does not only show in 
its outer, external appearance; it also shows through its natural inclinations. These 
inclinations guide it to act according to its particular nature. The divine authorship as 
well as God’s continuing involvement in the world, for Aquinas, can be called a law 
(Koritansky n.d.). St Thomas (ST, I-II, q. 90, a. 4) defines law as “an ordinance of 
reason for the common good, made by someone who has care of the community, and 
promulgated.” The law governing the world Aquinas calls the eternal law which is 
eternal because it does not result from the world which it governs but from whom it 
is derived, God (Koritansky n.d.). In most cases, God governs his creation through the 
eternal law without any chance of it being disobeyed as most beings lack the rational 
ability to consciously act against the eternal law. The only exception is the human 
being who, despite being subjected to divine providence and eternal law, possesses 
the power to act against the eternal law (Koritansky n.d.). Due to its rational nature, 
humankind’s relationship to the eternal law, in fact, is so different that Aquinas 
prefers to give it another name in its application to human nature, namely natural law. 
The natural law functions as determiner of human behaviour and thus provides the 
foundation for morality and politics (Koritansky n.d.). As pointed out earlier, St 
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Thomas’s ethics is teleological. The natural law effectively “guides human beings 
through their fundamental inclinations toward the natural perfection that God, the 
author of the natural law, intends for them” (Koritansky n.d.). Aquinas essentially 
considers “ethics as the study of how human beings can best fulfil their nature and 
obtain happiness” (De Young, McCluskey and Van Dyke 2009, 3).  
Importantly, the precepts of natural law are instilled in the human mind; they 
are the result of an intellectual habit called synderesis (ST, I-I, q. 79, a. 12). Having 
said that, however, naturally knowing the first precepts of natural law through 
synderesis does not immediately make human action. Rather, the principles have to 
be applied according to circumstances. The act of applying the understanding of the 
demands of natural law to concrete circumstances Aquinas calls conscience (ST, I-I, 
q. 79, a. 13). Koritansky (n.d.) provides the following practical example of the interplay 
between synderesis and conscience: “Therefore, by means of synderesis a man would 
know that the act of adultery is morally wrong and contrary to the natural law. By an 
act of conscience he would reason that intercourse with this particular woman that is 
not his wife is an act of adultery and should therefore be avoided.” De Young, 
McCluskey and Van Dyke (2009, 6) provide a summary that pulls together the strings 
encountered so far: “What it means for us to be created in God’s image, according to 
Aquinas, is, first and foremost, that we possess intellect, will, and the resulting ability 
to act on our own power. This link to the Creator further explains why our function 
involves both reasoning well and acting on the basis of that reasoning. We have 
intellects and wills, capacities that allow us to discover what our powers to act are 
intended for and how we are meant to act. In short, we are teleological beings, created 
by God with a particular function and for a particular purpose.” 
The precepts of natural law are derived from the very first demand that “good 
is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2). In order to 
specify this most general precept St Thomas points toward the natural inclinations of 
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human beings. Natural inclinations function as the most basic guide to 
comprehending the natural law (Koritansky n.d.). These inclinations are firstly those 
“in accordance with the nature he has in common with all substances (…) such as 
preserving human life and warding off its obstacles;” secondly those man shares with 
other animals, for example “sexual intercourse,” and the “education of offspring and 
so forth;” thirdly those which are specific to the rational nature of man, namely to 
“know the truth about God,” to “shun ignorance,” and to “live in society” (ST, I-II, q. 
94, a. 2). Importantly, solely acting on a natural inclination does not make an action 
morally good. Rather, inclinations are only part of the natural law if they are subjected 
to reason (Koritansky n.d.).  
4.3.3 The Need of Political Society 
Moving on to St Thomas’s political philosophy Koritansky (n.d.) points to the natural 
inclination “‘to live in society’” as the “ideal point of departure.” Building on Aristotle, 
Aquinas considers political society as a natural result of man’s political nature. Rather 
than being a construct of human invention, as contract theorists would argue 
centuries later, political society resembles “a prompting of nature” (Koritansky n.d.); 
man naturally aspires to it and it is needed for perfecting his existence. St Thomas 
“considers the social realm grounded in man’s physical, intellectual and moral need 
for assistance from his fellow man and in a basic love that one man has for another” 
(Scully 1981, 407).  
Furthermore, Aquinas’s positive understanding of the state differs from the 
earlier Augustinian understanding which essentially considered the state to be a 
means of restraining man’s prelapsarian libido dominandi (Weithman 1992, 354). 
Logically, as human beings find fulfilment only in living together well in the political 
community St Thomas puts particular emphasis on the common good. Like Aristotle, 
St Thomas reasons upward from the other natural communities. 
In the first, he holds that the State is natural insofar as it is the end of a natural, 
generative process. This process, he explains, commences with the union of man and 
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woman, giving rise to the domestic society of the family and household, which provides 
for daily needs. It continues through the wider and more complex society of small 
communities, which can provide more completely for the needs of its members. And 
it culminates in the still wider and more complex political society of the State, which 
as a perfect or complete society, provides most fully for individual needs. The needs 
include not only the needs of life itself, but the needs of the good life – the life of virtue, 
to which the laws of the State are ordered. (Scully 1981, 409-410) 
Importantly, although the state is natural to human nature it still is the fruit of human 
action which may require, if completely thought through, the use of violence. As Scully 
(1981, 412) puts it, “This does not mean, of course, that man is born with the State any 
more than a man is born with virtue, for States are founded through human industry 
and virtues are acquired through human experience.” Moreover, an important 
implication of man’s political nature is the role of citizens in political society. Due to 
his nature as “civic and social animal” (ST, I-II, q. 72, a. 4), the good citizen is the one 
who puts the interest of the common good above his private interests.  
When it comes to determining the best regime for political society, Aquinas 
has been interpreted by different scholars as “advocate of absolute monarchy, limited 
monarchy, republicanism, and mixed constitutionalism” (Blythe 1986, 547). The 
following discussion sides with Koritansky (n.d.) who states that Aquinas 
distinguished between the best regime in theory and the best possible regime. To 
begin with, St Thomas adopts Aristotle’s classification of six basic regime types. These 
are distinguished based on the criteria of how the political society is ruled (by one, 
few, many) and of whether the rule is just through the determiner of its contribution 
toward the common good. The regimes that are just Aquinas calls, respectively, 
monarchy, aristocracy, polity or republic whereas the unjust regimes are labelled 
tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (Koritansky n.d.). Monarchy, for Aquinas, 
constitutes the best regime type as the wise monarch is uniquely capable of leading 
society to the common good and would only be hindered in carrying out this task had 
he to consult others who are less wise. However, St Thomas does acknowledge that 
monarchs who are not as wise as the ideal monarch would be may not rule as 
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effectively and, in the worst case, may become tyrants who work for their private ends 
instead of for the common good. As a result, Aquinas makes a distinction between the 
best regime “simply speaking” and “the best regime in a particular time and place” 
(Koritansky n.d.) which, for Aquinas, might be a mixed regime which combines the 
virtues of monarchy, aristocracy, and polity.  
Therefore, Aquinas outlines in the Summa Theologiae a more modest proposal 
whereby political rule is somewhat decentralized. The regime that he recommends 
takes the positive dimensions of all three “good regimes.” Whereas it has a monarch 
at its head, it is also governed by “others” possessing a certain degree of authority who 
may advise the monarch while curbing any tyrannical tendencies he may have. Finally, 
Aquinas suggests that the entire multitude of citizens should be responsible for 
selecting the monarch and should all be candidates for political authority themselves. 
(Koritansky n.d.) 
An important issue which will again become relevant in the discussion about 
the morally appropriate regulation of targeted killings can be found in the relationship 
between government and its people. In emphasising the uniqueness of human nature 
among all creatures Aquinas, following Aristotle, stresses the importance of speech as 
an inherent aspect of the political nature of human beings. From this, for Aquinas, it 
follows that human beings “are to be served by way of a medium that is in keeping 
with the very nature of man’s fundamental relatedness of man to man in society on 
every level, namely, dialogue” (Scully 1981, 428). As a result, St Thomas holds that 
government authority, if true to human nature, must give a voice and listen to the 
community for which it takes care. 
The governmental, legislative wing of society at society’s highest point of development 
makes society a political society or a State. Though, within a large and complex society, 
this governmental, legislative wing must be somewhat removed in the actual exercise 
of governing, it remains, nevertheless, essentially tied to the society from which it 
arises. Its function is to serve that society and its members by promoting an 
environment in which local communities, families and individuals may subsist and 
develop as human, rational, moral beings. Consequently, the authority of State-
government, however much an authority, cannot be regarded as absolute, for it 
remains subject to the common interests of the members of society, who ultimately 
have the last word. (1981, 428) 
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It is important to note that although St Thomas doubtlessly saw a place for the 
involvement of the public in the political decision-making process it would be a 
mistake to read him as advocate of something he, in reality, did not argue for. As 
Crofts (1973, 163) warns “Thomas emphasized the importance of popular sovereignty 
but the interpreter must not ascribe to the political theory of Thomas a democratic 
tone that sounds too modern. Thomas was not a democrat; he believed that the source 
for political authority was not so much popular sovereignty as it was the divine will.” 
In cases where the government does not listen or when it willingly acts against 
the common good it should come as no surprise that St Thomas, as noted by Coates, 
imagines a right of resistance. How far St Thomas is willing to go in granting a right 
to resistance has been subject to considerable debate as his position varies according 
to which of his works is consulted. That he allows for resistance as response to a ruler’s 
blatant disrespect of the responsibilities which have been bestowed on him, however, 
is uncontroversial (see, e.g., Blythe 1986; Crofts 1973; Johnson 2014, 32-33; 41-43; 
Johnstone 2003; Reichberg 2017, 122-127). 
4.3.4 Aquinas’s Additional Types of Law 
Although the demands of natural law provide the basis for human action they do not 
specify all particulars of human behaviour. To cite an example that is particularly 
relevant for the later discussion of how targeted killings should be regulated 
Koritansky (n.d.) points to a shortcoming of natural law: “Whereas Aquinas argues 
that the natural law requires criminals to be punished for injustices such as murder, 
theft, and assault, there is no natural specification as to precisely what kinds of 
punishment ought to be imposed for these crimes.” In order to fill these gaps, St 
Thomas argues for the necessity of human law as guarantor of maintaining human 
social life. As the state makes the human law it “aids man in his acquisition of virtue, 
through which man achieves his human perfection, since the laws of the State restrain 
him from wickedness, savagery and corruption” (Scully 1981, 412). Following from 
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this, it is unsurprising that Aquinas has an understanding of individual rights which 
is quite different from the cosmopolitan/revisionist perception. As Bigongiari (1997, 
xxxi) puts it succinctly, St Thomas “is more concerned with the stability of the state 
than with the upholding of individual political rights.” Likewise, Crofts (1973, 166) 
argues that “Thomas is far more interested in political duties and obligations of the 
individual in society than in the political rights and privileges to which the individual 
lays claim.” 
Human law, according to Aquinas, has two main functions. Firstly, it 
contributes the specificity the natural law cannot provide as a consequence of its 
generality and, secondly, it forces those falling under its authority to keep its 
requirements. Following from the second function, Aquinas distinguishes between 
human laws which are “conclusions” from principles of natural law and laws which 
are “determinations” from natural law (Koritansky n.d.).  
Human laws are considered conclusions from the natural law when they pertain to 
those matters about which the natural law offers a clear precept. To use Aquinas’ own 
example, “that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that 
one should do harm to no man.” (ST, I-II, 95.2). Thus, human laws must include 
prohibitions against murder, assault, and the like even though such actions are already 
prohibited by the natural law. At the same time, however, the natural law does not 
specify exactly how a murderer must be punished, whether (for example) by means of 
banishment, the death penalty, or imprisonment. Such details depend upon a number 
of factors that prudent legislators and judges must take into consideration apart from 
their understanding of the general principles of natural justice. (Koritansky n.d.) 
Direct conclusions from the natural law Aquinas calls the laws of nations (ius 
gentium) which are thus common principles of human law valid above and beyond 
any particular regime (Koritansky n.d.). St Thomas discusses one further type of law, 
namely the divine law. In essence, the divine law is the part of the natural law which 
God has given to mankind through revelation. It thus cannot conflict with the natural 
law human beings derive through synderesis. Unsurprisingly, the Scholastics put 
considerable effort into justifying the non-contradiction of reason and faith (Bellamy 
2006, 37).   
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4.4 The Historical Background of Contemporary Debate  
        about Authority 
The following section draws heavily on Johnson’s (2007, 2013b, 2014) work on 
authority in which he points out the differences between the classical and the modern 
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. Importantly, while discussing the 
differences between the two understandings, this section does not have the space to 
narrate the historical developments behind the abandonment of the classical 
understanding. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Westphalian settlement did 
not bring about changes in state conduct overnight. Quite the contrary, the modern 
understanding of sovereignty was arguably only firmly established in the twentieth 
century (see, e.g., Glanville 2013; Stirk 2012). 
4.4.1 Classical Sovereignty 
Johnson traces back the historical development behind what he considers to be a 
modern over-emphasis of the just cause criterion which, as he argues, has resulted in 
the neglect of the authority criterion. Describing the classical understanding of the 
authority criterion, most succinctly put forward by St Thomas, as in sync with the 
“ends of good politics,” Johnson (2013b, 19-20) provides the following summary of 
this interpretation: 
Here the primary necessity for a just war is sovereign authority; the other necessities 
named not only follow in precedence but also depend importantly on that authority, 
for among the responsibilities included in those of sovereignty are determining when 
there is a just cause for resort to armed force on behalf of the political community and 
maintaining right intention in the use of such force.  
This is a conception placed squarely within the frame of an understanding of 
the ends of good politics. For the medieval writers, these were defined in the terms of 
the three interrelated “goods” of politics – order, justice, and peace – as taken over 
from earlier Classical thought by Augustine. The just war conception of sovereign 
authority reflected the good of political order; the conception of just cause reflected 
the good of justice within the political community; and the conception of right 
intention corresponded to the good of peace within that community. More broadly, 
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this understanding also extended to relations between and among political 
communities, as disorder, injustice, and conflict in one community inevitably affected 
the well-being of neighboring communities. 
Before moving on, it should be noted that Johnson’s interpretation of what St Thomas 
had to say about authority rests on the Angel of the School’s definition of just war in 
which he listed the authority criterion in first place (ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1). Johnson 
subsequently argues that Aquinas considered the authority criterion as the most 
important one of just war, logically prior to all the other criteria. However, this 
position has not been unanimously embraced. Reichberg (2017, 115-116), for example, 
does not consider St Thomas to argue that the authority criterion constitutes “a formal 
precondition of just cause,” as Johnson does.  
St Thomas as systematiser of the classical just war benefited a great deal from 
the canonical debate which had taken place before his own days. His thought was also 
deeply influenced by the revived interest in natural law during his days which held, as 
discussed above, that the political community was the result of “a natural bonding 
among persons for their common good, with the ruler bearing the overall 
responsibility for maintaining and protecting that good” (Johnson 2014, 36).   
Johnson (2013b, 25) identifies two directions from which the lead role of the 
authority criterion resulted. The first was the argument that only sovereign temporal 
rulers had the right to use armed force. In consequence, neither the Church nor 
private individuals were justified in using such force. This argument, as noted above, 
was a conscious attempt to rein in a worrisome proliferation of actors who claimed to 
have the right to use armed force and which had resulted in “widespread banditry and 
warlordism” (Johnson 2007, 7). The canonists denied the Church the use of force in 
line with the idea of the two swords which, introduced by Pope Gelasius I in order 
distinguish between the ecclesiastical and temporal spheres, resulted in the argument 
that only the temporal power had the right to employ force. With regard to private 
individuals the argument was that they could appeal to their superiors in order to 
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establish or re-establish a state of justice. Only the highest of superiors, the sovereign, 
had the right to resort to armed force because he alone had no temporal superior 
(Johnson 2013b, 25). That is why St Thomas argued that “Now in human society no 
man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a 
private individual not having public authority takes another's property by violence, he 
acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do”  (ST, II-II, q. 66, a. 8). It was 
the sovereign’s responsibility to ensure a tranquillitas ordinis: “Here the right to use 
force is tied explicitly to the obligation to protect and preserve justice by restoring it 
when it has been violated and by punishing those persons responsible for the 
violation” (Johnson 2014, 2). St Thomas (ST, II-II, q. 64, a. 3) thus comes to the 
following conclusion: “I answer that, As stated above [Article 2], it is lawful to kill an 
evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it 
belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a 
physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the 
health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons 
of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can 
lawfully put evildoers to death.” Theologically, too, this take reiterated the distinction 
between public war and the illicit private use of force, of which the latter, according to 
St Augustine, was “inherently unjust because tinged with sinful self-love” (Johnson 
2007, 5).  
At the same time, the limitation of the use of force to sovereign authority only 
took on a crucial role with regard to the moral distinctiveness of war which today’s 
revisionist just war theorists so vehemently oppose: “it distinguished bellum, war, as 
an activity on behalf of the common good, from duellum, the duel, use of arms by 
individual knights and nobles without sovereign authority” (2007, 5). The result was 
“a first instance of a double bind between legitimate authority and the use of force in 
the context of medieval legal thought. In sum, a war was just by virtue of being waged 
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by a prince, yet what made a prince a prince was his right to wage war” (Bartelson 
2010, 90). 
The second direction Johnson identifies was the reflection about “the moral 
responsibilities and personal characteristics of the ideal or ‘good’ ruler” (2013b, 25). 
Medieval accounts such as Aquinas’s commonly referred to Romans 13:4 “as a kind of 
motto” (Johnson 2014, 13) which defined authority, including the authority to use 
force, as having been bestowed upon the ruler by God: “He beareth not the sword in 
vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.” 
As Johnson (2007, 5-6) points out, since the times of St Augustine Christian thinking 
on authority considered the use of force as a part of the ruler’s responsibility to 
maintain and establish order in accordance with God’s will. Aquinas contributed a 
great deal to this literature in that he explained this divine responsibility, as pointed 
out above, within the context of natural law. In addition, Romans 13:4 also had 
significance for the character formation of the good ruler because the ruler, as 
“minister” of God, had to acquire the necessary virtues (Johnson 2014, 13-14). For a 
discussion of how St Thomas related his account of virtue ethics to the personal 
characteristics of the good ruler see the discussion in Reichberg (2017, 134-141). It 
suffices here to note that “the prince or sovereign ruler was defined in moral terms as 
having ultimate responsibility for the overall good of the political community 
governed, and this responsibility requires the right of recourse to the sword to deal 
with both internal and external threats to this good” (Johnson 2013b, 25).  
In addition, it has been argued that through his “superimposition of an 
Aristotelian account of political community on to the received doctrine” (Bartelson 
2010, 91) Aquinas gave increased emphasis to the prince’s responsibility of defending 
the common good. “The authority of the prince is legitimized with reference to his 
ability to defend the political community against both internal and external enemies. 
From this point of view, going to war for reasons other than the good of the 
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community would not only make that particular war unjust, but would also 
undermine the legitimacy of princely authority” (2010, 91).  
It must be said, however, that Bartelson (2010, 95) seems to go too far when 
he argues that Aquinas’s thinking equates to “relocating the source of legitimacy from 
the persona of the prince to the body politic.” Aquinas was very much a scholar of his 
time who believed in the precept of Rom. 13:4. It is thus preferable to side with 
Reichberg (2017, 114-141) who partly embraces Bartelson’s general argument of St 
Thomas having emphasised defensive rationales of war, but without denying the 
punitive and restorative rationales Johnson stresses in Aquinas’s just war. In 
particular, Reichberg interprets St Thomas as having put forward two arguments for 
sovereign authority. The first one was the one he inherited from his predecessors and 
which stressed the responsibility to use force in order to remedy past wrongs. The 
second one focused on the ruler’s responsibility for the common good and the virtues 
the ruler had to acquire in order to get there. As a result, as Reichberg (2017, 141) 
concludes, Aquinas, in this second argument, “prioritized the newly emergent idea of 
‘defensive war,’ and prompted a line of reflection that would emphasize non punitive 
rationales for resorting to armed force.” 
The confluence of the two directions which led to the classical authority 
criterion is indicated in St Thomas’s complete account of authority in war (ST, II-II, 
q. 40, a. 1) in which he argues that 
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the 
authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the 
business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his 
rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private 
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as 
the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their 
business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to 
them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that 
common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according 
to the words of the Apostle (Rm. 13:4): “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is 
God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil”; so too, it is their 
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business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against 
external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the 
poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner”; and for this reason 
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): “The natural order conducive to peace among 
mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of 
those who hold the supreme authority.” 
Given this foundation, in sum, Johnson (2014, 84) argues that the classical 
understanding of sovereignty as understood by thinkers like Aquinas was a top-down 
approach which followed from the responsibilities of the ruler who held responsibility 
for the common good. It was an understanding of sovereignty that did not, like the 
modern conception, understand sovereignty in terms of the state and the inviolability 
of its borders (2014, 2). The ruler took on the function of a judge; a just war “has to 
do precisely with the execution of justice in response to injustice. This is the function 
of just war, bellum iustum” (Johnson 2013b, 26). In St Thomas’s own words (ST, II-
II, q. 66, a. 8): “As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they 
may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or 
coercion, save within the bounds of justice—either by fighting against the enemy, or 
against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this 
kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice.” In this regard, 
Bartelson (2010, 88) speaks of a medieval understanding of authority as law 
enforcement.  
The right to self-defence, in this understanding, was taken for granted. It was 
a self-evident truth of natural law. That is why in a seminal work Pope Innocent IV 
(2006, 150-151) did not use the term for war when he referred to defensive uses of 
force: “It is permissible for anyone to wage war in self-defense or to protect property. 
Nor is this properly called ‘war’ (bellum) but rather ‘defense’ (defensio). [One] may 
lawfully fight back on the spot (incontinenti) (…) before he has turned his attention to 
other matters.” Every person had a right to self-defence and it was considered to be 
the logical consequence that the political community also enjoyed that right.  
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Extending beyond mere self-defence, for classical thinkers the responsibility 
for the common good also included what might be considered as offensive force, 
namely the right to punish and the retaking of property which had been unjustly 
seized. Crucially, the common good came in two forms. First, there was the common 
good of the ruler’s own political community. However, there was also the common 
good of all humanity. In consequence, maintaining and establishing justice and peace 
could require the use of force both within and without one’s own territory (Johnson 
2014, 2). In contrast to the modern understanding, in the Middle Ages, there was no 
sovereignty in the sense that even in the face of grave violations of natural law a ruler 
had to fear no sanction because of the inviolability of his borders. While the sovereign 
temporal ruler was the only body to use the sword within the political community 
there was no such sovereignty between political communities. As Philpott (1995, 356-
357) puts it, in the Middle Ages, “every ruler both endured limits within his own 
territory and enjoyed some claims over the internal prerogatives of other rulers within 
Christendom.” In other words, in the classical just war, it is  
(…) the sovereign ruler of each political community as the final repository of 
responsibility for the good of that community and for the nexus of relations among 
communities that serves to protect and reinforce the good of all. Here the 
responsibility to govern is understood as moral in character; it is to serve the good of 
the community for which the sovereign, and only the sovereign, has overall 
responsibility. Hence, on this conception, the idea of just war is not merely procedural 
or formal but also serves to establish that only the sovereign has the right to resort to 
armed force and thus has a monopoly on the use of such force within the political 
community or on behalf of that community in relations with others. Putting the 
requirement of sovereign authority first means both that the sovereign is the one who 
must judge whether a use of armed force in a given case would be just or unjust and 
whether it would serve peace, and that the sovereign is the one charged with using 
such force only with a right intention, and thus in the right way. (Johnson 2013b, 23-
24) 
Within Christendom, there was “moral and legal unity. Although nobody was 
sovereign within this realm, natural law obligated all of the faithful, and everybody 
was tied to someone else by some sort of legal bond” (Philpott 1995, 362). That is why 
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St Thomas (ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1), immediately following his reference to Rom 13:4, 
argues that “Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): ‘Rescue the poor: 
and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner’; and for this reason Augustine says 
(Contra Faust. xxii, 75): ‘The natural order conducive to peace among mortals 
demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those 
who hold the supreme authority.’” There should thus always be a moment of critical 
reflection before drawing parallels between medieval and modern-day warfare as the 
underlying differences in the conceptualisation of the state invite misinterpretation 
(Beestermöller 1990, 25). 
4.4.2 Westphalian Sovereignty 
The modern understanding of sovereignty, “known alternatively as ‘the Westphalian 
system’ or as ‘the United Nations system’” (Johnson 2014, 1), first comprehensively 
advanced by Grotius, was a bottom-up approach in the sense that the ruler was only 
the representative of the people who had the function to protect the rights the people 
had handed to him, her, or them (2014, 84). As Reichberg (2017, 232) distinguishes 
between the very different conceptualisations of respublica and the modern state: 
“Aquinas, by contrast, writing as he did toward the end of the feudal period in 
medieval Europe, conceptualized the respublica as an organic entity that was 
constituted by personal rather than purely formal ties between a lord and his 
subjects.” Instead of residing with the ruler as the person responsible for the common 
good of the political community, Westphalia understood sovereignty as a 
characteristic of the community itself (Johnson 2013b, 21). As Bartelson (2010, 93) 
notes, “With Grotius, the legitimate authority necessary to justify warfare was firmly 
located in the modern state, and defined in terms of its sovereignty. Sovereignty in 
turn was understood as the supreme and indivisible authority within a given territory, 
its legitimacy deriving from the tacit consent of self-interested subjects themselves 
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enjoying a right of self-preservation analogous to that of states coexisting in a state of 
nature.” 
Westphalia constituted a pendulum swing away from Aquinas’s natural law 
ethics as Grotius, while still a Christian thinker himself, grappled with an 
understanding of sovereignty that de-emphasised its divine origin. As Hehir (1992, 
238-239) puts it, “The transmission of the normative doctrine from Augustine to 
Aquinas had presupposed the framework of the Respublica Christiana, a political 
system which was profoundly altered by the rise of the lay-state in the fourteenth 
century and the rise of the nation state in the sixteenth century. The Spanish 
scholastics and Grotius were all involved in the effort to salvage the substance of the 
natural law ethic, and specifically the just war teaching, in a new setting where princes 
no longer acknowledged a higher authority in the world of politics or religion.” 
Following from this new understanding, authority was limited to the self-defence of 
the territorially defined political community.  
The essentials of this conception of sovereignty were a particular national territory 
inhabited by a particular people with their particular history, expressed in the patterns 
of everyday life and in their laws, customs, and institutions, and the right of the people 
to defend all this against any challenge to it. In this understanding two characteristics 
stand out: the definition of sovereignty in terms of territory that may be defended and 
the concept of the people as having one fundamental right, that of self-defense, whose 
exercise they delegate, within the political community, to their rulers for defense of 
the entire national territory. (Johnson 2014, 1) 
Had it been a command of natural law during the Middle Ages to rectify a tyrant’s 
grave violations of that law, he could now act with impunity within his own borders. 
As Philpott (1995, 364) summarises, “Westphalia set new standards for each of 
sovereignty’s three faces. It made the sovereign state the legitimate political unit. It 
implied that basic attributes of statehood such as the existence of a government with 
control of its territory were now, along with Christianity, the criteria for becoming a 
state. Finally, as it came to be practiced, the Treaty removed all legitimate restrictions 
on a state’s activities within its territory.” 
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Instead of starting with the authority criterion, contemporary just war 
thinkers start with considerations of justice as expressed in the just cause criterion. 
Both Walzer, due to his indebtedness to international law, and revisionists, who 
reason from the principle of individual self-defence, embrace this modern 
understanding. The problem that results, according to Johnson, is that in this 
understanding it remains unclear who is responsible for deciding on matters of 
justice. As he (2013b, 21) laments: “Who makes the decision regarding justice? That 
is left unclear; but perhaps it is the moralists, or perhaps it is public opinion, or 
perhaps it is the law itself and the lawyers who interpret it. In any case, the role of the 
political authority is secondary, reacting to whatever has been determined by the 
appropriate experts with regard to justice.”  
While Johnson detects the prototypical statement of the modern 
understanding of authority in recent statements by the US Catholic bishops the 
revisionist just war camp has arguably been willing to go even further. While 
contemporary just war thinkers like the US bishops, according to Johnson (2013b, 
20), have relegated the authority criterion to second or third place some revisionists 
seek to abandon it altogether. In a sense this move is unsurprising given that most 
revisionists’ sole interest is in finding the moral truth and they have no second 
thoughts about whether they actually have the authority to decide whose conduct is 
just or unjust. As Johnson (2013b, 24) notes, the role of the moralist was more limited 
and modest in the classical just war: “Within this frame specialists in moral thinking, 
along with specialists working from other perspectives, may (and should) offer advice, 
but final judgment rests with the sovereign, because the responsibility for the good of 
the community rests on him (or her or, in rare cases, them).”  
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4.5 Collectivists, Individualists, and Sovereign Authority 
Rather than being the result of flawed reasoning by collectivist thinkers, the 
differences between the classical and revisionist/cosmopolitan take on authority 
resonate from distinct philosophical points of departure; the main difference, as it 
turns out, lies in their use of different units of analysis. While the classical just war 
bestows special value on the political community it is the individual, for revisionists, 
who functions as the entry point of moral debate. In taking political communities as 
primary unit of analysis it should be noted that Walzerians in actual fact have “much 
in common with classical Aristotelian approaches to the jus ad bellum, like that 
offered by Aquinas” (O’Driscoll 2009, 33).  
In what follows, the points of critique which surfaced in the above discussion 
of the revisionist/cosmopolitan argument will be considered. As it turns out, while 
Steinhoff is correct in parts of his rebuttal of Coates, his critique does not succeed 
against the classical just war of St Thomas. An unbiased investigation concludes that 
what Steinhoff considers to be the moral truth is only the result of his individualist 
starting point. The collectivist classical just war, due to its different starting point, 
arrives at opposite conclusions. Besides considering the rather narrow dispute 
between Coates and Steinhoff this section seeks to illuminate the differences between 
collectivists and revisionists from a broader perspective. Therefore, the discussion will 
consider additional aspects of the debate which only partly featured in the above 
discussion of the two authors. In order to do that, Reitberger (2013, 66) provides a 
fairly comprehensive list of charges against what he calls the “Legitimate Authority 
Requirement (LAR)” the most important of which will be considered before the 
background of different philosophical outlooks. In particular, Reitberger questions 
(…) that the LAR is necessary in order to promote peace and stability; that non-
authorities have access to arbitration and redress from states, hence do not need to 
wage war; that just war is similar to law-enforcement and must be similarly restricted; 
that only those representing a political community have a right to wage war on behalf 
of it; that the LAR improves the chance that wars will be fought for just reasons (jus 
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ad bellum); that the LAR is necessary to maintain the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants and preserve non-combatant immunity; and finally, that the LAR 
is necessary to establish an effective chain of command, greatly improving the chances 
that wars will be fought with just means (jus in bello). 
4.5.1 Steinhoff’s Particular Critique of Coates 
This section first considers the aspects in which Steinhoff’s objections succeed before 
the discussion turns to the aspects in which his critique misses the point. As it turns 
out, while the majority of his objections are unfounded and only seem to be the result 
of different starting points of analysis, even in the cases where Steinhoff has a point 
against Coates, he fails to contradict the Thomistic just war.  
To begin with, Steinhoff (2007, 10) claims that “the greatest crimes in human 
history have been committed by states or empires, not by subnational terror groups 
or guerilla movements.” He charges that Coates (2016, 149) is incorrect in arguing 
that “modern revolutionary war is countervalue warfare in its purest form.” Here, in 
fact, one encounters the first instance where Steinhoff’s critique succeeds. However, 
Steinhoff only succeeds against Coates, not against the classical just war generally, 
certainly not against the Thomistic just war. To begin with, as indicated above, while 
Steinhoff is arguably correct that the greatest crimes have been committed by states, 
this does not amount to a contradiction of the requirement of sovereign authority as 
these wars did not meet the criteria of just cause and right intention and were thus 
unjust wars. Steinhoff seems to be correct, however, that Coates’s claim that modern 
revolutionary war is always unjust is flawed. The reason why this is the case leads back 
to the discussion of resistance undertaken in the previous section. In cases of blatantly 
unjust rule, St Thomas, although he would stress the virtue of prudence in this regard, 
would acknowledge a right to act against the tyrant. He thus does not rule out 
revolution per se and he would not hold, as Coates seems to do, that any revolutionary 
war has to be indiscriminate and disproportionate. 
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Steinhoff detects another flaw in Coates’s argument which, upon closer 
investigation, in actual fact turns out to be problematic, but which does not contradict 
the classical just war. Rather, Coates seems to part with the classical take in this 
instance. Steinhoff (2007, 12) accuses Coates of a contradiction in that he defines a 
legitimate authority as an authority  
(…) which is a legitimate (whatever that may precisely mean) representative of a 
community and, in addition, one which abides by the law (whatever the law may 
actually be) that is valid for interstate or intercommunity relations.  
With such an understanding of legitimate authority, however, Coates 
contradicts himself. Since he doubtlessly regards the requirements of causa justa and 
non-combatant immunity, which are (among others) necessary for the legitimization 
of war, as constituents of international law, legitimate authority is, against his claims, 
by no means logically prior in his conception, but rather dependent upon these 
requirements: an actor who enters armed conflicts without just cause and without 
respect for the principle of non-combatant immunity does not have legitimate 
authority.  
For the classical just war, sovereign authority considered acting according to the 
natural law as a non-negotiable pre-requisite. Coates (2016, 143-144), however, states 
that “even when an individual state acts ostensibly on its own behalf, if it acts in 
defence of its legitimate interests or in vindication of its rights, it acts at the same time 
as the agent and representative of the international community. In order to be 
authoritative, the defence of its ‘particular’ right must constitute at the same time an 
upholding of the rule of international law and of the shared values in which the 
common good of the international community consists.”  
Assuming that Coates in his reference to international law refers to positive 
international law Steinhoff is right to argue that Coates contradicts himself as natural 
law and positive international law are at odds with each other in many respects. Had 
Coates referred to the natural law instead of international law his claim that the 
authority criterion is logically prior would not have been a contradiction. Natural law 
takes for granted that man, in order to lead a flourishing life, must live in society. In 
other words, from a natural law perspective, Coates’s second of the two elements 
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needed for legitimate authority, abiding by the law, would be redundant; both aspects 
are part of the natural law.  
Importantly, one might even go further than Steinhoff’s critique. The classical 
just war, following the first principle of natural law, stressed that a just war had to 
discriminate between the guilty and the innocent. Current positive international law, 
however, holds that once war has broken out combatants on both the just and unjust 
sides enjoy the same rights. Admittedly, as noted earlier, St Thomas’s just war was 
flexible enough to consider granting equal rights to soldiers fighting for an unjust 
cause. However, granting equal rights did not affect the question of moral equality 
and certainly was not his default position as is the case in international law. 
Consequently, Coates’s authority requirement, through grounding it in positive 
international rather than natural law, is very much at odds with the classical just war 
in this respect. 
The first aspect in which Steinhoff is incorrect is when he criticises Coates on 
the issue of war as only to take place between legitimate authorities (2007, 7). In 
contrast to what Steinhoff suggests, Coates is right that the classical just war as 
represented by the thinking of St Thomas held that war, bellum, could only be waged 
between sovereign authorities, that is, between sovereign temporal rulers. The reason 
for that was exactly the concern of reining in the widespread use of violence by various 
types of actors at the time. The classical just war is simply fundamentally at odds with 
the revisionist/cosmopolitan take that any individual has the right to wage war. 
Unsurprisingly, given Steinhoff’s wrong reading of history, he does not provide a 
single counter-example from within the classical just war.  
The next issue of contention Steinhoff detects, likewise, misses the point. The 
first of Coates’s ostensible “double standards” (2007, 8) is that Coates seems to 
suggest that the indiscriminate killing carried out by individuals constitutes terrorism 
while the same type of killing by the state as legitimate authority does not. Steinhoff 
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objects to this linguistic double standard. Historically speaking, however, the word 
“terrorism” entered the English language from the French only after the French 
Revolution in the late 18th century. For St Thomas, such violence carried out by 
individuals would have come under the Latin term of rixa (brawling), “a use of force 
to effect private vengeance or to secure other unjustifiable ends, in the absence of 
authorization from legitimate authority, or in a manner disproportionate to the initial 
offense” (Reichberg 2017, 270-271). While St Thomas held that sovereign authorities 
could not undertake rixa, this did by no means mean that a sovereign’s bellum could 
not be unjust.  
Thus, Steinhoff’s scenario of “state terrorism,” namely the indiscriminate 
killing of Palestinians by Israeli forces, would doubtlessly be an unjust war for 
classical just war thinkers. For the classical just war, the emphasis was on limiting 
unjust employments of force. Distinguishing between public and private uses of force 
was considered to be essential in this regard. That is why Coates does not want to label 
unjust actions by sovereign authorities, such as the one referenced by Steinhoff, as 
terrorism. For critics this may amount to a linguistic double standard, but it certainly 
is no moral double standard. 
Steinhoff continues his critique by questioning that the legitimate authority 
criterion is “logically prior” (2007, 8). He suggests that such an interpretation would 
amount to an “enabling act” (2007, 8) for sovereign authorities. He provides a drastic 
example in which a sovereign authority could justly declare children to be legitimate 
targets. However, contrarily to what he seems to suggest, logically prior does not mean 
that sovereign authority is the only criterion that must be met for a war to be just. St 
Thomas, as does Coates, held that for a war to be just, the criteria of just cause and 
right intention also had to be met. Killing the innocent, as in the example Steinhoff 
suggests, would be the prototypical unjust war for classical just war thinkers.  
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In addition, the assertion that an attack on a representative of the legitimate 
authority such as a policeman is more reprehensible than an attack on an unarmed 
civilian is vehemently rejected by Steinhoff (2007, 9). Upon an unbiased look, the 
reason for this argument is not, as Steinhoff suggests, the result of poor moral 
intuitions but flows directly from the main disagreement between collectivists and 
individualists. The classical just war allocates a special moral value to the political 
community as the enabler of a flourishing life. Attacking this institution thus amounts 
to an attack on civilised life itself, leading to the argument that killing a representative 
of the authority is morally worse than killing an innocent bystander. For the sake of 
clarity, one may add that the classical just war would always, without question, 
consider the killing of an innocent person, whether or not a representative of the 
political community, unjust. 
Next, Steinhoff (2007, 9) turns against Coates’s (2016, 141) argument that “the 
public monopoly of the use of force remains a fundamental step in any process of 
pacification, and securing that monopoly is a precondition of civilized society.” 
Steinhoff holds that the key aspect in Coates’s assertion is the meaning of the word 
“civilized.” He argues that if democracy is meant by civilised, then “breaking this 
monopoly of violence is a historical and, under most circumstances even today, (…) 
indispensable precondition” (2007, 9). Once again, there seems to be no contradiction 
here. As both Coates and the classical just war as represented in the thought of St 
Thomas hold, the public monopoly of force is not unconditional but bound to the 
precepts of natural law. That is why Aquinas confirms the right of resistance against 
unjust rule. In order to rule justly, the sovereign would have to work for the common 
good of his political community. If the sovereign violates this duty, a right to 
resistance arises which has been subject to extensive debate within the classical just 
war literature. Likewise, although the state is a natural result of humankind’s social 
nature its establishment might nonetheless require the use of force as the state comes 
into existence through the work of human hands. 
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An instance where Steinhoff clearly misinterprets the classical just war is his 
interpretation of sovereignty. Elaborating on Coates who regrets that the classical 
authority criterion has become subordinated to the modern concept of state 
sovereignty built around the principles of political sovereignty and territorial integrity 
Steinhoff (2007, 11) argues: “According to Coates, the principle in its earlier and 
traditional form was far more demanding – which is incorrect, as in fact medieval 
theorists for the most part subsumed legitimate authority to the sovereignty of the 
ruler.” Unfortunately, however, it is in fact Steinhoff whose history is mistaken. For 
thinkers like St Thomas there was no such thing as inviolable sovereignty. Any ruler 
was bound by natural law and, in case the ruler broke it in a grave enough manner, 
other rulers were justified in taking measures against that ruler. When Coates thus 
argues that the old authority criterion was more demanding he refers to the duty of 
the ruler to obey the natural law, an obligation from which his territorial borders could 
provide no exception. 
4.5.2 General Revisionist/Cosmopolitan Objections against  
           Sovereign Authority 
Instead of attempting a lengthy rebuttal, the following section points out why a 
collectivist moral approach will continue to insist on the moral purchase of the 
authority criterion. While Steinhoff argues that every individual has the authority to 
wage war, Reitberger does not embrace this view. However, he argues that the 
criterion of “legitimate authority” as it was, for example, employed by St Thomas is 
ethically indefensible. “When we regard legitimate authority as a deontological 
requirement, however, defensive wars could be unjust if they are fought by the wrong 
type of actor, lacking proper authorization, such as individuals or self-organized 
collectives of individuals. And this is unreasonable” (2013, 72). Reitberger (2013, 73) 
builds his argument around the thinking of McMahan and concludes that “the right 
to self-defense appears to be independent of the number of attackers as well as their 
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form of political organization.” The problem with the authority criterion, according 
to Reitberger, is that it insists that at some point a group of individuals loses its right 
to self-defence because they do not resemble a recognised authority. Thus, “A cut-off 
point must be established between individuals defending themselves together (which 
would presumably still be justified) and groups waging unjust war because they fail to 
live up to the LAR. Unless such a cut-off-point can be established it seems illogical to 
insist upon legitimate authority in cases of self-defense unless one is willing to deny 
or restrict the right of individuals to defend themselves in the first place, singly or 
jointly” (2013, 73). 
In response, the ostensible problem of finding a “cut-off point” is of no concern 
for the classical just war as it resides with the individual. The classical just war holds 
that every individual has the right to self-defence. One may use lethal force, if 
proportionate, on the spot in order to prevent an attack on one’s life. Importantly, in 
such an instance the defender would not wage “war,” but rather act in “defence.” It 
goes without saying that, in case the violence took place in a group setting, people 
nearby would not have to stand idly by. Quite the contrary, in line with the demand of 
love of neighbour, such persons would be morally obliged to assist the victim in his or 
her act of self-defence. Importantly, such an act of “group violence” would, likewise, 
not be an act of “war.” Here, discussion touches again on the crucial distinction of the 
classical just war that only the sovereign authority may wage war. For the classical just 
war there is no point at which a group of individuals loses its right to self-defence 
because it never had such a right in the first place. Only individuals may use force in 
individual self-defence; collective self-defence, one of the three just causes for war, 
falls within the sole authority of the sovereign. 
Having resolved the important “war or no war” issue, a further critique 
Reitberger (2013, 78) puts forward is directed against the classical idea that the 
authority criterion was a pre-requisite of promoting peace in that it banned the use of 
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private warfare. Objecting to an unlimited authority criterion he (2013, 79) argues 
“However, it is clear that this argument must have limits – pacification does not 
require complete monopolization of force, and monopolization does not override 
basic rights. Virtually all societies recognize a right for individuals to defend 
themselves, with lethal force if necessary, suggesting that the monopoly is 
conditional.” In response, it is unclear what exactly Reitberger is criticising here as St 
Thomas supported the right of individual self-defence. Furthermore, classical 
thinkers acknowledged that in case of grave violations of the natural law by the ruler 
a right of resistance would arise. The “monopolisation” was thus always limited. 
Importantly, it was limited both from the inside and the outside. In cases of grave 
violations of the natural law there would not only be a right to resistance domestically 
but also a duty of neighbouring princes to intervene from the outside. 
Next, Reitberger (2013, 80) turns against the classical argument that the 
authority criterion provided the “possibility of arbitration” which thus made the 
private resort to force unnecessary. He flatly rejects this view as “flawed” (2013, 80-
81): “It is an open question whether the legal channels (when they exist) actually do 
provide a possibility of arbitration and redress for citizens. The argument assumes 
that the legal channels are responsive to citizens’ rights, needs and entitlements and 
capable of effectively protecting them, and judging from historical as well as present 
experience it cannot be taken for granted that the legal authorities actually provide 
redress for injured parties.”  
Underlying Reitberger’s very critical view of authority here seems to be his 
individualist moral starting point. The classical just war simply had a much more 
positive view of sovereign authority as making a major contribution to the common 
good. Of course, Aquinas was not naïve and recognised that authority was always 
subject to abuse. Such abuse, however, was the result of a violation of the natural law. 
That is why he was so insistent on his virtue ethics approach which would enable the 
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individual to meet the demands of natural law in order to lead a flourishing life. The 
same basic difference between an individualist and collectivist outlook underlies 
Reitberger’s (2013, 81- 83) opposition to the classical understanding of war as law 
enforcement. “If proper law enforcement and protection is available, it is obvious that 
we should let the responsible authorities fight wars on behalf of society, for the same 
reason that we should preferentially let the police catch thieves – they are hopefully 
best suited for the job. But if the authorities cannot or would not enforce the law, or 
the laws that are enforced violate basic human rights, there is no valid reason to insist 
that only the authorities have the right to wage war in defense of such rights” (2013, 
82). 
Reitberger continues his attempt to contradict the authority criterion with 
discussions of the remaining issues on his list cited above. Due to space concerns the 
discussion does not consider these additional but minor concerns, concluding that the 
single most fundamental reason behind the contemporary rejection of the authority 
criterion is a matter of perspective. In line with the precepts of liberal political 
philosophy generally revisionist/cosmopolitan just war thinkers start from an 
individualist point of view which is necessarily at odds with the collectivist outlook of 
thinkers who stress the importance of sovereign authority. 
 
4.6 The Authority to Conduct Targeted Killings 
This final section assesses in which respects the classical just war understanding of 
sovereign authority can be helpful in finding an ethically defensible answer to small-
scale uses of force. Importantly, in contrast to the Walzerian just war, it is not positive 
international law but natural law which functions as the baseline of argument. While 
this argument about the morality of targeted killings has a common starting point 
with Walzerians in collectivism its main concern is the morality of war, not a space in-
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between the morality and legality of war. Thus, in a sense, the classical just war is 
closer to the “deep morality of war” of revisionists. However, making such an 
argument does in no way deny that the legal regulation of war has moral value. 
Following St Thomas, what is right (ius) does not necessarily define human law (lex) 
in every detail.  
In addition, the demise of the classical understanding of sovereign authority 
was the result of several aspects one of which was the concern to draft laws which 
would reduce the occurrence and violence of war. After all, as Johnson (2014, 137-
138) emphasises, the classical understanding of sovereignty was not abandoned 
without reasons and one should keep in mind Hehir’s warning (1992, 255) that “The 
wisdom of Westphalia should not be too quickly dismissed.” However, it is also true 
that, as Johnson argues, something was lost when the modern understanding of 
sovereignty was established. The task of recovering parts of what has been lost without 
giving up the positive changes the new understanding of sovereignty contributed is 
thus a delicate one.  
Fortunately, the task that must be undertaken with regard to small-scale force 
is not without precedent. Arguably, the contemporary debate about a “duty to protect” 
seeks to recover parts of the classical understanding that rulers could not hide behind 
their borders when they blatantly violated the natural law and it was the responsibility 
of that ruler’s peers to stop those violations. Johnson (2014, 137-154), in his analysis 
of the “R2P” debate, emphasises the “dilemma” (2014, 142) of the legalist paradigm 
“posed in the state of the law of the time: on the one hand, a body of international 
agreements of various sorts and levels of authority seeking to identify human rights 
and provide for their protection against violation; on the other hand, a prohibition 
against the use of armed force by states except in defense against ‘armed attack,’ which 
had been a principle of international law since the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter in 1945.” 
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In line with the classical understanding of war as a legal proceeding this 
section seeks to recover parts of the classical understanding of sovereign authority for 
the regulation of targeted killings. Importantly, the argument it makes is no call to 
completely abandon the modern understanding of sovereignty with its limitation of 
just cause to self-defence. Rather, this section calls for a limited return to classical 
sovereign authority with regard to the contemporary threat posed by non-state 
terrorist actors. Subdivided into a discussion of external and internal authority the 
section discusses the moral issues associated with the increase in small-scale force 
which the introductory chapter identified. With regard to external matters, the 
argument will be made that cases in which terrorists plot or hide in a country whose 
government is unwilling or unable to prosecute them constitute a violation of natural 
law, a just cause that may be grave enough to warrant a targeted killing.  
Relatedly, because terrorists are no sovereign authority they do not enjoy 
moral equality. If the criteria of just cause and right intention are met they can be 
prosecuted, “brought to justice,” by a sovereign authority. Regarding internal 
authority, two particular issues will be discussed. Firstly, the problem of transparency 
which has arisen as a result of the secrecy behind the Obama administration’s 
programme of targeted killing. Secondly, and related to the first issue, the division of 
labour between the military and the CIA in carrying out targeted killings with 
apparently different rules of conduct for each governmental branch (see chapter 5 for 
case-based illustrations).  
To begin with, one particular challenge that must be addressed is that “of de-
territorialised, transnational terrorism that appeals to a political agenda that sits 
uneasily within a Westphalian conception of the role of territory” (Williams 2006, 
133). The problem that arises in cases such as those presented in this thesis is that at 
times terrorists seek to escape justice by hiding in third countries. Such hiding was 
clearly the case with Osama bin Laden (see 5.5) and Anwar al-Awlaki (see 5.6). Both 
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these individuals hid in Pakistan and Yemen respectively in order to escape justice 
and, depending on one’s source, to plot further crimes. In these two cases, there was 
a somewhat inconclusive picture as to why the sovereigns of the countries in which 
the terrorists hid did not bring them to justice themselves. The bin Laden case is the 
most interesting in this regard as some argue the Pakistani government had no 
knowledge about bin Laden’s whereabouts while the Hersh account goes as far as to 
argue that bin Laden was somehow protected by Islamabad. What seems 
indisputable, however, is that, in both cases, the sovereign was either “unable or 
unwilling” to carry out its task, namely to ensure a state of justice.  
In the face of this failure, it seems reasonable to argue that the government 
which had been wronged, the United States, did not have to stand idly by and accept 
a continuing state of injustice which the two terrorists’ hiding constituted. From a 
Thomistic perspective, given such circumstances, the US did have the authority to 
bring them to justice. Arguing this way, the conundrum Walzer (see, e.g., 2016) 
identifies when he speaks of parts of the “war on terror” as lying somewhere in-
between law enforcement and war, the notion that led him to first think about the 
concept of jus ad vim, can be resolved. The practice of targeted killing is law 
enforcement through war; its function parallels a legal proceeding whose objective is 
the re-establishment of a state of justice. Importantly, this does not mean that bin 
Laden and al-Awlaki were liable to be killed without further consideration. Before 
arriving at such a conclusion the criteria of just cause and right intention must be 
considered also. The argument made here is solely that, due to the failure of the 
sovereign in whose territory the terrorists hide, the sovereign who suffered from an 
injustice by those terrorists has the general authority to bring them to justice, to wage 
war against them.  
Arguing that one particular country may have such authority does not, 
furthermore, reject positions which favour collective responses to terrorist action such 
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as allocating this authority to the United Nations. After all, as Midgley (1975, 20) 
notes, St Thomas does not rule out a progressive development of international society. 
However, as long as such supranational authority has not been established or has 
proven to be ineffective, as has arguably been the case with the UN system, the right 
to punish terrorists should reside with the afflicted states. Recent attempts to, for 
example, regulate drone warfare through an international regime (see, e.g., Buchanan 
and Keohane 2015) are thus broadly in line with a Thomistic take on such uses of 
violence.  
Given the position pronounced so far, the moral argument about authority and 
targeted killing has thus curious parallels with the “unable or unwilling” standard put 
forward by all US administrations since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 which Heinze 
(2011, 1080) refers to as a “regime of non-state responsibility.” One thus encounters 
in this argument a morally praiseworthy “renegotiation” of the just war tradition in 
classical just war terms which is not subject to the Westphalian principles. At the same 
time, however, arguing that one of the most controversial aspects of the “war on 
terror” is in fact morally defensible does not mean that the remaining just war criteria 
of just cause and right intention have been applied correctly. As a result, one may 
conclude that the warnings against a potential “everywhere war” (Gregory 2011) do 
not deny the moral authority to take action against the oftentimes borderless threat 
of Islamist terrorism.  
Having argued that territorial borders must not function as a tool of protecting 
injustice, however, should not be understood as denying the moral value of borders 
per se. After all, as argued above, the classical understanding of sovereignty which was 
replaced by Westphalian sovereignty did not come without moral justification. As 
Williams (2006, 130) notes: 
The strongest defence of the Westphalian border lies in its role in the nexus of rules 
and norms of interstate behaviour that aim to restrain the uses of violence in 
international relations. (…) The fear of abuse of relaxed rules by the powerful to pursue 
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expansionary or hegemonic wars; the fear of the opening of ‘domestic’ politics to 
violent intrusion by outsiders allowing cultural and religious divisions contained 
within the Westphalian structure to once again be a casus belli; the fear of a slippery 
slope to the Hobbesian abyss of the war of all against all motivates this defence. 
However, the fears listed by Williams are prudential concerns, not deontological ones. 
In order to avoid the slippery slope he identifies, the argument made here comes with 
a call for employing a considerable amount of prudence. In line with the general 
pedigree of the Christian just war tradition as being a tradition focusing on the “dual 
theme” (Johnson 1984, 2) of permission and restraint the argument made here only 
applies to the limited use of force. The argument does not extend to large-scale, state-
against-state, warfare. The lesson that history teaches is to limit the potential ignoring 
of territorial borders to the war against unjust culpable non-state actors. While there 
might be exceptions for “traditional” war as well, such as in the case of humanitarian 
intervention, engaging with those questions is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The question of how the concept of moral symmetry applies to the practice of 
targeted killing can be resolved quickly. For the Thomistic just war, modern-day 
terrorists cannot be the moral equals of the soldiers who, representing a sovereign 
authority, fight them. In addition, they cannot be exonerated of their personal 
culpability as might be the case for legitimate soldiers fighting on the unjust side and 
should thus not be granted equal rights. The reason for this is simply that terrorist 
violence always resembles an illicit private use of force, not war. The framework 
governing targeted killings should thus adopt the classical understanding of 
belligerency in which “the legal effects of a just war were viewed as benefiting the just 
belligerent only. The unjust adversary, by contrast, was not even properly speaking a 
belligerent; rather he was deemed the rebellious object of armed enforcement action 
and in this respect was likened to a criminal resisting arrest” (Reichberg 2013, 182). 
In consequence, the potentially problematic asymmetric operator-target relationship 
the introductory chapter identified as discussed in the literature review turns out to 
be no moral concern for the policy of targeted killing.  
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With regard to the domestic aspect of targeted killing this thesis does not 
follow Aquinas by the word. As pointed out above, there has been much debate about 
St Thomas’s preferences regarding the ideal type of government, but he certainly was 
no democrat in today’s understanding of the term. This thesis takes for granted that 
representative democracy is the best type of government. Importantly, making this 
argument does not affect the natural law argument as to how government comes into 
existence and what its purpose is, namely to contribute to the common good. Adopting 
a natural law position also means that the role of the moralist is, as Johnson 
emphasises, of a more modest kind. Putting significant trust in those in authority, the 
moralist seeks to offer advice. The final decision, however, the moralist is willing to 
accept, resides with decision-makers.  
One common aspect of small-scale employments of force is that they are 
subject to government secrecy. For example, if there was no such secrecy, at least one 
account of the bin Laden raid could easily be falsified. Moreover, in cases such as al-
Majalah (see 5.3), the US still has not acknowledged its role in carrying out the strike. 
On a different level, there has been much debate about the decision-making process 
leading up to targeted killings. Talk about secret “Terror Tuesday” meetings in the 
White House and obviously different rules of engagement for the military and the CIA 
in carrying out targeted killings caught the public eye. Furthermore, it seems unclear 
whether the president as commander-in-chief, as well as his subordinates, was 
sufficiently checked in his decisions and whether, in case of failure, was sufficiently 
held accountable.  
In what follows, instead of drafting precise rules for how the authority to 
conduct acts of targeted killings should be regulated the thesis reflects on what St 
Thomas had to say about authority and, then, draws conclusions. As pointed out 
above, Aquinas stressed man’s political nature which required him to live in society. 
One of the most important aspects in this regard was man’s ability to speak which sets 
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him apart from other animals. The ability to speak enables man to enter into dialogue 
and consequently advance the common good. Government, although instituted by 
God and necessarily somewhat removed from the society at large, must nonetheless 
give voice and listen to the community whose care it has been entrusted with. With 
regard to small-scale force, it seems that the Obama administration did not 
sufficiently engage in dialogue with the American people. Naturally, decision-makers 
must withhold information from the public that would otherwise endanger vital 
operations. However, there is a price for excessive secrecy such as arguably was the 
case in operations such as the bin Laden raid and the al-Majalah bombing, namely 
that the public’s trust in its government suffers. Kelsay (2013, 83) points to a tension 
between the justified withholding of information and excessive secrecy: “Officials who 
say that their presentation of evidence must be restricted for security reasons have a 
point, but it only goes so far.”  
In response to this tension, it seems reasonable to argue that when a state 
carries out targeted killings it, at least retrospectively, must acknowledge its hand in 
the operation. For if the reason for secrecy is to cover up an act of injustice, the 
government violates the natural law. In addition, there should be some sort of 
accountability mechanism which checks retrospectively whether the employment of 
lethal force was justified. Walzer (2016, 17-18) has suggested such a mechanism which 
would arguably contribute to government’s legitimacy in taking such decisions.  
All this suggests how important it is to open up the process by which lists of targets 
are put together and decisions about drone attacks are made. It can’t be right that a 
couple of people appointed by the president, with the president looking on, make these 
decisions entirely on their own. Particular decisions about particular targets will 
always be made by a small group, but these decisions should be subject to periodic 
review by a larger number of people inside the government but independent of the 
president’s office (and of the CIA). The general criteria for selecting targets (…) should 
also be considered and debated not only inside but also outside the government, by 
the body of citizens, by all of us. I don’t object to these killings because they are 
“extrajudicial”; my argument here refers only to dangerous enemies who can’t be 
captured and brought to trial. But I do want their deaths to be the subject of ongoing 
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political and moral arguments, and there should be known government officials 
accountable to the rest of us for attacks that go badly wrong. 
Finally, from a Thomistic perspective, the much debated “division of labour” 
between the military and the CIA in carrying out targeted killings is not morally 
problematic as such. In cases when targeted killings are justified, government has the 
authority to undertake them. Who carries out this task is a secondary question; there 
seems to be no decreasing moral value in the action only because the CIA, or JSOC, 
carries out such action. Having said that, however, it does indeed make a moral 
difference if one actor or the other is given the authority to strike in order to evade 
public accountability. As the cases chapter will illustrate, there seems to have been an 
attempt by the Obama administration to use the different legislation governing the 
conduct of the CIA and JSOC to ensure the most possible secrecy. If such secrecy is 
used in order to hide the US’s involvement in unjust conduct such behaviour is 
ethically indefensible. Furthermore, although there is no problem with two 
government agencies carrying out such action as such, it does make a difference if 
they are subject to different rules, some of which violate the natural law. For example, 
regarding the issue of so-called signature strikes, it seems that different rules apply to 
the CIA and the military. Signature strikes, from a natural law perspective, are 
inherently unjust as the identities of those who are targeted are unclear and thus no 
moral culpability has been determined. It is unjust if one actor, presumably the one 
which can act in the most secretive fashion, is given the permission to blatantly violate 
the natural law. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter, based on textual assessment and logic, has demonstrated that 
underlying the chasm between classical and Walzerian just war approaches on the one 
hand and revisionists on the other is a major philosophical disagreement. While the 
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former approaches allocate special moral value to the political community, most 
revisionists have an entirely different starting point, namely individual morality. It is 
this major disagreement that underlies the different understandings of the authority 
criterion. At the same time, the chapter has demonstrated that despite the 
commonality just pointed out between Walzerians and the classical just war, the latter 
had a very different understanding of sovereign authority compared to both the 
Walzerian and revisionist just wars. In particular, classical thinkers did not limit just 
war to the only just cause of self-defence and they, consequently, did not embrace the 
Westphalian standards of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. The chapter 
concluded by arguing for a limited recapture of the classical understanding of 
sovereign authority based on Thomistic natural law philosophy with regard to 
targeted killing, providing some insights into how such uses of violence should be 
regulated both externally and internally.  
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5 The Cases 
Introduction 
Preparing the ground for the second stage of this thesis’s argument with regard to 
small-scale force, the chapter on liability, this chapter provides eight detailed cases of 
small-scale employments of force carried out by the Obama administration. While the 
first post-9/11 targeted killings were authorised by the Bush administration, the 
practice only moved to the centre of attention during the presidency of Barack Obama. 
Before starting with the presentation of cases, it makes sense to provide a general 
summary of the Obama administration’s decision-making process leading up to the 
employment of such force. McNeal (2014, 728-729) provides the following digest of 
the approval process behind the so-called kill list: 
First, military and intelligence officials from various agencies compile data and make 
recommendations based on internal vetting and validation standards. Second, those 
recommendations go through the NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], which 
further vets and validates rosters of names and other variables that are further tailored 
to meet White House standards for lethal targeting. Third, the President’s designee 
(currently the counterterrorism adviser) convenes an NSC [National Security Council] 
deputies meeting to get input from senior officials, including top lawyers from the 
appropriate agencies and departments, such as the CIA, FBI, DOD, State Department, 
and NCTC. At this step is where the State Department’s Legal Adviser (…) and the 
Department of Defense General Counsel (…), along with other top lawyers, would have 
an opportunity to weigh in with legal opinions on behalf of their respective 
departments. Objections to a strike from top lawyers might prevent the decision from 
climbing further up the ladder absent more deliberation. In practice, an objection from 
one of these key attorneys almost certainly causes the President’s designee in the NSC 
process to hesitate before seeking final approval from the President. Finally, if the NSC 
gives approval, the President’s counterterrorism advisor shapes the product of the 
NSC’s deliberations and seeks final approval from the President. 
This general process should be kept in mind when considering the cases presented in 
this chapter. At times, it is impossible to identify the individual steps pointed out by 
McNeal as there is no knowledge of the exact deliberations leading up to a targeted 
killing. It must also be noted that the administration’s decision-making process 
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evolved over Obama’s two terms in office and might not yet have been employed as 
described by McNeal in some of the cases. 
With regard to case selection, an effort has been made to provide a sufficiently 
diverse set. The cases considered took place in three different countries and include 
commando raids, cruise missile strikes, and drone strikes. Moreover, cases are listed 
in chronological order, not in terms of decreasing moral certitude. For the ease of 
reading, the cases are grouped together in a single chapter. Instead of presenting 
detailed discussions of circumstances within the actual casuistical analysis, the reader 
is asked to refer back to the cases chapter in order to appreciate the cases’ complexity.  
 
5.1 The Yamamoto Paradigm 
Finding a paradigm for targeted killing requires to go beyond the war against Al Qaeda 
and associated forces. Leaving recent operations aside, the paradigm case can be 
found in the very first known wartime targeted killing the US carried out, namely the 
killing of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto during the Second World War. This 
case’s resolution, arguably universally accepted as morally appropriate, seems to 
underpin the reasoning of the Walzerian legalist paradigm and, at least partly, the 
revisionist just war, too. In addition, the Obama administration itself invoked the 
Yamamoto case as precedent for its policy of targeted killing (see, e.g., Holder 2012), 
an assertion that triggered clashing opinions (see, e.g., Goldsmith 2011a, b; Heller 
2011).  
The targeted killing of Admiral Yamamoto took place on April 18, 1943 next to 
the island of Bougainville in the South Pacific. Eighteen P-38 aircraft were launched 
from Henderson Field, Guadalcanal and intercepted the admiral’s bomber aircraft, 
shooting it down. The mission evolved in the wake of a single week; it was a “real-time 
decision,” meaning that there had been no pre-existing policy of specifically targeting 
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an individual (Arvanitakis 2015, 7). On April 13, US intelligence had intercepted secret 
Japanese communication which spelled out the minutiae of a planned troop 
inspection by the admiral close to the front line which would bring him within reach 
of US fighter aircraft. Since the 1920s, the US had been able to access secret Japanese 
communication, contributing to its victories in the Battle of Midway and Guadalcanal 
(Frank 1990, 38). After completely deciphering the message, its contents were 
presented to Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean 
Areas, as well as to the political leadership in Washington (Davis 2005, 227). Although 
there is no definitive account of the Yamamoto mission, Arvanitakis (2015, 8) points 
to “an adjudication process at the highest levels of command” which may even, more 
or less directly, have involved President Roosevelt.  
The military decision-making process seems to have been influenced, first and 
foremost, by considerations of utility, not morality (Davis 2005, 228-229). As Davis 
(1969, 7) quotes one participant of the deliberation process: “‘Assuming that we have 
planes able to intercept him – it would have to be planes – you should first consider, 
I suppose, what would be gained by killing him.’” Interestingly, punitive thinking 
played an important role in this regard: “(…) Yamamoto was now their implacable 
enemy, the man who had launched the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and had not 
willingly yielded an inch since then. From Hawaii to the Philippines to Java to 
Australia to the Solomon Islands, the blood of thousands of American and Allied 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen had been spilled because of Yamamoto, and here was an 
opportunity to eliminate him” (Davis 2005, 228). The aspect of self-defence as 
legitimate just cause to kill Yamamoto, although present, seems to have been 
subordinate to the retributive cause. The self-defence rationale shines through briefly 
in Davis’s account of Nimitz’s thinking: “Yamamoto was the beating heart of the 
Japanese navy. In his own country, he was seen as embodying the unwavering 
Bushido fighting spirit (2005, 228). (…) Layton and Nimitz also discussed the 
possibility that a successor to Yamamoto might present an even more formidable foe; 
127 
 
they concluded that the Japanese navy had no comparable leader of strategic vision, 
stature, and daring. He was, without a doubt, the leader, the man who made that huge 
fleet work” (2005, 229). This invocation of self-defence, however, is immediately 
followed by another punitive rationale, namely that of revenge (2005, 228-229): “In 
the United States, however, he was the hated face of the Japanese war machine. 
Americans still believed the small admiral arrogantly planned to dictate peace terms 
in the White House. Killing him would be a horrific setback for Japan, and, for 
America, payback for Pearl Harbor.” Revenge also featured prominently when Nimitz 
approved the mission: “This would be [sic] biggest mission any of them had ever 
flown, for if they knocked Yamamoto out of the war, it would be both a stunning 
military victory for the Americans and horrendous setback for the Japanese. They 
were being assigned to a mission of ultimate revenge, to settle accounts for all the 
maiming, misery, and blood that had been spilled in the South Pacific” (2005, 237). It 
is unsurprising that the targeted killing of Admiral Yamamoto is commonly known as 
“Operation Vengeance” although there is no official US record of such a mission 
(Arvanitakis 2015, 42). 
As to the question whether Yamamoto should specifically be targeted, there 
was considerable doubt whether the admiral’s killing would make a positive 
contribution to winning the war in the Pacific (2015, 4-5). Among the greatest 
concerns was the fear that the Japanese would figure out that their codes had been 
deciphered and would subsequently change them. The question was thus whether 
taking out Yamamoto was worth a gamble which might result in losing a major 
strategic asset (Davis 2005, 229). Eventually, this issue was resolved with the help of 
a cover story which gave credit to Australian coastwatchers to have intercepted the 
message (2005, 237). Moreover, another major concern was Yamamoto himself who 
was considered to be a possible “key to stopping the war” (2005, 229). The admiral 
had been against going to war with the US and had a high personal reputation both 
with the Japanese emperor and the Japanese people. If he gave up his uniform and 
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joined the War Cabinet, some argued, he could become a key voice within government 
to push for a peace settlement (2005, 229).  Davis (2005, 289-290) succinctly 
summarises these concerns as follows: 
There was also a faction that desperately wanted Isokuru Yamamoto to live, not die. 
(…) the war cabinet in Tokyo, headed by Premier Tojo and his powerful army 
supporters, would never admit the war was lost. Yamamoto was the only person who 
stood any chance of challenging them. Not only did the admiral have a close 
relationship with Emperor Hirohito, he was an acknowledged naval hero and was 
idolized by the common man. His dominant personality, and his loyalty to his men 
inspired people to follow him, and military victories had only increased his stature. 
The intelligence sources argued that Yamamoto might someday have been able to lead 
Japan away from the war with America that he had started but never truly wanted. 
Another relevant concern in the deliberations was his possible succession. 
Davis (1969, 8) quotes Nimitz as having said that “‘The only thing that concerns me is 
whether they could find a more effective fleet commander.’” For the US, Yamamoto 
resembled a military commander who had been in leading positions for many years 
and to whose operational style it had grown used. At the time of the deliberations, 
Yamamoto was thought to have been convinced that victory for the Japanese navy was 
already beyond reach (Agawa 1979, 345). The concern was that Yamamoto’s successor 
might pursue different strategies, potentially bringing a new dynamic to the war in 
the Pacific which recently had been developing well for the US. In addition, there was 
uncertainty about the reaction of the Japanese people. On the one hand, there were 
those who argued that killing Yamamoto would be a blow to the morale of both the 
Japanese armed forces and the Japanese people while, at the same time, it would 
provide a boost for US forces. On the other, there was the fear that, instead of 
weakening the resolve of the Japanese, Yamamoto’s death might as well lead to the 
contrary. During the deliberations, however, the conclusion was made that new 
Japanese offensives due to anger caused by the killing Yamamoto were unlikely as 
Japanese forces were strained already (Davis 1969, 8). Despite all of these concerns, 
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Admiral Nimitz authorised the targeted killing on April 17, making clear that he would 
take responsibility for the risks involved in the mission (Davis 2005, 229). 
With regard to the political deliberations, one noteworthy aspect of the 
thought process of Secretary Knox was that he seems to have been concerned about 
the legality as well as the morality of singling out an individual for targeted killing. 
That is why he ordered a legal report on the matter which concluded that “since the 
Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in sneak attacks, without a 
declaration of war, they were outlaws among nations, and had forfeited the protection 
of international law” (Davis 1969, 19). In addition, Knox insisted on a list of historical 
precedents for killing enemy leaders during war (1969, 19). As far as President 
Roosevelt’s involvement is concerned, there can be no ultimate conclusion as there 
are, again, no official records of a direct contact between the commander in chief and 
his Navy secretary between April 13 and 18 while the president was travelling within 
the US (Arvanitakis 2015, 17). However, Davis (1969, 16) claims the two had been in 
contact concerning the Yamamoto decision but their communication was 
“deliberately omitted from the record.” According to Davis’s account (1969, 17), 
Roosevelt was briefed about the planned raid by Admiral William Mott. “Mott sent 
word of the Yamamoto mission to the train, though so far as he knew, FDR took no 
active part in the decision. ‘He left such things with the military,’ Mott said. As a 
matter of fact, an order invoking the President’s authority was being prepared for 
dispatch to the South Pacific. The order was signed by Frank Knox.”  
As far as the planning of the mission was concerned, the first option 
considered was not to shoot down the admiral’s aircraft. According to the intercepted 
message, Yamamoto would land on Ballale Island and do a first inspection before 
boarding a subchaser and going to a base at Buin. The initial plan was to hit the 
admiral whilst on the boat (Davis 2005, 232). As it turned out, however, the “true 
determining factor of the mission” (2005, 232) was the distance of about 450 miles 
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between Guadalcanal and Bougainville; neither the navy nor the marines had aircraft 
at their disposal capable of flying such a mission. The only aircraft available that, 
equipped with additional fuel tanks, would be able to conduct this mission was the P-
38, which, however, belonged to the army (2005, 232). That is why the army was 
asked to join the mission planning whereas prior deliberations were restricted to navy 
and marines only. During the deliberations the navy pushed for its plan to attack the 
subchaser but the army won the debate arguing for attacking Yamamoto mid-air 
(2005, 237-239). 
With regard to mission planning, the US faced logistical problems. It was 
estimated that, even with the extra tanks, the pilots would only have ten minutes of 
fuel left at the point of interception. As a result, in case the Japanese side was early or 
late, the mission to kill Yamamoto would inevitably fail (Arvanitakis 2015, 26). During 
the first four segments of the flight, the eighteen aircraft would fly at wave top level in 
order not to be detected by Japanese radar. For the last segment, the aircraft would 
separate into two groups. The four “hunters” would attack the bombers, in one of 
which Yamamoto would be, from an altitude of 2,000 feet while the others would 
climb to 10,000 feet to provide top cover and fight any Japanese escort aircraft. 
Generally speaking, the mission plan was “written in extreme detail,” providing each 
pilot with his exact responsibilities, leaving “no room for interpretation” (2015, 27). 
Up until the engagement of the Japanese, the pilots adhered to strict radio silence 
(2015, 30). Admiral Yamamoto’s convoy was made up of two “Betty” bombers and six 
“Zero” aircraft. Only a few minutes after the start, the US side lost two aircraft due to 
technical problems, reducing the overall number to sixteen (2015, 29). Apart from this 
initial mishap, the flight just above sea level was uneventful and, at the estimated time, 
the fighters started to climb to the assigned altitude. In line with the mission plan, 
shortly after the pilots spotted the Japanese convoy, they discarded the additional fuel 
tanks in order to improve manoeuvrability, and started to engage the enemy (2015, 
30). However, due to the fact that one “hunter” could not initially discard his fuel tank 
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and was thus in need of protection, the actual number of aircraft attacking 
Yamamoto’s bomber was reduced to two. These two successfully attacked 
Yamamoto’s bomber. It crashed into the jungle, killing all passengers. The actual 
fighting lasted less than two minutes and once it was over, fifteen US aircraft returned 
to base, only one had been lost in the fighting (2015, 33). Of the escorting Zeros, none 
were shot down (Glines 1991, x). 
5.1.1 Implications for Targeted Killing 
The Yamamoto operation arguably set a precedent for the war time killing of military 
leaders as the mission  
(…) became a classic air action in the annals of the U.S. Air Force. (…) It may not seem 
of any real consequence today who actually fired the shots that downed an enemy 
bomber. What is important is that the mission was planned and carried out in the 
finest tradition of the U.S. Air Force. The anonymous cryptographers who decoded the 
enemy messages and learned the admiral’s itinerary, the Army Air Force squadron 
commander who planned the interception, and the pilots who participated in it 
deserve prominent mention in the World War II military aviation history books. 
(Glines 1991, x-xi) 
In the US, at the time, the news that Yamamoto had been killed was welcomed as good 
news from the war in the Pacific. “No tears were shed in America for Yamamoto, for, 
as the New York Times would state, ‘He was regarded as perhaps the boldest, most 
imaginative and – where the United States was concerned – the most unscrupulous 
of the Japanese offensive fighters. He hated the United States.’ Whether or not that 
last sentence was true, the United States hated him. From Maine to California, 
Americans were glad he was dead. The fact that he was shot down by American pilots 
was considered payback for Pearl Harbor” (Davis 2005, 310-311). In addition, 
Arvanitakis (2015, 41) argues that the killing was of “great strategic value.” What 
Arvanitakis emphasises in particular regarding the strategic nature of the Yamamoto 
killing is that the admiral “was truly unique, irreplaceable” (2015, 44). He argues that 
US decision-makers appreciated Yamamoto’s value as a target holistically and 
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evaluated the effect of his demise for both the short term and long term. In addition, 
the US leadership was “pragmatic in their expectations,” meaning that killing 
Yamamoto was not expected to bring the war to an end but might make a contribution 
to ending the conflict nonetheless. As a result, for Arvanitakis (2015, 45), the targeted 
killing of Yamamoto constitutes the US precedent for this particular practice. 
Taking the Yamamoto mission as paradigm for the determination of liability 
to targeted killing, it is possible to derive several paradigmatic guidelines from the 
Yamamoto case which seem difficult to maintain regarding the circumstances of 
today’s targeted killings and thus require casuistical re-assessment. To begin with, the 
targeted killing of Admiral Yamamoto as a wartime military leader is in line with the 
precepts of the legalist paradigm of just war. The legalist paradigm distinguishes 
between the licit wartime targeting of military leaders and the illicit targeting of 
political leaders (see, e.g., Walzer 2016, 13). As touched upon above, the Obama 
administration justified the legality of its targeted killing policy by invoking the 
Yamamoto precedent. In a high-profile speech Attorney General Holder (2012) 
argued that  
Furthermore, it is entirely lawful – under both United States law and applicable law of 
war principles – to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated 
forces. This is not a novel concept. In fact, during World War II, the United States 
tracked the plane flying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the commander of Japanese 
forces in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway – and shot it down 
specifically because he was on board. As I explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
following the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the same rules apply today.  
However, directly targeting military leaders during war was not always 
considered to be licit. In fact, as pointed out above, the question of historical 
precedents applicable to the Yamamoto case was an important aspect of the political 
decision to target him. It remains unclear which precedents were considered but, in 
1988, a “Yamamoto Retrospective” was held which considered such questions. One of 
the speakers, Joseph Dawson, took up one particular historical instance, which might 
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have been part of the Yamamoto decision, to point out the newness of the Yamamoto 
case. It is worth quoting from this contribution in length, because if one accepts the 
Yamamoto case as paradigm one might want to consider other possible solutions. 
Glines (1991, 159-160) quotes Dawson as follows: 
We know some commanders concluded that the chance dangers of combat and service 
life were enough without intentionally directing fire against enemy commanders. The 
story of the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo is perhaps the most famous example of 
not firing on an enemy commander, even when the opportunity seemed right. Across 
the field stood Napoleon Bonaparte with his staff. An alert English artilleryman called 
out to the Duke: 
“There’s Bonaparte, Sir. I think I can reach him. May I fire?” 
The Duke was aghast. 
No, no. Generals commanding armies have something else to do than shoot 
at one another.” 
Was not firing on Napoleon only a matter of what Wellington, and some other 19th 
century commanders, may have considered “sporting” or “fair” – or something that 
“was just not done” to a brother general? It was universally admitted that any officer, 
no matter how high his rank, might die coincidental to combat or campaigning, but 
here is the prime 19th century example of one senior officer who would not order 
disciplined troops to fire upon the known location of a senior enemy soldier while 
simultaneously all-out efforts were made to kill or cripple thousands of other enemy 
soldiers on the same battlefield. (…) Unlike Wellington in 1815, the Americans in 1943 
seized the chance to bring down an enemy commander. 
As a result, it seems that the Yamamoto precedent, as it broke with the 
tradition of not targeting military leaders, contributed toward making the wartime 
targeting of military leaders legally and, for Walzerians, morally, acceptable. More 
generally, an issue this thesis must address is whether individuals may become liable 
to targeted killing solely for wearing uniforms or whether, as revisionists argue, they 
must first forfeit their right not to be harmed. In addition, with regard to the principle 
of just cause one must ask whether the strict limitation of just cause to self-defence 
embraced by both Walzerians and revisionists should be maintained. During the 
Yamamoto Retrospective, another speaker, Paul Woodruff, addressed the ethics 
behind the Yamamoto killing arguing that both motives of punishment, retribution 
and vengeance, were present in the decision. However, precisely because in the actual 
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decision the rationale of self-defence was pre-eminent he concluded that the targeted 
killing of Yamamoto was morally justified (Glines 1991, 169). It seems that this 
position has been commonly accepted in contemporary moral debate. Unsurprisingly, 
the Obama administration, in addition to the armed conflict justification presented 
above, also referred to the inherent right of self-defence enshrined in international 
law as rationale behind targeted killing (Brennan 2011). However, as the following 
cases demonstrate, aspects of punishment such as retribution and perhaps of 
vengeance, too, seem to have featured in the decision process of recent targeting 
decisions. It thus must be investigated whether the morality of targeted killing, in 
contrast to the Yamamoto paradigm as well as both the Walzerian and revisionist just 
war, should go beyond self-defence and allow for some limited punitive force as well.  
 
5.2 The Case of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Somalia, 14  
        September, 2009 
The case of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was a “seminal event” for the future development 
of the Obama administration’s targeted killing programme (Klaidman 2013, 209). 
Moreover, the targeted killing of Nabhan was the first President Obama authorised in 
the theatre of Somalia (Scahill 2013, 295). Not only does this particular operation 
foreground the tension between attempting capture on the one hand and targeted 
killing on the other, but the case also has implications for a punitive rationale of 
targeted killing.  
As reported by Klaidman (2013, 122-127), the CIA and the military had been 
following Nabhan’s activities for years. In fact, as Scahill (2013, 226) has it, the Bush 
administration had previously, on March 2, 2008, carried out an unsuccessful missile 
strike to kill Nabhan. Now, in August 2009, JSOC had a lead on the man whom it 
considered to be a “major al-Qaeda terrorist.” Nabhan was considered to be “a senior 
member of al-Qaeda’s East Africa branch and a critical link between al-Qaeda and its 
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Somalia-based affiliate, the Shabab” (Klaidman 2013, 122). As Scahill (2013, 226) 
quotes a Somali terrorism scholar, Nabhan “‘had become the bridge between al 
Shabab and al Qaeda, tapping into the resources of al Qaeda, bringing in more foreign 
fighters, as well as financial resources – more importantly military know-how: How 
to make explosives, how to train people, and so on.’” More specifically, Scahill (2013, 
294) writes that US intelligence believed Nabhan “was running three training camps 
that produced several suicide bombers, including a US citizen.” Peritz and Rosenbach 
(2012, 203) quote one security analyst who suggested that “‘Nabhan was a high-
enough target within the al-Qaeda organization that his elimination could seriously 
disrupt the command structure of al-Qaeda in Somalia.’”  
In addition, he had been associated with several terrorist attacks in East Africa, 
among them an attack on an Israeli resort in Mombasa and the US embassy bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania. With regard to the latter attacks, however, Peritz and 
Rosenbach (2012, 197) note that US authorities never connected him to those. Scahill 
(2013, 119) provides further detail, describing the link US authorities identified 
between Nabhan and the attack on the Mombasa resort as well as a missile attack on 
an Israeli plane at Mogadishu’s airport on the same day. 
In the first strike, three men drove a vehicle laced with explosives into the Paradise 
Hotel, killing themselves and thirteen others, and wounding eighty more. Minutes 
later, two men fired surface-to-air missiles at Arkia Israel Airlines Flight 582. Both 
narrowly missed the plane. Washington suspected that the men who plotted these 
attacks were part of the same cell that had hit its embassies in 1998. (…) A previously 
unknown operative, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, came to the attention of US authorities 
when the car that blew up the Paradise Hotel was traced back to him. The Kenyan 
citizen of Yemeni descent was also accused of firing one of the rockets. Nabhan had 
supposedly been managing a Mombasa cell for years, perhaps serving as the principal 
intermediary between the Kenya cell and al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan-Pakistan. 
Killing Nabhan was considered to be “a major victory in the war on terror,” however, 
there was debate whether capturing him would be even more effective in the longer 
run. The assumption was that Nabhan was “a potentially huge intelligence windfall,” 
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being able to provide the agencies with a better understanding of the relationship 
between Al Qaeda and its affiliates (Klaidman 2013, 122). 
Now, after months of surveillance, US authorities discovered that Nabhan was 
about “to travel along a remote coastal road in southern Somalia. (…) Nabhan’s 
convoy would soon be setting out from the capital, Mogadishu, on its way to a meeting 
of Islamic militants in the coastal town of Baraawe” (2013, 123). This opportunity 
triggered a deliberation process within the Obama administration about how to act. 
Klaidman (2013, 123) describes the setting of the decisive meeting as follows: 
Early one September evening, more than three dozen officials assembled by secure 
videoconference to consider options for the sensitive operation. The meeting was 
chaired by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. After a short 
introduction, Mullen called on Vice Admiral William H. McRaven, head of the Joint 
Special Operations Command and one of the military’s most experienced terrorist 
hunters. Nabhan had been under close surveillance for months. He’d stayed mostly in 
heavily populated areas, where the risk of casualties, either to civilians or American 
soldiers, was too great to launch any kind of raid. But now it looked like they had the 
narrow window of opportunity they had been hoping for. 
JSOC suggested three possible options with varying degrees of risk pointing 
out which equipment would be used and providing estimates about collateral damage. 
The first and least risky option in terms of potential harm to US soldiers was to fire 
Tomahawk cruise missiles from a warship off the Somali coast. The downside of such 
a strike, however, would be that the potential collateral damage was high and there 
was no certainty that Nabhan would actually be killed (2013, 123-124). The second 
option was to launch a helicopter-borne assault on Nabhan’s convoy after which the 
helicopters would briefly land in order to confirm the kill. “There was less chance of 
error there. Small attack helicopters would allow the commandos to ‘look the target 
in the eye and make sure it was the right guy’ (…)” (2013, 124). Finally, the military 
suggested a so-called “snatch and grab” operation, an attempt to capture Nabhan 
alive. The plan was to carry out a “‘vehicular interdiction.’ Helicopters would swoop 
in, allowing a sharpshooter to shoot through the engine block of Nabhan’s jeep. The 
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vehicle would die, helicopters would land, and commandoes would grab Nabhan” 
(2013, 125).  “From a purely tactical standpoint it was the most attractive alternative. 
Intelligence from high-value targets was the coin of the realm in the terror wars. But 
it was also the riskiest option, requiring significant boots on the ground” (2013, 124). 
In addition, there was the problem that the Obama administration had not yet made 
a decision about how to deal with captured alleged terrorists. 
And there was another problem: where would Nabhan be taken if the military 
succeeded in capturing him? Nine months into its own war on al-Qaeda, the Obama 
administration had no detention policy for terrorists captured outside established 
warzones like Afghanistan or Iraq. The CIA was out of the interrogation business, its 
secret black sites shut down by Obama’s executive order. Moving Nabhan to 
Guantánamo was out of the question, since the administration’s committed policy was 
to transfer detainees out of there, not in. The detention facility at the US air base in 
Bagram, Afghanistan, wouldn’t work either; the White House didn’t want the prison 
to become the new Guantánamo. Turing him over to the host government, as they 
might have done in Pakistan or Afghanistan, was also not an option in anarchic 
Somalia. Finally, bringing Nabhan to the United States for prosecution or prolonged 
detention was a political nonstarter for the Obama White House. Some weeks earlier, 
Hoss Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had raised with Obama the 
conundrum they were facing. He warned the president that the military could not 
afford to be “trapped in a no-quarters environment.” Obama did not understand the 
military idiom. Cartwright explained that under the laws of war the military was 
required to take the target of an operation into custody if he surrendered or was 
wounded. “We do not have a plausible capture strategy,” Cartwright told the president. 
(2013, 124-125) 
This lack of a detention policy led JSOC to consider detaining Nabhan “on a ship at 
sea while figuring out what to do with him – ‘pretty much making it up as we went 
along,’ as one participant put it” (2013, 125). 
Klaidman (2013, 125) further reports that among the participants of the 
meeting there had been an uneasiness about the idea of using ground troops in 
Somalia due to the October 1993 mission which became known as “Black Hawk 
Down.” That operation, too, was supposed to capture a Somali warlord and ended 
with eighteen dead American Army Rangers. Finally, after the deliberations, the 
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president was presented with a kill and a capture option plus the contingency plan of 
dropping a 500-pound bomb from a fixed-wing aircraft. That contingency plan, 
however, would prove to be a theoretical option only due to cloud cover. Klaidman 
writes that “as everyone left the meeting that evening, it was clear that the only viable 
plan was the lethal one” (2013, 126), which Obama then approved under the mission 
name “Operation Celestial Balance.”  
The mission was an operative success: “The next morning Somali villagers saw 
several low-flying attack helicopters emerging over the horizon. Several AH-6 Little 
Birds, deployed from US naval ships off the Somali coast, approached the convoy, 
strafing Nabhan’s jeep and another vehicle. Nabhan and three other militants were 
killed. One of the helicopters landed long enough for a small team of commandos to 
scoop up some of Nabhan’s remains – the DNA needed to prove he was dead” (2013, 
126). Interestingly, Mazzetti (2013, 246-247) adds that while Obama did indeed opt 
for the lethal option, he had not chosen the helicopter raid. Instead, he had ordered 
the least risky option of a missile strike. “But things didn’t go as planned. With JSOC 
making final preparations for the operation, code-named Celestial Balance, the 
missile-launcher malfunctioned on the plane that had been designated for the 
mission. With time running out and Nabhan on the move, McRaven ordered that the 
commandos carry out the fallback plan: The SEALs waiting on a Navy ship off the 
Somali coast loaded into the helicopters and headed west, into Somali airspace. The 
helicopters strafed the convoy, killing Nabhan and three al Shabab operatives.” 
While the operation was considered to be “a success of a sort” by the 
administration as Nabhan was killed and Obama received credit for being willing to 
take the risk of ordering a daylight raid, Klaidman (2013, 126-127) reports that there 
was uneasiness within the inner circle as to whether the absence of a detention policy 
had contributed to taking the kill decision. 
Rumors swirled through the Pentagon that Nabhan had been killed because the White 
House didn’t want to face the tangled and politically fraught detention issues. Jeh C. 
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Johnson, the military’s top lawyer, was so concerned, he conducted his own inquiry to 
satisfy himself that that was not the case. In the end, no direct evidence has ever 
emerged showing that the decision to pursue a kill over a capture in the Nabhan case 
was dictated by the lack of a long-term detention policy. Yet participants in the 
conference call that day realized that over time, the lack of a policy would foreclose 
important tactical avenues in the war on terror. The inability to detain terror suspects 
was creating perverse incentives that favored killing or releasing suspected terrorists 
over capturing them. (2013, 126) 
One final aspect the Nabhan case highlights is the tension between the urgency 
of action as represented by the military and sufficient justification of action as 
represented by the team of legal advisers. As Klaidman (2013, 202) recalls Harold 
Koh’s [legal adviser of the Department of State] second thoughts about the Nabhan 
targeted killing. 
That night, Koh had slept fitfully. He had lingering doubts about the quality of the 
intelligence that had been presented, and he was disturbed by his own passivity during 
the SVTS [secure video teleconference] meeting. The military was a juggernaut. They 
had overwhelmed the session with their sheer numbers, their impenetrable jargon, 
and their ability to create an atmosphere of do-or-die urgency. How could anybody, 
let alone a humanitarian law professor, resist such powerful momentum? Koh was no 
wallflower when it came to expressing his views; normally he relished battling it out 
with his bureaucratic rivals. But on this occasion he’d felt powerless. Trying to stop a 
targeted killing “would be like pulling a lever to stop a massive freight train barreling 
down the tracks,” he confided to a friend. 
 
5.3 The Case of al-Majalah, Yemen, 17 December, 2009 
The case of al-Majalah brings the discussion to another theatre of President Obama’s 
war against Al Qaeda, namely to the Republic of Yemen. In Yemen, an Al Qaeda-
affiliated group called AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) had announced its 
intent on striking Western targets, increasingly worrying the Obama administration 
during its first year in office (Mazzetti 2013, 229). In consequence, on December 14, 
2009, the State Department designated AQAP as a terrorist organisation (Johnsen 
2014, 251). Reportedly, the intelligence community had obtained information about 
an attack that was in the end stages of planning but, at the same time, the information 
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was non-specific. As Savage (2015, 224) quotes the head of the National 
Counterterrorism Center at the time, Mike Leiter: “‘We thought it was going to be 
something in Yemen, (…) So we surged resources for targeting in Yemen (…) to disrupt 
that ‘something,’ even though we didn’t know what it was.’”  
Yemen had not been in the centre of attention before as most resources were 
allocated to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, the CIA and JSOC had 
only a small number of operators on the ground. Having said that, however, in late 
2009, as part of what Leiter referred to as a “surge,” JSOC was able to expand its 
presence in the Arabian Peninsula due to freed-up resources from the drawdown in 
Iraq (Mazzetti 2013, 229). This troop increase was part of an agreement between the 
US and the Yemeni government that allowed the US to attack Al Qaeda in Yemen as 
long as the US did not publicly acknowledge its involvement in the strikes (Savage 
2015, 224). As another part of the arrangement, the head of the US Central Command, 
General Petraeus, in late September 2009, signed a classified order which “authorized 
the military to conduct a host of unconventional missions in Yemen” (Mazzetti 2013, 
229). These operational plans, however, were rejected by the Obama administration. 
The Yemeni president would not allow US ground troops to run interrogation facilities 
in Yemen or to employ lethal force in commando raids. In addition, the Obama 
administration, facing opposition in its attempt to close the prison at Guantánamo 
Bay, did not want to add new prisoners from Yemen. Consequently, Admiral 
McRaven, the JSOC commander, was asked to find an alternative approach for Yemen 
(2013, 230). 
The alternative that was employed in the US counterterrorism campaign 
directly leads to the case of al-Majalah, the first airstrike in Yemen President Obama 
authorised: “Al Majalah was the opening salvo in America’s newest war. Unlike the 
CIA’s ‘covert action’ programs, which require formal notification to the House and 
Senate intelligence committees, this operation was done under a military ‘Special 
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Access Program,’ which gives the armed forces wide latitude to conduct lethal, secret 
operations with little, if any, oversight” (Scahill 2013, 307). Mazzetti’s basic summary 
(2013, 230) of this approach indicates that while al-Majalah was the first such 
employment of lethal force, it would not remain the only one: “What followed was a 
strange, half-baked campaign: a quasisecret war undermined by sometimes absurd 
attempts to hide the American hand in military operations. (…) The results were 
unsightly, and over the next several months the American strikes in Yemen would 
claim more civilian casualties then senior operatives affiliated with al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula.” According to Human Rights Watch (HRW 2013, 69),  
Al-Majalah is a tiny village at the foot of steep mountains about 230 kilometers east of 
the southern port city of Aden. It has no schools, electricity or other services; as one 
resident put it, ‘The government does not exist here.’ The area that was hit lies on the 
edge of the village – a stretch of shrubs and rocky earth whose coppery color was in 
keeping the US codename for the strike, ‘Operation Copper Dune.’ There, Bedouins 
from two al-Majalah families tended bees and put their sheep and goats to graze. They 
slept in huts made of straw and wood or of steel caging on which they draped their 
tenting. 
On December 16, Admiral McRaven briefed the White House, the Pentagon, 
and the State Department about plans to attack three AQAP targets using cruise 
missiles. JSOC wanted to strike within the next twenty-four hours. Due to the fact that 
it would be the first bombing in Yemen authorised by the Obama administration, the 
meeting involved some seventy-five officials, exceeding the number of participants 
normally taking part (Scahill 2013, 303). According to Klaidman (2013, 199), the 
primary target was Mohammed Saleh Mohammed Ali al-Kazemi who was code-
named “Akron.” He was considered to be a deputy of AQAP in Abyan province. JSOC 
had followed him for months and had now confirmed his presence in a camp near al-
Majalah. Using high-tech surveillance, the US had concluded that al-Kazemi was “in 
the late stages of planning a terrorist attack on the US embassy in Sana’a. A team of 
AQAP suicide bombers would soon be strapping on their explosives-laden vests and 
heading for the Yemeni capital. There was no time to lose” (2013, 199). 
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Reportedly (Shane 2015, 205), General Petraeus “pushed hard for what he said 
was a rare opportunity to take out a large number of militants.” In addition to al-
Kazemi at al-Majalah, the military also wanted to hit targets “Cleveland” and “Toledo” 
who were suspected to be “located in the area” as well (Klaidman 2013, 199). The third 
target, objective “Cleveland,” had been added by General Petraeus “at the last minute 
because evolving intelligence suggested a particular operative had just arrived at the 
location” but the Pentagon general counsel approved only the first two strikes as he 
considered the potential collateral damage of a strike against Cleveland as too high 
(Savage 2015, 225). In particular, the presence of women and children in proximity of 
the target seems to have underpinned that decision (Klaidman 2013, 210).  
According to Klaidman (2013, 200), the meeting “unfolded in a crisis 
atmosphere.” The Pentagon’s general counsel, throughout the meeting, felt “heavy 
pressure by the military” to approve the strikes as well as “rushed and unprepared:” 
“(…) it was like a one-hundred-car freight train hurtling down the tracks at eighty 
miles an hour. You would have to throw yourself on the tracks to try to stop it” (2013, 
210). In the late afternoon of December 16, the lawyer had been provided with 
PowerPoint slides, the so-called “baseball cards,” which pointed out al-Kazemi’s 
terrorist history as well as potential strike options.  
They displayed a color picture of the target and physical characteristics, including his 
estimated height and weight. Below the photo was a kind of terrorist curriculum vitae, 
listing his rank in the organization, professional expertise, and links to individual 
attacks. Akron was an operational planner and was believed to have been responsible 
for a July 2007 suicide bombing that killed nine people, including seven Spanish 
tourists. Farther down, in small print, was the specific intelligence backing up the 
military’s claims – humint if it came from a spy, or signit if it was based on electronic 
surveillance. (2013, 200) 
In addition, a Yemeni parliamentary investigation (2010, 5-6) labelled al-
Kazemi an “Al-Qaeda leader” who had financed terrorist activity and brought up to 
twenty Saudi, Emirati and Pakistani Al Qaeda members to the camp at al-Majalah, 
including “a Pakistani expert in poisons and explosives.” Local residents told Human 
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Rights Watch (2013, 75) that while there were foreigners who had joined al-Kazemi at 
al-Majalah “they were not aware that he was engaged in military operations and had 
not seen a training camp, but added that they could not be sure.” As to the relationship 
between the civilians and the alleged terrorists, Shane (2015, 208) reports that “The 
local Bedouin families had been paid to provide food, laundry, and other services to 
the Al Qaeda camp, but there was no evidence and no likelihood that they shared the 
militants’ ideology or posed any direct threat to Americans.” 
However, there are also aspects which are not quite as clear about the actual 
role of al-Kazemi. For example, Human Rights Watch (2013, 74) provides further 
information about target Akron’s past as well as his role during the time before the 
strike at al-Majalah: “Al-Kazami fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s; he was among 
hundreds of Yemenis who joined the mujahideen with the approval of the Saleh 
government and tribal leaders. He was arrested in 2005 by Yemeni security forces on 
suspicion of terrorism-related crimes and served about two years in prison. Upon his 
release, al-Kazami returned to Abyan and ultimately ended up in al-Majalah, where 
he had relatives, and lived with his wife and four children there. The parliamentary 
report said that he had pledged ‘to not get involved in activities with Al-Qaeda.’” 
Scahill (2013, 312), in interviews with Yemeni journalists and security analysts, was 
told that they “were puzzled as to why Kazemi was being portrayed as an al Qaeda 
leader, pointing out that he was an aging veteran of the earlier wars in Afghanistan 
and was not a senior figure within AQAP.” Moreover, according to Woods (2012), al-
Kazemi had wanted “to start a new life” after having been released from prison. 
In terms of strike options, the military suggested several missile options 
including sea-based strikes, helicopter raids, and fixed-wing aircraft attacks. Capture 
missions involving ground troops were ruled out (Klaidman 2013, 201). With regard 
to the execution of the mission there was a close coordination between several 
departments. As Scahill (2013, 308) reports, “A military source familiar with the 
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operation told me al Majalah was a ‘JSOC operation with borrowed Navy subs, 
borrowed Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy surveillance aircraft and close 
coordination with CIA and DIA on the ground in Yemen. Counting the crew of the sub 
we’re talking 350-400 [people] in the loop.’” 
Although it seems that the military had been pushing hard for the strike and 
President Obama finally approved the operation, Shane (2015, 205-206), quoting a 
senior figure within the president’s circle, notes that the administration was aware of 
the risks such an operation entailed. “But General James Jones, then Obama’s 
national security adviser, said officials knew intelligence on targets in Yemen was still 
a work in progress, especially compared to Pakistan. ‘It was case by case and trying to 
get some assurances that in fact that target was where we thought he was, who we 
thought he was, would be there when we thought he was,’ Jones said in an interview. 
‘It was more difficult because it was kind of an embryonic theater that we weren’t 
really familiar with.’” The risk of killing the wrong people also shines through in the 
Pentagon’s legal counsel reportedly having said after the al-Majalah strike: “‘If I were 
Catholic, I’d have to go to confession’” (Klaidman 2013, 210). Having said that, 
however, Savage (2015, 225) argues that it would be wrong to interpret this quote as 
“an expression of remorse about civilian casualties,” because it was made before news 
broke about civilian casualties. 
The day after the president’s signing off on the strike, on December 17, JSOC 
launched surveillance aircraft to monitor the targets before firing Tomahawk cruise 
missiles armed with cluster munitions from a US submarine positioned near Yemen’s 
coast (Scahill 2013, 307). The missiles hit two adjacent sets of Bedouin huts at around 
6 am, bringing death to their inhabitants while most of them were asleep (HRW 2013, 
69). On the day of the attack, the Yemeni government took responsibility for having 
carried out the strike, claiming it had killed “‘around 34’ al Qaeda fighters” (Mazzetti 
2013, 231). As was later revealed by two leaked diplomatic cables, the US collaborated 
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in hiding its involvement in the attack and, until the present day, has not publicly 
acknowledged its hand in the strike, leading Woods (2012) to call it a “cover up.” Later 
reports questioned the initial casualty count, establishing that a significant number of 
civilians had been killed alongside the alleged terrorists. The most up-to-date 
numbers refer to fourteen potential militants killed alongside forty-four dead civilians 
from two extended families. Among the civilians killed were twelve women, five of 
them pregnant, and twenty-two children (Woods 2015, 196). The Yemeni 
parliamentary investigation (2010, 5) claimed that after the bombing “a group of 
youngsters from Al-Qaeda surrounded the site of the incident, retrieved six dead 
bodies from the area and transported seven wounded to the hospital.” In the 
aftermath of the attack, four additional civilians died and thirteen were wounded due 
to exposure to unexploded bomblets from the cruise missiles (HRW 2013, 68). 
In a secret but later leaked meeting between General Petraeus and the Yemeni 
president on January 2, 2010, the latter congratulated the US on the strikes but also 
mentioned that “‘mistakes were made’ in the killing of civilians in Abyan” (US 
Embassy Sana’a 2010). During the meeting, General Petraeus claimed that no 
civilians had been killed in the strike. While Woods (2012) and Shane (2015, 207) 
suggest that Petraeus had been poorly briefed it seems more likely, however, that the 
general was employing a novel way of classifying combatants which the Obama 
administration had introduced: “Unless there was explicit intelligence exonerating 
specific individuals, the administration had decided to count all males of military age 
found at the strike site as combatants” (Johnsen 2014, 260). 
Given the high casualty count as well as the information that evolved regarding 
the operation’s planning it is unsurprising that al-Majalah attracted significant critical 
scrutiny. Human Rights Watch (2013, 70) quotes an eyewitness that, in the aftermath 
of the attack, the Yemeni government and state media had reported that the area 
around al-Majalah was “an impenetrable mountain enclave stashed with weapons, ‘as 
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if it were Tora Bora.’” In fact, however, the site was in a valley and accessible by car. 
Besides the people killed, the thirty houses near the strike site were all burned. Human 
Rights Watch (2013, 70) raises the question why the US employed a model of 
Tomahawk missile equipped with cluster munitions designed to spread sub munitions 
over a wide area. Scahill (2013, 308) adds that “the bomblets were also equipped with 
an incendiary material, burning zirconium, that set fire to flammable objects in the 
target area.” There has been some discussion why alternatives like, for example, 
armed drones had not been employed instead. Shane (2015, 206) points out that 
cruise missiles had been the only option available given the fact that Djibouti, from 
where the US launched its drones, only allowed the US to fly unarmed drones at the 
time. In addition, as Woods (2015, 61) notes, even if drones had been available, the 
Yemeni government had forbidden the use of drones after the first US targeted killing 
via drone in Yemen in 2002. Scahill (2013, 312), adding a further possibility, referred 
to unnamed US officials who “cited strained resources” as the reason why cruise 
missiles were employed. As the CIA’s armed drones were stationed in Pakistan, cruise 
missiles were the only way to strike at the time. In line with Scahill’s claim, Woods 
(2015, 195-196) argues that “JSOC had to depend on whatever assets it could acquire 
from regular forces,” making the resort to cruise missiles inevitable. Relatedly, 
following this train of thought, the lack of US resources in Yemen may also have had 
an impact on the assessment of acceptable collateral damage.  Woods (2015, 193) 
quotes a former JSOC analyst as follows: “‘In order to eliminate the threat, or in more 
literal terms assassinate this person (…) commanders and decision-makers are more 
likely to go through with a strike, even if it means that other innocent people are 
involved, because of the limited opportunities to strike.’” 
Furthermore, the Yemeni parliamentary investigation (2010, 7) concluded 
that mistakes were made in identifying the correct “geographic coordinates and the 
determination of the location.” Human Rights Watch (2013, 71) quotes an anonymous 
Yemeni official saying “‘They hit multiple encampments and they were only supposed 
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to hit one,’ (…) ‘That one you could argue was bad intelligence from the Yemenis.’” 
Johnsen (2014, 265-266) points out that the US’s heavy reliance on information from 
Yemeni authorities in absence of its own intelligence was a serious flaw in its approach 
as it entailed the risk of “getting played.” Although, as Shane (2015, 204) notes, the 
US had been aware of this risk, it could not escape its reliance on Yemen in terms of 
HUMINT [Human Intelligence]. In this light, the role of SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] 
became even more important, as illustrated by the present case which, as pointed out 
above, seems to have been brought to attention by SIGINT. Moreover, the question 
was asked why there had been no attempt to capture al-Kazemi. According to Human 
Rights Watch (2013, 74-75) “Whatever his ties to violent militants, al-Kazami traveled 
freely through the area upon his release from prison, suggesting ample opportunities 
for capture. Indeed, residents said his movements required him to pass multiple 
checkpoints at which security forces could have detained him. Surveillance aircraft 
had been flying low over the area two months before the strike, residents said, 
suggesting the authorities could track al-Kazami’s movements.” 
Finally, given the critique listed above, it seems that the Obama administration 
felt some uneasiness regarding the action it had taken at al-Majalah. Shane (2015, 
209) quotes a White House official telling him that when the administration became 
aware of the destruction caused, “‘The president wasn’t happy with it, and so we went 
through a very long process led by Brennan to tighten up how we take lethal action in 
Yemen,’ the aide said. ‘We were aware of blowback on the ground and how off things 
had gotten.’” As a practical consequence, the US stopped employing cruise missiles in 
Yemen after al-Majalah (2015, 227). 
The destruction of the strike was followed by heavy protests by the local 
population. On December 20, a protest gathering was held at al-Majalah with tribal 
leaders from the entire country in attendance. The public outrage against the strike, 
which was assumed to have been carried out by the US would later lead to the 
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parliamentary investigation cited above. Regarding this public backlash, Scahill 
(2013, 312) quotes a “senior Yemeni official:” “‘The involvement of the United States 
creates sympathy for Al Qaeda. The cooperation is necessary – but there is no doubt 
that it has an effect for the common man. He sympathizes with Al Qaeda.’” 
 
5.4 The Case of Datta Khel, Pakistan, 17 March, 2011 
The next case turns the spotlight to the country in which the targeted killing of Osama 
bin Laden would take place about six weeks later. In mid-March of 2011, US-Pakistani 
relations were in a poor condition. Contributing to this state of affairs had been the 
Raymond Davis incident, a diplomatic affair involving a CIA contractor who killed two 
Pakistanis whom he accused of trying to rob him, as well as a public backlash against 
the CIA’s drone campaign in the Pakistani tribal areas. Mazzetti (2013, 290) reports 
that there was the impression with senior non-CIA officials within the Obama 
administration that the agency “seemed to be conducting a war in a vacuum, oblivious 
to the ramifications that the drone strikes were having on America’s relations with 
Pakistan’s government.” 
The incident at Datta Khel is one of the best-reported cases of one of the CIA’s 
targeting procedures. Before moving to the details of the particular case, it is worth 
considering this practice generally. 
The CIA had approval from the White House to carry out missile strikes in Pakistan 
even when CIA targeters weren’t certain about exactly who it was they were killing. 
Under the rules of so-called signature strikes, decisions about whether to fire missiles 
from drones could be made based on patterns of activity deemed suspicious. (…) 
For instance, if a group of young “military-aged males” were observed moving 
in and out of a suspected militant training camp and were thought to be carrying 
weapons, they could be considered legitimate targets. American officials admit it is 
somewhat difficult to judge a person’s age from thousands of feet in the air, and in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas a “military-aged male” could be as young as fifteen or sixteen. 
Using such broad definitions to determine who was a “combatant” and therefore a 
legitimate target allowed Obama administration officials to claim that the drone 
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strikes in Pakistan had not killed any civilians. It was something of a trick of logic: In 
an area of known militant activity, all military-aged males were considered to be 
enemy fighters. Therefore, anyone who was killed in a drone strike there was 
categorized as a combatant, unless there was explicit intelligence that posthumously 
proved him to be innocent. (2013, 290-291) 
This targeting practice was no invention of the Obama administration. In fact, 
signature strikes had been introduced by the late Bush administration. As Woods 
(2015, 114) notes, the CIA, during its first four years of conducting targeted killings 
post-9/11, had only deliberately targeted known individuals. With the introduction of 
signature strikes, the practice of targeting known individuals was re-labelled as 
“personality strikes.” The rationale behind employing signature strikes is to weaken 
the network of the enemy which, it is argued, can be achieved by expanding targeting 
beyond known individuals. A senior US counterterrorism official explains the 
concept: “‘The enemy has lost not just operational leaders and facilitators [in 
Pakistan] – people whose names we know – but formations of fighters and other 
terrorists. We might not always have their names, but (…) these are people whose 
actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat’” (Cloud 2010). This 
concept, apparently, was embraced by the Obama administration. As Woods (2015, 
115) notes, signature strikes “would come to dominate phases of the secret Pakistan 
drone war.” 
On March 16, 2011, the CIA carried out a drone strike against a car near Datta 
Khel which killed five suspected insurgents. This strike, according to Woods (2015, 
232), might have directed the CIA’s attention toward a gathering of people in the 
actual village of Datta Khel. Datta Khel is situated in North Waziristan in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Masood and Shah (2011) describe the 
situation at the time of the strike as follows: “The region is under the sway of a local 
warlord and Taliban commander, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who made a truce with the 
government as the Pakistani military pushed into South Waziristan in 2009. But Mr. 
Bahadur has accepted many Taliban fighters who fled the campaign into his area, and 
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he continues to have close ties to the Haqqani network, a militant group allied with 
the government and the Taliban that uses North Waziristan as its main base to launch 
attacks against American forces in Afghanistan.” 
It does not surprise then that Roggio (2011) classified Datta Khel as “a known 
hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al Qaeda activity.” Zooming in on the event 
going on in the village on March 17, it was common practice for the Taliban as 
“reigning authorities in the area” to “settle disputes between tribes with competing 
claims” (Masood and Shah 2011). With regard to the exact background of the meeting, 
(…) some 40 individuals gathered in Datta Khel town center. They included important 
community figures and local elders, all of whom were there to attend a Jirga — the 
principal social institution for decision-making and dispute resolution in FATA. The 
jirga on March 17 was convened to settle a dispute over a nearby chromite mine. All of 
the relevant stakeholders and local leaders were in attendance, including 35 
government-appointed tribal leaders known as maliks, as well as government officials, 
and a number of khassadars (government employees administered at the local level by 
maliks who serve as a locally recruited auxiliary police force). Four men from a local 
Taliban group were also reportedly present, as their involvement was necessary to 
resolve the dispute effectively. (Stanford and NYU 2012, 58) 
Adding further detail, Coll (2014) quotes a tribal leader: “‘There were two tribes in the 
area, Manzarkhel and Maddakhel. (…) The dispute was between these two tribes. They 
were taking chromite out, but there was a question of who owned what.’” A UN 
investigation (Emmerson 2014) found that precisely at issue was the method of 
payment of 8.8 million rupees for the mining rights. 
The gathering had been officially sanctioned by the Pakistani government and 
the maliks had notified the local military post about the planned gathering ten days 
beforehand (Woods and Lamb 2012). It took place in the Nomada bus depot, “an open 
space in the middle of town large enough to accommodate over 40 people as they sat 
in two large circles about 12 feet apart” (Stanford and NYU 2012, 58). According to 
the UN report (Emmerson 2014), the field of the jirga was close to many shops and 
other businesses as well as near a parking lot used by bazaar visitors. 
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Regarding the kinetic action on March 17, the CIA fired a missile at one of the 
circles of seated men at about 10:45 am. In rapid succession, several further missiles 
were fired. At least one of these hit the second circle of the meeting. The operation 
killed at least forty-three people while injuring an additional fourteen (Stanford and 
NYU 2012, 59). According to Woods (2015, 233), “The bus station and surrounding 
buildings were still burning six hours after the drone strike, eyewitnesses reported. 
Body parts were scattered for hundreds of yards, and had to be collected up in sacks.” 
Reportedly, contributing to the strike decision was the fact that the US, due to its poor 
relations with Pakistani authorities, no longer had access to Pakistani field 
intelligence. In this light, the CIA had been monitoring Datta Khel after the strike on 
March 16, making an attempt at assessing the gathering. Gannon et al. (2011) quote 
US officials apparently referring to the four Taliban present at the jirga that “‘the CIA 
tracked the militants driving to the meeting and decided rather than targeting just the 
car, they would wait to get the entire assembled party.’” According to Savage (2015, 
254), the CIA did not know the names of the men in the car, relying on their “patterns 
of life” instead. The final judgement, according to Woods (2015, 232), had apparently 
been that there was enough information to carry out a signature strike. As basis for 
this claim Woods relies on Shane (2011) who quotes US officials arguing that “‘The 
fact is that a large group of heavily armed men, some of whom were clearly connected 
to Al Qaeda and all of whom acted in a manner consistent with A.Q.-linked militants, 
were killed.’”  
The strike at Datta Khel was the Obama administration’s 202nd drone strike in 
Pakistan (Woods 2015, 231). In the week preceding the strike at Datta Khel, the CIA 
had carried out five further strikes (Masood and Shah 2011). On the previous day, the 
Davis affair had been resolved under a “‘blood money’ arrangement” which led to the 
release of the CIA contractor and his return to the US (Mazzetti 2013, 291). The Davis 
affair seems to be of considerable significance for the events at Datta Khel because the 
incident allows two opposite interpretations given one accepts the strike killed 
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innocent people. In fact, it must be noted that the US maintains that the strike hit a 
gathering of senior militants and had thus been a legitimate target (Stanford and NYU 
2012, 57). One official was quoted saying: “‘These people weren’t gathering for a bake 
sale. (…) They were terrorists’” (Masood and Shah 2011). First, the CIA drone strike 
might have been a demonstration of power in light of the diplomatic repercussions of 
the Davis affair. As Mazzetti (2013, 291) reports, “(…) some American officials 
suspected that the massive strike was the CIA venting its anger about the Davis 
episode. Munter [the US ambassador to Pakistan] thought that General Pasha, the ISI 
chief, had gone out on a limb to help end the Raymond Davis affair and that the Datta 
Khel strike could be perceived as a deliberate thumb in the eye.” A different 
journalistic account (Gannon et al. 2011), refers to an anonymous US official who 
argued that “‘the strike reflected the CIA’s anger at the ISI, which it blamed for 
keeping Davis in prison for seven weeks.’ ‘It was retaliation for Davis,’ the aide said. 
‘The CIA was angry.’” In addition, former ISI chief Durrani told Woods (2015, 233) 
that the strike was “clearly a show of [American] anger.” Noteworthy in this regard is 
that the US ambassador made a request not to carry out the strike because of his 
concern about a further deterioration of US-Pakistani relations. This request, 
however, was rejected by the CIA director “who insisted on going ahead” (Gannon et 
al. 2011). Second, related to the inherent dangers of signature strikes pointed out 
above, “many American officials believed that the strike had been botched, and that 
dozens of people died who shouldn’t have” (Mazzetti 2013, 291). The exact rationale 
behind the strike notwithstanding, US-Pakistani relations deteriorated further, with 
General Kayani claiming the US had acted “‘with complete disregard to human life,’” 
as well as anti-American street protests taking place in major Pakistani cities (2013, 
291). 
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5.5 The Case of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan, 2 May, 2011 
The killing of Osama bin Laden is a curious case. On the one hand, the killing of Al 
Qaeda’s leader has arguably been the best-publicised targeted killing in recent history. 
Even a minor industry developed telling those interested how the operation unfolded, 
including a Hollywood blockbuster produced by Walt Disney. Moreover, the bin 
Laden raid has been subject to vivid legal (see, e.g., Ambos and Alkatout 2012; Beres 
2011; Paust 2011; Wallace 2012) as well as moral (see, e.g., Govern 2012; McMahan 
2012a; Strawser 2014; Walzer 2011) debate. However, with the hindsight of several 
years, much uncertainty remains as two irreconcilable accounts have emerged 
regarding what really happened in Abbottabad, Pakistan on 2 May, 2011.   
5.5.1 The Official Account 
What in the following will be called the official account of the killing of bin Laden has 
been put forward by the Obama administration, numerous journalistic investigations, 
as well as autobiographical accounts. Although these accounts vary in minor detail, it 
is possible to tell one comprehensive and non-contradictory story of the planning 
process and the actual raid which killed arguably the world’s most infamous terrorist 
leader. The following mainly relies on Bowden’s (2012) narrative. Bowden provides a 
thorough account of the deliberations within the administration in a “fly-on-the-wall” 
style as well as the minutiae of the actual raid. His account also stands out compared 
to others because of the access he had to key decision-makers, including President 
Obama. Bowden’s account was also specifically taken as the point of departure for 
Hersh’s (2016) counter-narrative which will later be discussed as the “unofficial 
account.” 
Starting with bin Laden’s personal background, due to the fact that he easily 
ranked among the world’s best recognised personalities, this section, because of space 
limitations, will not provide a biographical account of bin Laden and the emergence 
of Al Qaeda. These aspects have been covered elsewhere (see, e.g., Bergen 2011; Kean 
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and Hamilton 2004; Wright 2007) and, therefore, it is taken for granted that bin 
Laden was responsible for plotting terrorist attacks against the United States, most 
prominently the assault of September 11, 2001. Bin Laden’s responsibility for the 
attacks seems to have been established both by US investigations (Kean and Hamilton 
2004) as well as his own claims of having ordered the assault (Bergen 2012, 36). 
Moreover, this chapter will not address previous attempts to end bin Laden’s life by 
both the Clinton and Bush administrations.  
In June 2009, the Obama administration renewed the effort to come up with 
a plan to finally track down bin Laden after years of unsuccessful efforts by the Bush 
administration. Apparently, the new president’s rationale behind stepping up the 
hunt for bin Laden was multi-faceted. In contrast to his immediate predecessor, 
Obama did not consider the US generally at war with terrorism, but at war nonetheless 
with specific individuals who had attacked the country in the past and posed a 
continuing threat (Bowden 2012, 60). Specifically concerning bin Laden, Obama, 
shortly after taking office, had ordered a review on US policy in Afghanistan whose 
lead author told the president that, contrary to many analysts’ conclusions, bin 
Laden’s current role was more than that of a figure head. Quite the contrary, he was 
still actively plotting attacks: “He communicates with his underlings and is in touch 
with his foot soldiers. His troops believe they are getting his orders, and we know from 
good intelligence that they are” (as quoted in Woodward 2010, 105).  
Having said that, Obama’s concern with bin Laden seems to have gone beyond 
his posing a continuing threat through his role in directing Al Qaeda. If one were to 
follow Bowden’s assessment (2012, 61), elements of desert also seem to have featured 
in Obama’s thinking: “As Obama saw it, there was no way to defeat Al Qaeda so long 
as its founder and spiritual leader remained at large. He was the soul of the 
organization. The president believed that bin Laden wasn’t just evil, he was 
charismatically evil.” Bowden (2012, 185) suggests that Obama thought that “getting 
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bin Laden would be like closing an open wound” to America. In an interview with 
Bowden (2012, 256), Obama himself, in admittedly vague terms, hinted at a 
retributive element in authorising the bin Laden raid: “When I went up to New York 
for that small ceremony after bin Laden was killed, to talk to those guys at the fire 
station who had lost half their unit, and to meet with the children of those who had 
been killed in 9/11, and the widows and the widowers, and to just understand how 
fully they appreciated that America hadn’t forgotten about them and what happened, 
the feelings were profound.” The assumption that retribution played a role in the 
decision to target bin Laden has also been supported by some of Obama’s secretaries. 
Secretary of Defence Gates (2015, 544) recalls the mood in the Situation Room after 
the mission: “Even after the helicopters had returned safely, there was no celebration, 
no high-fives. There was just a deep feeling of satisfaction – and closure – that all the 
Americans who had been killed by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and in the years 
before, had finally been avenged.” A similar idea shines through in Secretary of State 
Clinton’s memoirs. During the deliberations leading up to the raid and in response to 
administration officials who were concerned about the repercussions of violating 
Pakistan’s sovereignty and the nation’s national honour, Clinton (2014, 171) claims to 
have said: “‘What about our national honor?’ I said, in exasperation. ‘What about our 
losses? What about going after a man who killed three thousand innocent people?’” 
Closely related, the end of achieving justice also seems to have featured in 
Obama’s decision to green-light the raid. As Bowden (2012, 162) describes Obama’s 
way of thinking during pre-raid discussions: “So success would be a demonstration of 
justice achieved at great cost and sacrifice, and with tremendous skill. It would be a 
satisfying achievement for America and the world, an emotional turning point, but 
more, it would vindicate the determination and skill of everyone who had given of 
themselves – in some cases all of themselves – to the struggle.” This thinking seems 
to have been vindicated after the killing of bin Laden when Obama, in his speech that 
disclosed the raid, stressed that in killing bin Laden, “justice has been done” (Obama 
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2011). In addition, the idea of retribution also seemed to shine through when the first 
person Obama called, immediately after the execution of the operation, was his 
predecessor George W. Bush (Bergen 2012, 235). The idea of justice seemed to 
resonate with the American people as indicated by celebrating groups of people in 
various places around the country. As Mahler (2015) summarises the raid’s impact on 
the American psyche: “Symbolically, it brought a badly wanted moment of moral 
clarity, of unambiguous American valor, to a murky war defined by ethical 
compromise and even at times by collective shame. It completed the historical arc of 
the 9/11 attacks. The ghastly image of collapsing towers that had been fixed in our 
collective minds for years was dislodged by one of Obama and his senior advisers 
huddled tensely around a table in the White House Situation Room, watching closely 
as justice was finally brought to the perpetrator.” 
Furthermore, neutralising the threat posed by America’s public enemy no. 1 
would doubtlessly have been a major political success for Obama. It should be 
mentioned that Obama at the time was facing significant opposition regarding the 
implementation of his political agenda and he was planning to announce his 
candidacy for a second term. In addition, the death of bin Laden would enable Obama 
to argue that Al Qaeda was on the path of defeat, providing support to his decision to 
reduce the US military footprint in Afghanistan (Mahler 2015). Although not directly 
suggesting that the hope for domestic political gain featured prominently in Obama’s 
decision to authorise the bin Laden raid, Bowden (2012, 188-189) alludes to the idea 
that it did play some role. “Killing bin Laden would be one accomplishment that even 
Obama’s worst critics would acknowledge. Here was the one arena where a president 
could decide and act without outside political interference, especially given the covert 
nature of the enterprise. (…) No one involved with Obama’s handling of the bin Laden 
effort saw the slightest hint that politics shaped his thinking, but there’s no question 
success would help, and that a public failure would hurt.”  
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More than a year after Obama had given new emphasis to the hunt for bin 
Laden, in August 2010, the agency was able to establish the identity of his personal 
courier which focused the CIA’s attention on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. 
“The house stood inside a large triangular-shaped compound at the end of a dirt road 
about a half hour drive north of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, in a neighborhood 
called Bilal Town. Abbottabad was in a basin surrounded on all sides by the rugged 
Sarban Hills. The drive from the capital was uphill, and Abbottabad’s relatively cool 
air made it an escape for well-to-do residents of the big city during the brutally hot 
summer months. There were several golf courses nearby. One mile away was 
Pakistan’s large military academy at Kakul” (2012, 134). After intensive and 
innovative surveillance of the compound, the CIA assumed that bin Laden might live 
there and first informed the president about its assessment (Schmidle 2011). 
Reportedly, the president was intrigued but not “especially hopeful” (Bowden 2012, 
66) about the new lead.  
Despite calls for rapid action from within the CIA, Obama apparently wanted 
to avoid a rushed decision, telling the agency to “work harder” (2012, 151) on 
identifying the person suspected of being bin Laden. Subsequently, the CIA made 
considerable but unsuccessful efforts to establish the identity of bin Laden, including 
the consideration of flooding the compound, setting it on fire or detonating a stink 
bomb as well as the actual implementation of a fake vaccination programme aimed at 
providing the agency with DNA samples (2012, 154-155). In addition, given the 
numerous aspects Obama had to consider if he decided to apply force in the absence 
of conclusive intelligence – harm to diplomatic relations with Pakistan, the potential 
risk of US soldiers, concern for collateral damage, and the domestic political 
consequences in an election year, the administration had three different red teams 
review the operation against bin Laden (Zenko 2015, 99). Furthermore, the 
administration put significant emphasis on the legal aspects of the raid, asking its 
legal advisers to write memos for various contingency plans (Savage 2015, 257-271).  
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In late 2010, President Obama ordered the CIA to explore kinetic options 
against the compound. The two basic options available were to either bomb the 
compound or to order a commando raid. Despite calls from within the agency to rely 
on its own operators, CIA director Panetta got in contact with the US military’s Special 
Operations Command which had acquired significant experience with kill-or-capture 
missions in the war theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq (Bowden 2012, 151). The raid, 
although being carried out by the military, was going to be executed as a CIA covert 
operation thus avoiding the traditional military chain of command (Bergen 2012, 
167). In addition, according to Panetta (2015, 316), members of Congress were 
informed about the raid before it was executed. The CIA initially developed five 
possible assault options: First, the US would provide Pakistani authorities with the 
intelligence and they would carry out a commando raid. Second, the US would 
collaborate with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI in a joint mission. Third, the US 
would undertake a unilateral drone strike on the compound. Fourth, the CIA would 
carry out a commando raid with its own operators or, alternatively, with a surrogate 
force. Fifth, JSOC would lead a commando raid in close collaboration with the CIA 
(Jones 2012, 419-423). Due to the tense US-Pakistani relationship at the time as well 
as the fear that working with Pakistan in this matter would lead to mission failure, the 
Obama administration quickly determined that any operation would take place 
without informing Pakistan (Bergen 2012, 180). In the discussions between the CIA 
and the JSOC unit, the latter’s significant experience with raids as well as its logistical 
capacities, convinced the former that in case the president chose a ground option, 
JSOC would carry it out (Bowden 2012, 154).  
During a principals meeting on March 14, 2011, President Obama was 
presented with two assault options. As the president was briefed, the sense of urgency 
to act increased as the administration feared leaks which could potentially risk the 
mission (2012, 157). The meeting also included a discussion about the certainty of bin 
Laden actually being in the compound. Assessments varied between 95% certainty 
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and just 30%, with Obama concluding: “‘This is fifty-fifty, (…) Look guys, this is a flip 
of the coin. I can’t base this decision on the notion that we have any greater certainty 
than that’” (Bowden 2012, 163). 
The first and “simplest” option was bombing the compound by B-2 aircraft 
using “thirty or more” precision bombs, or instead firing a comparable amount of 
missiles (2012, 163-164). The compound would be completely obliterated, killing all 
people in it. The risk to US soldiers would be low, as the high flying B-2 would likely 
evade Pakistani defences. Moreover, with no ground troops involved, there was no 
risk of encountering Pakistani authorities on the spot, a worry that inevitably arose 
with any commando raid option. According to Panetta (2015, 311) the president, given 
the apparent advantages, had initially favoured this option. However, the downside 
was that some significant collateral damage was likely, the estimated casualty count 
being between fifty to a hundred people (Savage 2015, 261). In consequence, 
according to Bowden (2012, 164), this concern led Obama to rule out a heavy bombing 
“immediately:” “America was not going to obliterate them on a fifty-fifty chance of 
also killing Osama bin Laden. (…) He said the only way he would even consider 
attacking the compound from the air was if the volume and precision of munitions 
was such that the blast area would be drastically reduced.” Obama’s concern about 
civilian casualties came despite the opinion of his lawyers that the military advantage 
of killing bin Laden justified “a significant number of civilian bystander deaths” on 
necessity and proportionality calculations (Savage 2015, 261). 
The second option was a JSOC commando raid. The military was confident 
that, if the commandos could be brought to the compound, they “could clear it and 
kill or capture bin Laden with minimal loss of life” (Bowden 2012, 165). A major 
advantage besides the reduced collateral damage would be that the US could obtain 
proof of bin Laden’s identity in a ground raid whereas in the bombing option this 
seemed impossible (2012, 166). The downside was that the ground raid inevitably 
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entailed a risk of US soldiers being harmed during the assault as well as a potential 
confrontation with Pakistani authorities afterwards. Another aspect that was 
considered was that due to the mission being a CIA covert action, the US, in case of 
failure, could deny it. In concluding the meeting, Obama did not embrace either 
option but ordered the air force to develop a strike option that was more “surgical,” as 
well as further options including missiles or drones. Additionally, Obama wanted the 
military to develop the raid option further. In particular, he was interested in the ways 
of preventing Pakistan from noticing the violation of its sovereignty (2012, 167). 
In the next meeting two weeks later, Obama was presented with the options 
he had demanded. Regarding the raid option, JSOC presented a fully-developed plan. 
The military was optimistic that it could evade Pakistani recognition but, during the 
meeting, “was grilled hard” (2012, 169) by the principals. A particular worry was the 
compound’s close proximity to Pakistan’s prime military academy. Concerned with 
the potentially harmful impact on US-Pakistani relations, various options were 
considered before the president decided that in case of a confrontation, the US 
soldiers would fight their way out. “So Obama told McRaven that if his SEALs went 
in, they were coming out. Bin Laden was an imperative that outweighed the 
relationship” (2012, 173). With regard to the air options, Obama was presented with 
two alternatives to the obliteration bombing. The first plan would use smaller bombs 
which would make it possible to target the compound alone and thus reduce collateral 
damage. The downside would be that the reduced load could not destroy any tunnels 
that might exist underneath the compound, a concern that had featured in previous 
discussions. Having said that, even this type of bombing would entail the risk of killing 
innocent people as the identity of bin Laden had not securely been established and, 
even in case he was there, the bombing would leave no proof that the US had killed 
him. The second plan was to target the person alone whom the CIA had identified as 
potentially being bin Laden. This might be done using “the equivalent of a sniper 
drone” (2012, 174) during one of the walks the bin Laden suspect used to take in the 
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garden beside the compound. “There would be no smoking hole in the center of 
Abbottabad, no dead wives and children, little collateral damage, if any, and there 
would be no potential dead or wounded SEALs, no chance of a sticky standoff against 
Pakistan’s armed forces at the compound” (2012, 174). Judging from the deliberations 
in the situation room, the drone option was considered to be “tempting” given its 
riskless-ness (2012, 196). Still, despite seemingly solving all of the conundrums the 
president was facing, the drone option could not provide proof that it had actually 
been bin Laden who was killed.  
In sum, considering all of the options with the hindsight of Obama eventually 
embracing the ground raid, it seems plausible that he considered having proof of bin 
Laden’s demise supreme. Not having this proof, “meant that the uncertainty that 
surrounded this mission would live on, and that in some sense bin Laden would live 
on, even if it had been him” (2012, 175). In addition, Al Qaeda could continue its 
activities as if bin Laden was still alive, potentially issuing fake statements bearing his 
name (2012, 197). 
At the end of the meeting, although Obama kept both the raid and the drone 
option at his disposal, Bowden (2012, 175) detected a “strong clue that Obama had 
already made up his mind.” It is also noteworthy that Obama ordered JSOC to start 
“full-dress rehearsals” of the raid (2012, 175). When it came to the final meeting on 
April 28, the majority of Obama’s security team was in favour of the raid option (2012, 
198). One after the other, the principals had to choose among carrying out the raid, 
the drone strike, or to do nothing, and then defend their decision (2012, 201). The 
next morning Obama ordered the raid option, later sharing with Bowden (2012, 206-
207) his final calculus: 
The advantages of the raid were obvious and, to his way of thinking, outweighed the 
risks. A missile might go astray and, unlike taking a shot from a drone, the raid offered 
certainty. If bin Laden was there, they would know it and they would bring him out, 
dead or alive. Getting him without being able to prove it – worse, without knowing it 
– would forfeit a big part of the accomplishment. Here was a chance to bring closure 
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to the great tragedy of 9/11 and strike a mortal blow to al Qaeda. Add to that Obama’s 
trust in McRaven, and the near-unanimous support of his advisers, and the decision 
was clear. 
There was another compelling reason to send in the SEAL team. If this had 
been bin Laden’s hideout for years, it might hold a trove of valuable information, 
perhaps the kind that would enable the United States to further dismantle al Qaeda. 
Obama knew the logic behind F3EAD. The only way to exploit bin Laden’s personal 
data was to send in men who could collect it. 
One final aspect that deserves consideration is the kill-or-capture question. 
With the hindsight of several years past it seems certain that the raid in Abbottabad 
was planned as a kill mission. Journalistic investigations (see, e.g., Cole 2017; Savage 
2015, 266-268; Schmidle 2011) as well as autobiographical accounts by SEALs who 
took part in the raid (Bronstein 2013; Owen 2012, 192) confirm this view. Even the 
Obama administration admitted that killing bin Laden was the most likely outcome 
although claiming that, under certain circumstances, he would have been captured. 
Bowden (2012, 190) quotes President Obama that “‘Our basic attitude was that, given 
his dedication to his cause, the likelihood of surrender was very low (…) We also knew 
that there would always be the possibility of him strapping on explosives and trying 
to take out a team with him. So I think people’s general attitude was, if he’s going to 
surrender, he better be naked and on the ground. Had that occurred, then we would 
have arrested him and held him. I won’t go into all the details of what those various 
steps would have been, but ultimately, we would have brought him to justice. We 
would have brought him back here.’” The argument that capture never had been an 
option seems to be backed up by the evidence that has so far become available which 
“suggests that if the SEALs had wanted to take bin Laden alive, they could have” (2012, 
252). Having said that, however, it should at least be noted that Bergen (2012, 186) 
claims that the Obama administration had actually made very specific plans for how 
to deal with bin Laden in case of capture. 
With regard to the conduct of the mission, twenty-three Navy SEALs and 
support soldiers were flown by helicopter from Jalalabad Air Field in eastern 
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Afghanistan to Abbottabad. Bin Laden’s compound consisted of a guesthouse and a 
main house. One group of the SEALs first approached the guesthouse where they 
encountered “wild and ineffective” (Bowden 2012, 228) gunfire. The most likely 
source of this resistance was bin Laden’s courier, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, who was 
killed when the SEALs returned fire. In this firefight, Ahmed’s wife was wounded in 
the shoulder. After that, another group of SEALS entered the main house where bin 
Laden was supposed to reside, “clearing it methodically” (2012, 228). The following 
quote provides a detailed impression of bin Laden’s final moments: 
Abrar Ahmed, the courier’s brother, was in a first-floor bedroom with his wife Bushra. 
Both were shot dead. They cleared the first floor room by room, encountering no 
further gunfire. They passed through two large storage rooms and a kitchen. No one 
knew the layout of the interior. When they encountered a locked metal door in the rear 
sealing off a stairway to the upper floors, they slapped on a small C-4 charge, blew it 
off its hinges, and moved up the stairs. Bin Laden’s twenty-three-year-old son, Khalid, 
a slender bearded man wearing a white T-shirt, was shot dead at the top. There were 
wailing women and children on this floor, none of whom posed a threat. The team 
didn’t know it yet, but there was only one adult male left in the compound, and he was 
in the third-floor bedroom. (…) 
The SEAL team started up those stairs in single file, scanning different angles, 
searching while protecting each other. The first man up spotted a tall, bearded, 
swarthy man in a prayer cap wearing traditional flowing Pakistani clothes, the knee-
length shirt worn over pajama-like bottoms. The lead SEAL fired at the man, who 
retreated quickly into the bedroom. At the top of the stairs the lead SEAL tackled two 
women, likely two of bin Laden’s wives, fearing they were wearing explosive vests. The 
second SEAL up the stairs moved into the bedroom and encountered the tall man in 
the prayer cap, whom he recognized immediately. Bin Laden stood behind Amal, his 
hands on her shoulders. As she moved toward the SEAL he shot bin Laden twice in the 
head. The Sheik fell over backwards, face up, and the SEAL fired one more round into 
his head. The team members who followed pumped more rounds into bin Laden’s 
torso, but he was already dead. 
The engagement was over in seconds. In these final moments of shooting, 
Amal was shot in the leg. Bin Laden had a weapon on a shelf nearby, but had not picked 
it up. His identity was unmistakable, even with the grotesque wounds to his head. 
(2012, 228-230) 
After the kinetic part of the operation, the SEAL team searched the building for 
intelligence, collecting a considerable amount of documents. Furthermore, the team 
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took bin Laden’s body with them in order to establish his identity and bury his 
remains. All this took place in a rush as the SEALs had to expect the arrival of 
Pakistani authorities who, as pointed out above, had not been informed about the 
mission. After a water-proof identification of his identity, bin Laden’s body was buried 
in the Arabian Sea (2012, 264). 
5.5.2 The Unofficial Account 
The official account, despite minor inconsistencies, comes across as a credible chain 
of events but, in fact, was more of a composition of the viewpoints of the players 
involved, mainly the Pentagon, the White House, and the CIA (Mahler 2015). Soon 
after the public announcement of the raid, the Obama administration had to correct 
itself several times about the details of the operation. Compared to contradictions 
about who shot bin Laden or whether he was armed or not, however, the more serious 
question arising was whether the official narrative was an attempt to mislead the 
public about actual events. “Then there was the sheer improbability of the story, which 
asked us to believe that Obama sent 23 SEALs on a seemingly suicidal mission, 
invading Pakistani air space without air or ground cover, fast-roping into a compound 
that, if it even contained bin Laden, by all rights should have been heavily guarded. 
And according to the official line, all of this was done without any sort of cooperation 
or even assurances from the Pakistani military or intelligence service. How likely was 
that?” (Mahler 2015). In other words, there seemed to be reason to ask whether the 
official narrative was simply an example of “American mythmaking,” and whether 
accounts such as Bowden’s told a story the Obama administration had made up 
(Mahler 2015).  
This question was taken up by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (2016) 
who, in his account of the operation, claimed that Bowden had been played by the 
Obama administration. Before providing Hersh’s account it should be said that his 
take remains controversial and has adamantly been denied by the Obama 
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administration as well as considered highly unlikely by Bowden and untrue by Bergen 
who also wrote a book about the raid (Mahler 2015). Having said that, however, some 
voices (see, e.g., Gall 2015) have judged at least parts of Hersh’s claims to likely be 
accurate. 
Hersh opens his account with the claim that the official narrative “might have 
been written by Lewis Carrol” (2016, 13). In particular, he asserts that the claims that 
the operation was an all-American mission and that Pakistani authorities had not 
been informed beforehand are untrue. Hersh (2016, 14-15) refers to a “retired senior 
intelligence official” as having told him the true story of the killing of bin Laden: 
(…) that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 
2006; that Kayani and Pasha [chief of the army staff and director general of the ISI] 
knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters could cross 
Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin 
Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since 
May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the 
secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while 
Obama did order the raid and the SEAL team did carry it out, many other aspects of 
the administration’s account were false. 
According to Hersh (2016, 16), the story about bin Laden’s demise began with a walk-
in at the CIA station in Islamabad, Pakistan by a former senior Pakistani intelligence 
officer in August 2010. He offered to provide the agency with the hiding place of bin 
Laden in return for the reward the US was offering. Sceptical about the veracity of the 
claim, the CIA started monitoring the compound in Abbottabad where bin Laden was 
allegedly living as a prisoner of the ISI, being used by that agency as leverage in its 
relations with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (2016, 24). Bin Laden was also said to be 
gravely ill so that the ISI placed a personal doctor next to the compound and bin 
Laden’s upkeep was financed by Saudi Arabia (2016, 19). The US did not inform 
Pakistani authorities because of fears that the Pakistanis would move bin Laden 
elsewhere (2016, 18-19). 
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By October 2010, the CIA started discussions about kinetic options, similar to 
those discussed in the official account. The main hindrance in these discussions seems 
to have been obtaining proof that the person killed was actually bin Laden (2016, 17). 
Also in October, President Obama was briefed about the lead but his reaction was 
hesitant, demanding proof that bin Laden was actually living in the compound. To get 
Obama’s support, the CIA, working together with JSOC, sought to obtain DNA 
evidence of bin Laden as well as convince the president about the risk-less nature of a 
night raid on the compound. These objectives, however, would only be achievable with 
Pakistani support (2016, 18). Consequently, Pakistani authorities were told about the 
US lead and US authorities secured Pakistani co-operation using both incentives and 
blackmail (2016, 19).  
According to Hersh (2016, 22), Obama was facing significant risks at this early 
stage of planning, especially being worried about whether bin Laden was really in the 
compound, whether the story might be a Pakistani deception, as well as about the 
potential political repercussions in case of mission failure. The first concern could be 
resolved when the US obtained a DNA sample that proved bin Laden’s identity. The 
other concerns were resolved when the US agreed with Pakistan about how the 
mission would unfold. Pakistan insisted the US “come in lean and mean” and that bin 
Laden had to be killed. Otherwise Pakistan would not allow the mission to take place 
(2016, 23). In the words of the retired officer on whom Hersh bases his account: “‘It 
was clearly and absolutely a premediated murder’” (2016, 27). In order to prepare the 
assault on the compound Pakistani authorities agreed to establish a liaison office 
which would help US forces to plan the attack. By then, JSOC had started rehearsing 
the mission on a site in Nevada, using a mock-up of the Abbottabad compound (2016, 
24). It was also agreed that after the killing of bin Laden, the US would use a cover 
story saying that bin Laden had been killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan so that 
any Pakistani involvement could be denied (2016, 26). 
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In terms of the actual unfolding of the raid, Hersh’s version, again, deviates 
strongly from the official account. To begin with, there was no firefight when the 
SEALS entered the compound. The ISI guards had left the compound beforehand and 
there were no weapons present. An ISI liaison officer led the SEALs to bin Laden’s 
quarters where the commandos used explosives to open the doors. Only one shot was 
fired, hitting one of bin Laden’s wives, who was “screaming hysterically,” in the knee 
(2016, 28). Hersh (2016, 29) then provides the following account of bin Laden’s last 
moments: 
“They knew where the target was – third floor, second door on the right,” the retired 
official said. “Go straight there. Osama was cowering and retreated into the bedroom. 
Two shooters followed him and opened up. Very simple, very straightforward, very 
professional hit.” Some of the SEALs were appalled later at the White House’s initial 
insistence that they had shot bin Laden in self-defense, the retired official said. “Six of 
the SEALs” finest, most experienced NCOs, faced with an unarmed elderly civilian, 
had to kill him in self-defense? (…) The rules of engagement were that if bin Laden put 
up any opposition they were authorized to take lethal action. But if they suspected he 
might have some means of opposition, like an explosive vest under his robe, they could 
also kill him. So there’s this guy in a mystery robe and they shot him. It’s not because 
he was reaching for a weapon. The rules gave them absolute authority to kill the guy.” 
The later White House claim that only one or two bullets were fired into his head was 
“bullshit,” the retired official said. “The squad came through the door and obliterated 
him. As the SEALs say, ‘We kicked his ass and took his gas.’” 
It should be noted that, the rest of Hersh’s account’s veracity notwithstanding, at least 
one other investigative report (Cole 2017) supports the claim that bin Laden’s body 
was mutilated by the SEALs. Moreover, Hersh (2016, 47) denies the official narrative 
of bin Laden’s burial, quoting a source that the SEALs had “torn bin Laden’s body to 
pieces with rifle fire. The remains, including his head, which had only a few bullet 
holes in it, were thrown into a body bag and, during the helicopter flight back to 
Jalalabad, some body parts were tossed out over the Hindu Kush mountains (…)”  
After the killing of bin Laden, according to Hersh (2016, 30), the Seals found 
no such thing as a treasure trove of computers and storage devices. The claim that bin 
Laden had been running Al Qaeda’s operations from the compound was untrue. As to 
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why the Obama administration made up the claim that bin Laden was still 
operational, Hersh (2016, 40) provides an aspect that will become important in our 
later discussion of the cases: “‘Why create the treasure trove story?’ the retired official 
said. ‘The White House had to give the impression that bin Laden was still 
operationally important. Otherwise, why kill him? A cover story was created – that 
there was a network of couriers coming and going with memory sticks and 
instructions. All to show that bin Laden remained important.’” Hersh also claims that 
the Obama administration explicitly used the bin Laden raid for political gain. 
Quoting a JSOC consultant (2016, 47), “‘the killing of bin Laden was political theatre 
designed to burnish Obama’s military credentials (…) It’s irresistible to a politician. 
Bin Laden became a working asset.’” 
After the raid, the SEALs waited outside the compound to be picked up, not 
having to fear any confrontation with Pakistani authorities. Due to an unplanned 
crash of one of the helicopters that had brought in the SEALs the Obama 
administration, fearing that the original cover story would no longer work, decided to 
break the promise given to Pakistan and put forward the account of the bin Laden raid 
that has been discussed above as the official account (2016, 32). 
 
5.6 The Case of Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, 30 September,  
        2011 
The case of Anwar al-Awlaki takes the discussion back to Yemen where he was killed 
in an American drone strike on September 30, 2011. Arguably, this particular 
operation trumps the bin Laden raid in importance with regard to the debates leading 
up to the kill decision as well as its implications for the codification of the general 
targeted killing programme. As Shane (2015, xiii) notes, “Awlaki’s death secured him 
a place in history: at least since the Civil War, he was the first American citizen to be 
hunted down and deliberately killed by his own government, on the basis of secret 
169 
 
intelligence and without criminal charges or a chance to defend himself in court. Many 
Americans welcomed his demise, but its extraordinary circumstances, and the 
unsettling precedent it set, sparked a debate about law and principles that would go 
on for years.” 
Due to the fact that al-Awlaki held dual American-Yemeni citizenship critics 
argued that killing him without trial was a violation of the American constitution. In 
addition, partly due to government secrecy, differing accounts emerged as to how 
grave a threat al-Awlaki posed and whether targeting him was justifiable. Crucially, 
his targeted killing laid bare the tension that led Walzer to first think about jus ad vim 
as lying somewhere in-between regular inter-state warfare and the justified use of 
lethal force by domestic police forces. As Shane (2015, 225-226) puts it: 
The ambivalence, both in the scholarly world and among the general public, was 
understandable. On the one hand, there was the notion that Awlaki had joined the 
enemy in a war and that, like German Americans who had fought for the Nazis in 
World War II, he could expect no immunity based on his citizenship. But the face-off 
with Al Qaeda bore little resemblance to World War II, or indeed to any war in 
American history. So there was a bracing alternative analogy: that killing Awlaki would 
be like a justified police shooting of an armed and threatening criminal. The police 
shooting parallel was cited by Barron [Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel 
acting assistant attorney general] and Lederman [Justice Department Office of Legal 
Counsel deputy assistant attorney general] and was raised repeatedly by government 
officials who supported targeting Awlaki. “My view was Anwar al-Awlaki was actively 
plotting to kill American citizens,” said Gerald Feierstein, who was the American 
ambassador to Yemen during the hunt. “To me, he was like a guy walking down an 
American street carrying an M-16. The police would take him out.” 
The Obama administration apparently took these concerns seriously and produced 
several legal memos which defended the legality of targeting al-Awlaki. 
Unsurprisingly, the administration sought to keep those memos secret but, due to 
leaks and court rulings, some redacted versions became public. Klaidman (2013, 215-
216) provides a basic list of legal concerns the administration struggled with. 
There was little doubt that Awlaki wanted to strike at his birth nation, yet could a group 
of anonymous security officials secretly reviewing highly classified evidence claim to 
be judge, jury, and executioner? Koh [State Department Legal Adviser] also worried 
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about reciprocity. Would the Russian or Chinese governments track down dissidents 
whom they viewed as terrorists and take them out on the streets of Washington, DC, 
or Paris with their own drones? And Koh was skeptical of some of the counterterrorism 
community’s conclusions about Awlaki. He had seen how quickly intelligence analysts 
would elevate a propagandist to an operator. Or how they used fudged terms like 
“facilitator” to imply that suspected militants represented grave threats to the United 
States. What was a facilitator? A driver? A chef? 
Al-Awlaki was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico in 1971 when his Yemeni father 
studied at New Mexico State University. After having spent the first eleven years of 
his life in the US the al-Awlaki family returned to Yemen but Anwar moved back to 
America in 1991 in order to attend college. Subsequently, against his initial plans, al-
Awlaki decided to become a Muslim cleric. In the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, he became “a national media star” known for his moderate views on Islam, 
showing no indications of preaching the use of violence (Shane 2015, xiii). Later on, 
however, al-Awlaki radicalised and attracted the attention of US law enforcement 
agencies. In particular, his dual identity as being both American and Yemeni made 
him dangerous according to counterterrorism officials (2015, 215). Al-Awlaki was able 
to give charismatic Internet sermons in colloquial English and had “an intuitive grasp 
of American culture” (2015, 174). After a stay in the UK where he continued to preach 
he eventually moved to Yemen where he joined AQAP. At first, US agencies considered 
him to be an inspirational, not an operational leader. In fact, according to Scahill 
(2013, 360), there was no consensus about the type of threat al-Awlaki posed: “During 
this time, Awlaki began to achieve almost mythical status in the US media and 
government narrative on terrorist threats. But the real question was how big a threat 
he actually posed. Although the dispute did not play out publicly, there was deep 
division in the intelligence community over how to approach Awlaki.” Reportedly, as 
late as October 2009, the CIA had concluded that it did not have the evidence to 
support a capture-or-kill operation against al-Awlaki (Ignatius 2010). Having said 
that, however, his publications were often found with terrorism suspects arrested in 
the United States and al-Awlaki was also proven to have been in email contact with 
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Nidal Hassan, a US army major who would later kill thirteen people in a mass shooting 
at Ford Hood, Texas. Interrogations found that while al-Awlaki had not been involved 
in the planning of the attack, the contact between him and Hassan might have 
contributed to his radicalisation (Shane 2015, 11). In his inspirational role, the 
administration considered him to have taken on the role previously held by Osama 
bin Laden. As Shane (2015, 26-27) notes: 
Bin Laden’s place in history was secure, but that was the point – his place was in 
history. In the years immediately after 9/11, the world had anxiously attended to his 
messages. But by the decade’s end he had the slightly pathetic sound of an aging pop 
star, well past his prime but still pretending to popularity. By contrast, Anwar al-
Awlaki, fourteen years younger, was the rising idol, preaching an ideology 
indistinguishable from Bin Laden’s but in refreshingly blunt, clear and informal style. 
His usual choice of English limited his influence in the Arab world, but it gave him the 
same international appeal that made Apple and Toyota borderless brands. 
Later, however, according to the mainstream account, al-Awlaki also took on 
an operational role, recruiting and actively plotting attacks against the United States 
as AQAP’s chief of external operations. Jones (2012, 437) considers him to have 
“fueled” what he calls the “third wave” of Al Qaeda, its spread in the Arabian Peninsula 
between 2007 and 2009. As Mazzetti (2013, 304-305) reports, John Brennan, one of 
Obama’s key advisers on counterterrorism, believed that al-Awlaki was responsible 
for AQAP’s shift from focusing on attacking Saudi Arabia to also attacking the US. In 
that function he had instructed, besides others, the so-called Christmas Day plot in 
2009. In that plot, which did not succeed, the Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab attempted to bring down Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from 
Amsterdam to Detroit by detonating a bomb hidden in his underwear. As the 
interrogation of Abdulmutallab brought to light, he had been attracted to the jihadi 
cause by listening to al-Awlaki’s lectures and reading his writings. In 2009, he went 
to Yemen and established contact with al-Awlaki. Apparently willing to take part in a 
suicide mission, Abdulmutallab was approved by al-Awlaki to carry out the airline 
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plot. When Abdulmutallab was tried al-Awlaki’s direct involvement in the attack came 
to light. 
While Abdulmutallab’s training and indoctrination unfolded, he said, al-Asiri [AQAP’s 
chief bomb builder] built the underwear bomb, ultimately giving it to him in person 
and having him practice pushing the syringe that was supposed to lead to its 
detonation. Meanwhile, al-Awlaki instructed Abdulmutallab to make a martyrdom 
video, to be released after the attack, explaining who he was and why he had carried 
out the operation. The court filing asserted that al-Awlaki made the arrangements for 
a “professional” camera crew and helped Abdulmutallab write the statement. (…) The 
Justice Department said that al-Awlaki left it up to Abdulmutallab to choose the flight 
– so long as it was a United States airliner – and the date of the attack. But the cleric 
told him not to travel directly from Yemen to Europe. Abdulmutallab ultimately 
departed Yemen for Ethiopia, traveled to Ghana, returned to his native Nigeria, and 
only then flew to Amsterdam, where he boarded the flight to Detroit. 
Al-Awlaki’s “last instructions” to Abdulmutallab, according to the court filing 
based on his interrogations, “were to wait until the airplane was over the United States 
and then to take the plane down.” (Savage 2015, 90-91) 
Scahill (2013, 318), one author who at times parts with the mainstream 
account, has put forward a less clear-cut picture of al-Awlaki’s direct involvement in 
the plot. Scahill notes that al-Awlaki only referred to Abdulmutallab as one of his 
“students” and that tribal sources in Shabwah told him that al-Awlaki was contacted 
by Al Qaeda members to provide Abdulmutallab with religious counselling but had no 
involvement in the plot. In addition, al-Awlaki himself had denied having been 
involved in the conception or planning of the attack. Generally speaking, Scahill is 
more cautious in allocating an operational role to al-Awlaki. 
While US media outlets, terror “experts” and prominent government officials were 
identifying Awlaki as a leader of AQAP, those allegations were dubious. Awlaki had 
entered dangerous territory in openly praising terrorist attacks on the United States 
and calling for Muslims in America to follow the example of Nidal Hasan. But the 
available evidence regarding al Qaeda’s relationship with Awlaki in 2010 suggests that 
Awlaki was not an operational member of the group but was seeking out an alliance 
with like-minded individuals. Some, like his uncle, even argued that he was pushed 
into an alliance with AQAP after he was marked for death alongside its leaders. (2013, 
361) (…) 
Awlaki was undoubtedly developing an affinity for al Qaeda’s principles – and 
his public remarks were becoming indistinguishable from the pronouncements of al 
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Qaeda. Still, words are not actions. To former DIA analyst Joshua Foust, it appeared 
as though some within the US intelligence community were elevating Awlaki’s status 
based on the fear he was able to inspire through his words. Although he found Awlaki’s 
praise for al Qaeda and calls for terrorist attacks against the United States 
reprehensible, Foust did not believe these statements constituted evidence of a senior 
operational role in al Qaeda. “Within AQAP itself, he’s literally middle management,” 
he told me at the time. “Even the AQAP leadership treats him like he’s just a 
subordinate, who needs to shut up and do what he’s told.” Foust added: “I think a lot 
of the focus on Awlaki doesn’t make any sense, because we assign him a kind of 
importance and influence that he doesn’t really have.” 
After the Christmas Day bomb plot, the White House changed its tune on 
Awlaki, claiming he had gone operational, with some officials comparing him to 
Osama bin Laden. “I think it’s an exaggeration, frankly, to think he is necessarily a new 
bin Laden,” Nakhleh, the former senior CIA officer, told me. “We would not have even 
thought much about him if it weren’t for Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber.” 
Although Awlaki was developing relationships with various al Qaeda figures 
in Shabwah and elsewhere, and his status was rising within its ranks, well-connected 
Yemenis who had interviewed AQAP leaders told me that he was not an operational 
member of the group. “Anwar al Awlaki was not a leader in al Qaeda, he did not hold 
any official post at all,” said journalist Abdul Rezzaq al Jamal. He told me that AQAP 
viewed Awlaki as an ally and that “the thing that united him and al Qaeda is the 
hostility to the US.” Awlaki “agrees with al Qaeda in vision, rationale and strategies. 
The efforts that were made by Awlaki in the framework of AQAP’s work, especially in 
terms of recruiting in the West, were very big.” (2013, 362-363) 
In contrast to Scahill’s sceptical reporting, the mainstream account does not only 
argue that the cleric was the mastermind behind the Christmas Day plot but, in 
addition, that he was permanently trying to find a way to attack the United States. As 
Klaidman (2013, 262) notes: 
There had been the Christmas Day plot, which had come perilously close to 
succeeding. Then, in October 2010, AQAP had managed to put improvised bombs – 
ink toner cartridges filled with explosive material inside HP printers – on cargo planes 
headed to the American homeland. (…) Over the summer of 2011 Obama was regularly 
updated on a particularly diabolical plan that AQAP’s master bomb builder, Ibrahim 
Hassan Tali al-Asiri, was devising. The intelligence indicated that AQAP was close to 
being able to surgically implant bombs in people’s bodies. The wiring was cleverly 
designed to circumvent airport security, including metal detectors and full-body 
scanners. AQAP’s terror doctors had successfully experimented with dogs and other 
animals. Obama and his advisers were in a race against time to kill Awlaki. 
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Furthermore, Klaidman (2013, 216) reports that Koh, when looking at the evidence 
against al-Awlaki, read “about multiple plots to kill Americans and Europeans, all of 
which Awlaki had been involved in at an operational level. There were plans to poison 
Western water and food supplies with botulinum toxin, as well as attack Americans 
with ricin and cyanide. Awlaki’s ingenuity at coming up with newer, deadlier plots was 
chilling. Koh was shaken when he left the room. Awlaki was not just evil, he was 
satanic.” The Christmas Day plot in particular apparently hardened the Obama 
administration’s approach to counterterrorism (Savage 2015, 95). In response, the 
Obama administration decided to target him under the code name “Objective Troy.” 
As Shane (2015, 219-220) directly quotes decision-makers within the administration: 
“If this had happened a year earlier in the administration, I think there might have 
been greater resistance – from State, potentially from Justice,” said Michael Leiter, 
who participated in the discussions as director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center. “But a year and a half in, whether it was Christmas Day or other events, you 
had a lot of people in the administration who were watching the streams of intelligence 
all the time and were recognizing the very real dangers. We'd had Fort Hood, which 
didn’t involve Awlaki directing things but did highlight how influential he could be. So 
after Christmas Day, I think a recognition had built up that we’re not going to do this 
willy-nilly, but there are some dangerous people out there who happen to be American 
citizens.” Leiter said the citizenship issue was thoroughly debated, but no one believed 
it should be an absolute shield for Awlaki. “The biggest question you are left with is, 
‘Okay, what’s the alternative? Just let this guy keep recruiting people, keep training 
them, keep telling them things and putting them on airplanes and hope that we keep 
finding them?’” 
There has been some controversy about when exactly the administration 
started to attempt killing al-Awlaki.  Klaidman (2013, 264), for one, claims that 
Obama gave “oral approval” to kill al-Awlaki “as far back as December 2009.” Others 
(see, e.g., Scahill 2013, 313; Woods 2011; Roggio 2010) allege the US had already made 
the attempt to kill him in an airstrike on December 24, 2009. In consequence, that 
would mean al-Awlaki had been targeted for his inspirational role, rather than for any 
operational role. Savage’s account (2015, 230) disputes this allegation, arguing that, 
based on his interviews with multiple decision-makers, only after the Abdulmutallab 
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interrogation which demonstrated al-Awlaki’s operational role had the 
administration decided to put him on the kill lists. Following Savage’s account, reports 
as to when exactly al-Awlaki was put on the kill list vary. Reportedly (Priest 2010) he 
was put on the JSOC kill list in January 2010, which was followed by his addition to 
the CIA kill list on February 5, 2010 (Panetta 2015, 266-267). 
As indicated above, there was considerable legal debate leading up to the 
decision to target al-Awlaki for death. Rather than giving an account of that debate, 
this discussion limitis itself here to the administration’s core rationale behind the 
targetability of al-Awlaki as narrated in Shane (2015, 221). 
Awlaki could be legally targeted by the CIA and the military on the basis of the agency’s 
conclusion that he posed “a continued and imminent threat” to the United States, said 
the memo, later released with heavy redactions after a lengthy court battle by The New 
York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union. Ordinarily, an “imminent” threat 
was the kind posed by a gunman pointing a loaded weapon at an innocent person. But 
Barron and Lederman evidently concluded that terrorists assumed to be plotting in 
secret qualified as an imminent threat, since requiring the government to wait until 
they acted was self-defeating. Because the evidence showed that Awlaki as a leader of 
AQAP was determined to attack the United States and was working relentlessly toward 
that goal, there was no requirement that the intelligence agencies know the details and 
timing of a specific plot. They could assume that an attack was always imminent. 
Klaidman (2013, 261) reports that while US intelligence had been following al-Awlaki 
for years, after the successful targeted killing of bin Laden, Obama considered al-
Awlaki as the main terrorist threat, more dangerous even than bin Laden’s successor 
at the head of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Shane (2015, 224) elaborates on Obama’s 
view of the al-Awlaki case: 
More than once, aides said, Obama remarked on the strength of the evidence against 
Awlaki, which was highly unusual for a terrorist case. Of course, none of the evidence 
would be presented in court, subjected to cross-examination, or assessed by a jury of 
his peers. But Obama and his aides had the firsthand testimony of Abdulmutallab 
about Awlaki’s role in the airliner plot; they had communications intercepted by the 
NSA that showed Awlaki plotting with other Al Qaeda members; and they had Awlaki’s 
own public declarations that he considered it every Muslim’s religious duty to kill 
Americans. The president considered that more than enough. “This,” Obama told 
aides of the decision to target Awlaki for execution without trial, “is an easy one.” 
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Obama also specifically asked for updates on al-Awlaki to be provided at every so-
called “Terror Tuesday” meeting: “‘I want Awlaki,’ he said at one. ‘Don’t let up on him.’ 
(…) ‘Do you have everything you need to get this guy?’ Obama would ask” (Klaidman 
2013, 261). Prior to the successful strike on September 30, which will be narrated 
shortly, there had been a strike on May 5, 2011 which al-Awlaki survived narrowly 
(Scahill 2013, 454-457). As was noted in the case of al-Majalah, in the initial phase of 
the Yemeni theatre, most strikes had been carried out by the US military. Likewise, 
the task of killing al-Awlaki had first been allocated to JSOC. In the summer of 2011, 
however, this task was turned over to the CIA. Klaidman (2013, 261-262) reports that 
the reason for this switch in targeting authority was “highly pragmatic:” 
The United States had built a new drone base in a strategically located Persian Gulf 
country. It was a regime with which the CIA had far better ties than the military, 
allowing it to conduct sensitive operations from certain locations that were off-limits 
to JSOC. The Defense Department turned over as many as eight drones to agency 
operators so that they could keep a bigger presence focused on Yemen. Meanwhile, the 
Pentagon put additional drones into nearby Djibouti, finished construction on a base 
in Ethiopia, and transferred drones from there from the Seychelles. What was striking 
was that JSOC accepted the CIA’s primary role in the hunt for Awlaki without 
complaint. Like the bin Laden mission, it was an example of the near-seamless 
integration of counterterrorism operations between the military and the CIA, a 
hallmark of Obama’s war. 
Shane (2015, 285), however, notes that there was something more behind this switch 
in lead authority. “But Obama was not happy with JSOC’s performance in Yemen: 
first, there were the bad strikes that had caused irreparable harm to the image of 
American counterterrorism efforts there, even among Yemenis who passionately 
hated Al Qaeda; and second, there was the Awlaki hunt – eighteen months and 
counting since the order to kill or capture, which really meant kill, and the job was not 
yet done.” 
Leading up to the successful strike on September 30, US intelligence had 
managed to obtain crucial information about al-Awlaki’s “patterns of life.” Among the 
intelligence secured during the interrogation of a high profile capture was information 
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about al-Awlaki’s travel and communication habits as well as about his usual security 
arrangements (Klaidman 2013, 263). Before US intelligence obtained this crucial 
information, it had tried to locate al-Awlaki using imaginative methods like, for 
example, a failed effort during which the CIA acted as matchmaker, sending al-Awlaki 
his third wife (Shane 2015, 253-256).  
The actual mission which killed al-Awlaki has been narrated comprehensively 
by Klaidman (2013, 263-264). 
In the end, Awlaki’s demise was the result of several factors: a mosaic of intelligence 
the Americans were able to assemble with the help of Warsame [the interrogated 
person mentioned above], a tip from a Yemeni source, and a fatal lapse in operational 
security by the cleric. In September, US intelligence had tracked Awlaki to Al Jawf 
province, an al-Qaeda stronghold in northern Yemen. In a departure from his 
peripatetic ways, Awlaki stayed in the same house for two weeks. But he often 
surrounded himself with children, and the standing orders from Obama had always 
been to avoid collateral damage at almost any cost. In many previous instances Hoss 
Cartwright [Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] would not even take a proposed 
operation up the chain to the president if there was a reasonable chance that civilians 
would be killed. But as the Americans were closing in on Awlaki, Obama let it be known 
that he didn’t want his options preemptively foreclosed. If there was a clear shot at the 
terrorist leader, even one that risked civilian deaths, he wanted to be advised of it. 
“Bring it to me and let me decide in the reality of the moment rather than in the 
abstract,” he said, according to one Obama confidant. “In this one instance,” recalled 
the source, “the president considered relaxing some of his collateral requirements.” 
But in the end Obama was never forced to confront that awful dilemma. 
On the morning of September 30, after finishing breakfast, Awlaki and several 
of his companions left the safe house and walked about seven hundred yards to their 
parked cars. As they were getting into the vehicles, they were blown apart by two 
Hellfire missiles. (Also killed was Samir Khan, the Pakistani American propagandist 
for AQAP and editor of the terrorist organization’s Internet organ, Inspire. Justice 
Department lawyers had told the military that they could not approve Khan’s killing, 
but after officials learned he had died in the raid, Khan was deemed “acceptable 
collateral damage.”) 
The mission that killed al-Awlaki, like the bin Laden raid, was carried out 
under the authority of the CIA. However, providing another instance of the curious 
relationship between the CIA and the military when it comes to the authority to carry 
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out targeted killings, JSOC was also involved. “The drones were technically under the 
command of the CIA, though JSOC aircraft and ground forces were poised to jump in 
should the operation require their assistance. A team of commandos stood at the 
ready to board V-22 helicopters and take action. For extra measure, US Marine 
Harrier jets scrambled in a backup maneuver” (Scahill 2013, 500). With regard to the 
atmosphere among the drone operators who executed the mission so far one account 
has been put forward. According to T. Mark McCurley (2015, 333) the operation was 
carried out in an unemotional setting. “Months of tracking ended in a matter of 
seconds. There was little reaction in the operations center. No cheers. No high fives. 
The Task Force was too professional for that. Frog [nickname of one of the operators 
used to conceal his identity] and I shook hands. He was smiling. We were one team. 
We’d earned a victory, evident by the trucks smoldering in the monitor.” 
Concerning the question whether al-Awlaki had been willing to surrender and 
defend himself in court his hiding as well as his rhetoric suggest the contrary. As 
Shane (2015, 43) reports: “(…) Awlaki stated flatly that he would not turn himself in 
to either Yemeni or American authorities, declaring that ‘justice is not open for 
negotiation.’ He was trusting his fate to a loftier authority, he said. ‘If the Americans 
want me, let them search for me,’ Awlaki said. ‘Allah is the best protector. If Allah, 
glorified and exalted be He, wants to rescue me from them, if they were to spend all 
what is on this earth, they won’t be able to get me. And if Allah predestined that my 
death be on their hands and the hands of their agents, then that would be my fate.’” 
As far as legal prosecution is concerned, the US legal system does not allow a 
trial in absentia, but Yemen, in the aftermath of the failed printer cartridge plot, 
brought such a case against al-Awlaki, charging him for “forming an armed group to 
carry out criminal attacks targeting foreigners” (Shane 2015, 262). As the result of this 
trial, al-Awlaki was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. This sentence, logically 
leads to the question whether it was, as the CIA concluded, infeasible to capture al-
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Awlaki. It seems that political calculations were also part of that conclusion. On the 
one hand, as Shane (2015, 263) puts it, the Obama administration did not trust the 
Yemeni government and, moreover, did not consider it capable of capturing al-
Awlaki. On the other, however, 
The legal opinion justifying Awlaki’s killing was premised on the notion that his 
capture was “infeasible.” The word was absolute, but the reality was far more 
complicated. If American intelligence could find Awlaki in the wilds of Yemen, 
protected by a handful of bodyguards, it was clearly not inconceivable that a Navy 
SEAL team could cross the Saudi border in the middle of the night, surprise the 
encampment, and take Awlaki alive. Indeed, SEAL and Delta Force teams battle-
hardened by years of raids in Afghanistan and Iraq might be said to specialize in the 
“infeasible.” But such a mission would be hugely risky to the American commandos, 
could spark protests in Yemen, and might well end with Awlaki dead anyway, in the 
gunfight that would likely break out on the ground. “It was an option and it was 
extensively discussed,” said a senior American official who knew Yemen well. “Can you 
come up with an op to capture? The answer everyone came up with was no. It was 
beyond Yemeni capabilities. And the blowback from a US operation would be too 
great.” So there was a legitimate case that a capture mission was unwise, if not quite 
infeasible. 
Scahill (2013, 391), again, provides a morally more suspect portrait of the US role 
regarding the Yemeni legal efforts. “Four days after the cargo bombs were discovered, 
Yemen indicted Awlaki in absentia on charges unrelated to the bomb plot. The official 
charge was “incitement to kill foreigners and members of security services.” The judge 
ordered prosecutors to hunt down Awlaki and bring him to justice dead or alive. 
Regardless of the specific charges against Awlaki, it was clear that the indictment was 
coordinated with Washington and intended to give legitimacy to the continued 
targeting and potential assassination of Awlaki while placing responsibility once again 
on the Yemenis.” 
 
 
 
180 
 
5.7 The Case of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, Yemen, 14  
       October, 2011 
The case of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki seems to be connected to the targeted killing of 
his father, Anwar al-Awlaki. Abdulrahman who, like his father, held American 
citizenship was killed in a JSOC drone strike on October 14, 2011, two weeks after his 
father. The reason why he was targeted or whether he was even specifically targeted 
remains, due to government secrecy, a debated question up until the present day. One 
account, which one again might want to refer to as the mainstream account, holds that 
Abdulrahman had not been directly targeted in the strike and that he was “collateral 
damage” as he attended a meeting of alleged Al Qaeda members. Junod (2015) and 
Scahill (2013) have challenged that account, proposing the opposing narrative that 
Abdulrahman might have been the target of a preventive or a revenge killing. With 
regard to prevention, Junod implies that by killing Abdulrahman he would not be able 
to follow in the footsteps of his father. Regarding revenge, Scahill suggests the 
possibility that Abdulrahman was targeted for the crimes of his father. 
Most of the controversy has in fact been about what Abdulrahman was doing 
at the strike site with whom. The immediate context of the killing of Abdulrahman al-
Awlaki leads back to the final weeks of his father’s hiding in the mountains of Yemen. 
According to Junod (2015), the sixteen-year old Abdulrahman lived with his 
grandfather, Nasser al-Awlaki, in Yemen’s capital Sanaa. Abdulrahman had not seen 
his father Anwar for two years and because he missed him he decided, without 
informing anyone in advance, to make an attempt to find him, only taking his 
backpack with him. Before his father had gone into hiding, Abdulrahman had visited 
and lived with his father in the al-Awlaki family’s ancestral village close to the Arabian 
Sea several times. According to his aunt, whom Junod quotes, “‘Abdulrahman was 
very aware who his father was and knew that the U.S. government was trying to kill 
him.’” On the morning of September 4, Abdulrahman was nowhere to be found having 
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left his grandparents’ house through the kitchen window. His mother later found a 
note which explained why he had gone. According to Scahill (2013, 496), the note read 
as follows: “‘I am sorry for leaving in this kind of way. I miss my father and want to 
see if I can go and talk to him, (…) I will be back in a few days. I am sorry for taking 
the money. I will pay you back [He had taken the equivalent of $40 from his mother’s 
purse]. Please forgive me. Love, Abdulrahman.’”  
The al-Awlaki family considered making an attempt to find Abdulrahman but 
because they feared that, in case the son had found his father, the Americans would 
discover Anwar’s location and kill him. After a few days, the family was informed by 
relatives living in Shabwah province that Abdulrahman was with them and that he 
had not yet found his father, nor did he have an idea where he might be. As the above 
case established, Anwar al-Awlaki was hiding in the mountains of Jawf province. 
Scahill (2013, 499) describes the scene as follows: 
(…) Abdulrahman arrived in Ataq, Shabwah. He was picked up at the bus station by 
his relatives, who told him that they did not know where his father was. The boy 
decided to wait in the hope that his father would come to meet him. His grandmother 
called the family he was with in Shabwah, but Abdulrahman refused to speak to her. 
“I called the family house and they said, ‘He’s OK, he’s here,’ but I didn’t talk to him,” 
she recalled. “He tried to avoid talking to us, because he knows we will tell him to come 
back. And he wanted to see his father.” Abdulrahman traveled with some of his cousins 
to the town of Azzan, where he planned to await word from his father. 
One day after Abdulrahman heard about the targeted killing of his father, 
according to Junod (2015), he informed his mother that he was coming home. He did 
not do this immediately, however, as the so-called Arab Spring caused political unrest 
at the time. Abdulrahman waited for about two weeks for the turbulences to settle 
down which would make his way back less risky. On the night of October 14, the day 
before he wanted to begin his journey back, a JSOC drone strike killed him as well as 
several others. Junod (2015) describes the strike scene as follows: “On that night, 
though, they were all celebrating Abdulrahman’s last night in his ancestral village near 
the Arabian Sea. (…) he was saying goodbye to the friends he’d made. There were six 
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or seven of them, along with a seventeen year-old cousin. It was a night lit by a bright 
moon, and they were sitting around a fire. They were cooking and eating.” Scahill 
(2013, 507) provides a slightly different account: 
Abdulrahman was mourning his father in Shabwah. The boy’s family members there 
tried to comfort him and encouraged him to get out with his cousins – to go for walks 
or go outside for meals in the fresh air. That was what Abdulrahman was doing on the 
evening of October 14. He and his cousins had joined a group of friends outdoors to 
barbecue. The boy and his cousins had laid a blanket on the ground and were about to 
begin their meal. There were a few other people nearby doing the same. It was about 
9:00 p.m. when the drones pierced the night sky. Moments later, Abdulrahman was 
dead. So, too, were several other teenage members of his family, including 
Abdulrahman’s seventeen-year-old cousin, Ahmed. 
The opposing account, in contrast, claims that Abdulrahman had not been 
with family members or friends but had in fact been attending a meeting of Al Qaeda 
members. In the aftermath of the strike news reports initially held that among those 
killed was Ibrahim al-Banna, an alleged leader of Al Qaeda, a report that was soon 
contradicted as al-Banna was proven to be still alive. Moreover, there were reports 
that incorrectly referred to Abdulrahman as being a twenty-one-year old, an assertion 
that his grandfather Nasser quickly proved wrong through the release of 
Abdulrahman’s birth certificate. As quoted in Junod (2015), Senator Carl Levin, at the 
time the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee who in this position 
received briefings on clandestine activities, said about the killing of Abdulrahman: 
“‘My understanding is that there was adequate justification. (…) It was justified by the 
presence of a high-value target.’” The senator’s remarks are in line with the account 
that, contrary to Junod’s reporting, describe the strike that killed Abdulrahman as one 
based on faulty intelligence.  
On the prowl in Shabwah at 9 p.m. on the evening of October 14, 2011, JSOC drone 
operators believed they had a legitimate Al Qaeda target, the Egyptian-born media 
chief for AQAP, Ibrahim al-Banna. They fired their missiles at a group of seven men 
eating by the side of a road. When the smoke cleared and the corpses were identified, 
word came from Yemeni tribal sources: al-Banna had not been present. Among the 
dead, along with some rank-and-file militants, were Abdulrahman al-Awlaki and his 
seventeen-year-old cousin, Ahmed Abdel-Rahman al-Awlaki. (Shane 2015, 294) 
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Claims that Abdulrahman himself had joined Al Qaeda were vehemently 
denied by his family. “‘He was a very sweet, very gentle boy,’ Nasser al-Awlaki later 
told some American visitors. ‘He was very slim – he was tall but very slim. He wore 
eyeglasses, he’s nearsighted, and to think that Abdulrahman would be part of Al 
Qaeda is really ridiculous. (…) He never carried arms in his life. He never learned to 
use a pistol’” (2015, 295). 
Elaborating on his family’s denial of any Al Qaeda connection, Scahill (2013, 
509-510) goes even as far as to suggest that Abdulrahman’s killing might have been a 
revenge killing based for his father’s misdeeds. He grounds his assertion on public 
statements by senior members of the Obama administration which deserve to be 
quoted in full. 
The CIA claimed that it had not carried out the strike, asserting that the supposed 
target, Ibrahim Banna, was not on the Agency’s hit list. That led to speculation that 
the strike that killed Abdulrahman and his relatives was a JSOC strike. Senior US 
officials told the Washington Post that “the two kill lists don’t match, but offered 
conflicting explanations as to why.” The officials added that Abdulrahman was an 
“unintended casualty.” A JSOC official told me that the intended target was not killed 
in the strike, though he would not say who the target was. On October 20, 2011, 
military officials presented a closed briefing on the JSOC strike to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. With the exception of the statements from anonymous US 
officials, the United States offered no public explanation for the strike. The mystery 
deepened when AQAP released a statement claiming that Banna was, in fact, still alive. 
(…) The Awlakis began to wonder if perhaps Abdulrahman was, in fact, the target of 
the strike. 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, one of the handful of US lawmakers who 
would have access on all intelligence on the strike, seemed to suggest that was the case 
when asked about the killing of the two Awlakis and Samir Khan. “I do know this,” he 
said on CNN, “the American citizens who have been killed overseas (…) are terrorists, 
and, frankly, if anyone in the world deserved to be killed, those three did deserve to be 
killed.” When asked specifically about Abdulrahman’s killing by my colleague, 
journalist Ryan Devereaux, Representative Peter King, who also sits on the 
Intelligence Committee, said, “I’m convinced, and I meet on a regular basis with 
General Petraeus and the CIA and also military leaders, that every attack that’s been 
carried out in Yemen and Afghanistan, anywhere the US has been involved, I believe 
that the United States had reason to carry them out and I support them,” adding, “I’m 
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satisfied they’ve done the right thing.” Asked whether he had specifically reviewed the 
Abdulrahman strike, King replied, “Yeah, that would be a logical deduction. You’re 
trying to get me in trouble.” Despite Representative King’s assertion that he had 
reviewed the case, he later falsely portrayed Abdulrahman as having been with his 
father when he was killed. “If the kid was killed when he was with him, that’s the 
breaks,” King said. 
Robert Gibbs, Obama’s former White House press secretary and a senior 
official in the president’s 2012 reelection campaign, was also asked about the strike 
that killed Abdulrahman. “It’s an American citizen that is being targeted without due 
process of law, without trial. And, he’s underage. He’s a minor,” reporter Sierra 
Adamson told Gibbs, during a press gaggle after a presidential debate where Gibbs was 
serving as a surrogate for Obama. Gibbs shot back: “I would suggest that you should 
have a far more responsible father if they are truly concerned about the well-being of 
their children. I don’t think becoming an al Qaeda jihadist terrorist is the best way to 
go about doing your business.” 
In contrast, the mainstream account holds that Abdulrahman had not been 
intentionally targeted and that the news about the botched strike caused serious 
uneasiness. As Shane (2015, 295-296) reports: 
When John Brennan gave him the news, Obama was furious, instantly understanding 
that the killing of a teenager would taint the counterterrorism strikes in Yemen, 
undermining once again the claim that it was justified American self-defense or aid to 
Yemen against al Qaeda, which most Yemenis despised. 
Obama, said one aide who spoke with him shortly afterward, considered the 
strike “a fuck-up” that was profoundly frustrating. “The nature of his anger was that 
we’d taken a ton of care around the Awlaki issue – painstaking legal analysis, many, 
many meetings, very deliberative decision making, to take this action that we 
recognized was a substantial action” – that is, targeting an American citizen, the aide 
said. “And none of that was manifested in the other strike.” Obama asked for a report 
on what had gone wrong. 
Shane (2015, 296-297) further holds that the possible explanation why Abdulrahman 
was targeted is less straightforward than the blend of preventive and revenge 
rationales alleged by the Junod and Scahill accounts. 
There was an explanation of sorts, if not a fully satisfying explanation, for the mistake. 
At the time of his death, Abdulrahman had been in Shabwah for six weeks. Shabwah 
was infested with Al Qaeda members and supporters, and until September 30 the 
teenager would naturally have been asking among them for help and direction in 
reaching his father. According to multiple Yemeni and American sources, after 
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Abdulrahman heard that an American strike had killed his father two weeks earlier, 
he was both brokenhearted and angry, and he decided to join AQAP’s fight against the 
Americans. “The son was there specifically to make contact with Al Qaeda,” said an 
American official who read the intelligence reports before and after the strike. 
Nasser al-Awlaki refused to believe that his kind-hearted grandson would 
even contemplate such a move. But the evidence to support the claims that the son had 
decided to try to avenge the father’s death is considerable. First, Abdulrahman had 
remained in Shabwah for two weeks after learning that his father had been killed. In a 
phone call a few days before his death, he had promised his grandmother that he would 
return to Sanaa. While the chaos in southern Yemen certainly made travel difficult, 
the fact that the teenager had not started the journey home by October 14 suggests that 
he may have had other plans. Second, it would be both psychologically and socially 
understandable if Abdulrahman decided to cast his fate with AQAP. In Shabwah, he 
was surrounded by Awaliq tribesmen for whom revenge of a son for a father’s murder 
would be not just acceptable but mandatory. And in the weeks in September when he 
was asking after his father, Abdulrahman had probably established contact with AQAP 
members who undoubtedly after September 30 would have urged him to join their 
fight. Third, a Yemeni journalist who acknowledges being supportive of AQAP and 
who is in regular contact with its leaders, Abdul Razzaq al-Jamal, reported that 
Abdulrahman had decided to cast his lot with Al Qaeda. After hearing of his father’s 
death, Jamal wrote, Abdulrahman told the AQAP leader in the town of Azzan, “I hope 
to attain martyrdom as my father attained it.” AQAP members called Abdulrahman 
“Usayyid,” or lion’s cub, a reference to the Arab proverb, “This cub is from that lion,” 
Jamal wrote. 
So it is entirely plausible, though the details are difficult to reconstruct, that 
Abdulrahman and his cousin were with a group that included Al Qaeda members when 
they were killed. But al-Banna, the Egyptian whom JSOC was purportedly targeting, 
was not among the dead – the United States would still be offering a reward for 
information on his location three years later – and the Al Qaeda connections of others 
killed in the strike remained uncertain. In part that reflects the difficulty of assessing 
where an individual is on a spectrum of “Al Qaeda ties.” In the context of Yemen’s 
tribal provinces, that vague term can include dedicated fighters who have sworn 
allegiance to the leader of AQAP, but it can also include men with brothers or cousins 
in Al Qaeda who themselves take no active part. 
Abdulrahman, said one administration official who was briefed on the strike, 
“was certainly with people who we believed to be AQAP.” That did not justify the killing 
of the sixteen-year-old, he said, but it explained how it happened. 
A number of initial news reports of the strike, based on interviews with 
anonymous Yemeni and American officials, mistakenly gave Abdulrahman’s age as 
twenty-one. Outraged, Nasser al-Awlaki countered the false reports by giving 
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reporters copies of Abdulrahman’s birth certificate, showing he had been born in 
Colorado in 1995. The incorrect age raised a possibility that American targeters 
somehow had bogus information and really believed that Abdulrahman was a twenty-
one-year-old Al Qaeda member. But several officials said the incorrect age was either 
an honest error or a clumsy after-the-fact falsehood intended to minimize the blunder. 
“That’s a ‘shit happens’ kind of story,” said another American official deeply involved 
in the counterterrorism campaign in Yemen about the strike. “We didn’t know he was 
there.” 
Savage (2015, 280), comparable to Shane, reports that US intelligence did not know 
that Abdulrahman was present at the strike site and that he was not specifically 
targeted although intelligence assumed that he had in fact joined Al Qaeda and 
therefore had been present during the meeting of militants. 
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6 Liability to Small-Scale Force2 
Introduction 
Within just war thinking, the expanded use of targeted killing after 9/11 caused 
considerable soul searching although, as Himes (2016) demonstrates, moral 
argument about this particular policy reaches back to the classical world. Most 
recently, debate about targeted killing has become part of the “war of ethics” as both 
Walzer (2016) and McMahan (2012a) have argued about the morality of this practice. 
This chapter demonstrates that the chasm between these two camps is not 
unbridgeable; the argument about small-scale force can partly reconcile both camps 
on substantive grounds. It will be argued that targeted killings should be ruled by an 
account of moral culpability in line with the punitive reading of St Thomas which, like 
revisionists, objects to parts of Walzer’s just war. The culpability account will be 
developed in conversation with McMahan’s account of moral liability to defensive 
harm. Consequently, Walzer’s legalist paradigm, due to its reliance on international 
law is not in the centre of attention. 
Before starting, it makes sense to briefly consider the legal justification for 
targeted killing provided by the Obama administration which largely overlaps with 
the Walzerian argument. In defence of his administration’s conduct, Harold Koh 
(2010), at the time the chief legal advisor to the Department of State, named two legal 
rationales: the right of self-defence and the existence of an armed conflict between the 
United States and Al Qaeda and associated forces. Saving the self-defence rationale 
for the later discussion it must be noted that the legal argument regarding the 
existence of an armed conflict contrasts markedly with moral liability or culpability 
accounts. Following from the armed conflict justification, terrorists are targetable 
                                                             
2 Parts of this chapter have been published in Braun, Christian Nikolaus. 2018. “Pope Francis 
on War and Peace.” Journal of Catholic Social Thought 15 (1): 63-87. 
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because of group membership. Consequently, questions of moral liability or moral 
culpability play no or only a secondary role in the decision to kill a member of the 
group. The Walzerian just war takes this justification as its point of departure. Walzer 
(2016, 13) upholds the rule that a state’s military leaders are legitimate targets of 
targeted killing while political leaders are exempt. He subsequently suggests that this 
distinction should be maintained for insurgent organisations but rejects it for terrorist 
groups. If reasonable, Walzer argues, the state should capture alleged terrorists and 
take them to court. If unreasonable, however, they become liable to targeted killing. 
Rejecting the armed conflict justification, this chapter seeks to determine under what 
circumstances a person can become liable to targeted killing. 
In terms of outline, the chapter introduces St Thomas’s two remaining just war 
criteria of just cause and right intention. Having provided this theoretical basis, the 
chapter investigates the cases casuistically in light of the Angelic Doctor’s criteria. 
Regarding just cause, it turns out that, depending on one’s reading of the cases, either 
the maxim of defence or the maxim of retribution seems to have ruled the cases. 
Consequently, the analysis investigates under which circumstances the criterion of 
just cause for targeted killing can be met. What emerges is an account that accepts 
two just causes, defence and retribution. With regard to right intention, the chapter 
provides a discussion of the practice of targeted killing based on the moral virtues as 
presented by Aquinas. Again going through the cases, the analysis investigates the 
interplay of the virtues and how they should govern the passions which inevitably 
arise in war. The chapter concludes that, beyond the uncontroversial just cause of self-
defence, retributive targeted killings can be morally justifiable in principle, but, due 
to prudential and charitable concerns, the bar for such operations is very high and, 
consequently, they are highly unlikely to be justifiable in practice. 
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6.1 Aquinas on Just Cause and Right Intention 
While the culpability-based reading has historically been the dominant take there has 
also been a divergent interpretation of the Thomistic just war which interprets the 
Angelic Doctor in terms of moral liability. As Reichberg (2017, 142-172) points out, St 
Thomas’s formulation of just cause historically led to two clashing interpretations. 
One, most influentially advocated by Thomas Cajetan, considers a just war as an 
instrument of retribution flowing from desert; as “an instrument of punishment, just 
war supposes subjective guilt on the part of the wrongful belligerent.” The other, 
originating with Francisco de Vitoria and suggested by Luis de Molina, imagines a just 
war in terms of liability, as “a means of overturning an objective wrong, just war 
prescinds from determinations of subjective guilt” (2017, x). The culpability-based 
conclusions of this chapter are thus one possible reading of Aquinas, but not the only 
possible reading. 
As noted earlier, during the Middle Ages, the common use of the term for war 
(bellum) referred to any internal or external use of force by a sovereign authority. The 
term bellum was neutral; its employment could be just or unjust. Private uses of force 
(duellum), however, could not rise to the level of war (Johnson 2014, 31). In 
consequence, the debate about the possibility of a “war” against terrorism which 
helped cause the emergence of jus ad vim would not have caused much concern 
during the days of St Thomas. While the ruler as sovereign authority could wage war 
against individuals, individuals did not have this right against the political 
community. Moreover, it is important to note that, in contrast to today’s legalist 
paradigm, Aquinas did not make a distinction between defensive and offensive uses 
of force. St Thomas effectively distinguished between two forms of just war, war as 
defence of the common good and war as punishment. Crucially, in contrast to many 
contemporary just war thinkers who treat just war criteria in a “check-list” manner 
(Orend 2013, 111), moving from one criterion to the next without giving due attention 
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to the interplay of individual criteria, the Thomistic just war criteria are inherently 
inter-connected. Just cause and right intention in particular must be seen holistically.  
As a result, while this chapter provides separate sections for each criterion, its 
argument for just cause for targeted killing rests on prudential considerations which 
generally fall under right intention. With regard to just cause, rationales of defence 
and retribution as flowing from the ruler’s responsibility to maintain and establish 
justice will be considered. Regarding right intention, the cardinal virtues, especially 
prudence and fortitude, and the highest of all virtues, the theological virtue of charity, 
will function as maxims. 
6.1.1 The Criterion of Just Cause 
St Thomas (ST, II-II, q. 40, a. 1) defines just cause as follows: “Secondly, a just cause 
is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they 
deserve it on account of some fault.” Put differently, war aimed “to restore a peace 
that has been disrupted (or threatened) by a particularly egregious wrong” (Reichberg 
2017, 9). In the words of an influential commentator of St Thomas, Aquinas’s just war 
served the function of “vindicative justice” (Vanderpol 1919, 250). Finnis (1998, 284) 
compares Aquinas’s conception of just cause to a “cause of action” as employed in the 
US legal system: “a wrong giving ground for complaints and just claims for redress.” 
The classical Christian idea of just war parallels a father’s loving punishment of his 
errant son and is thus conceived as in line with the commandment of love of neighbour 
(Luban 2012, 308). This formula, upheld by Aquinas, has mostly been discounted 
today as “absurd,” as “an unsupported assertion, a dogma” (2012, 308). Naturally, 
this understanding of just war contrasts with a rationale for war that exclusively relies 
on self-defence. Such an account would consider the preservation of individual lives 
as fundamental, whereas Aquinas’s punitive conception stressed the common good 
(Kaplan 2013, 238).  
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Generally speaking, St Thomas had less of “a unified ethics of killing and more 
a two-fold ethics for private and public killing” (Murphy 2012, 178). Following from 
this distinction, the defence of the community was a rationale flowing naturally from 
the understanding of the responsibilities of government, namely to maintain order 
against internal wrongdoing and external attack (Johnson 1999, 48). As a result, a just 
cause for war, for St Thomas, “meant one or more of three possibilities: that the use 
of force in question was for defense against wrongful attack, retaking something 
wrongly taken, or punishment of evil” (1999, 29). Following from St Thomas’s 
definition of just cause, the retributionist take holds that “(…) for St. Thomas the 
attack described in his account of just cause is undertaken by the agent in question 
(soldiers acting under the command of a prince) precisely to punish the culpable 
offense of the passive belligerent. To be the target of a just war is to suffer an evil of 
punishment (malum poenae) in retribution for the commission of an evil of sin 
(malum culpae). Just war is thus punitive in its essence; retribution is the end to 
which it is specifically ordered” (Reichberg 2017, 150). 
Parting with the historically dominant retributionist interpretation of 
Aquinas, revisionist thinkers embrace a liability reading. McMahan (2009), for 
example, suggest a rights-based liability account. This particular conceptualisation is 
rights-based because it claims that a person liable to attack “would not be wronged 
by being attacked, and would have no justified complaint about being attacked” 
(2009, 8). In a nutshell, McMahan (2009, 156) argues that liability to defensive force 
refers to “the extent to which a person is excused for posing a threat of wrongful harm” 
and that this “affects the degree of his moral liability to defensive harm, which in turn 
affects the stringency of the proportionality restriction of defensive force.” Following 
from that, McMahan (2009, 159-175) develops a spectrum of wrongful threats who 
are liable, to a varying extent, to defensive uses of force: culpable threats, partially 
excused threats, excused and innocent threats, and justified and just threats. 
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 Importantly, McMahan makes an effort to distinguish his moral liability 
account from an account based on moral culpability. As he (2005a, 386) points out 
“Liability is different from desert. The claim that someone deserves to be killed 
implies that there is a reason to kill her even if it is possible for no one to be killed; but 
the claim that someone is liable to be killed has no such implication. Liability is the 
broader notion: desert implies liability but liability does not imply desert. Thus, if a 
person deserves to be killed, it follows that he is liable to be killed, but he can be liable 
to be killed without deserving to be killed.” In addition, McMahan (2009, 8) points to 
the distinction between the instrumental and non-instrumental nature of the 
concepts: 
Desert is noninstrumental. If a person deserves to be harmed, there is a moral reason 
for harming him that is independent of the further consequences of harming him. 
Giving him what he deserves is an end in itself. Although a deserved harm is bad for 
the person who suffers it, it is, from an impersonal point of view, intrinsically good. 
By contrast, a person is liable to be harmed only if harming him will serve some further 
purpose – for example, if it will prevent him from unjustly harming someone, deter 
him (or perhaps others) from further wrongdoing, or compensate a victim of his prior 
wrongdoing. The goal is internal to the liability, in the sense that there is no liability 
except in relation to some goal that can be achieved by harming a person. 
Following from the instrumental nature of liability, McMahan (2009, 9) notes that 
the requirement of necessity is inherent to it. Moral culpability, however, is not ruled 
by necessity “since the value of a person’s getting what he deserves is not instrumental 
and hence is not necessary for anything beyond itself.” McMahan’s account, in 
contrast, holds that once a person has been found to be morally liable to defensive 
force that force must still adhere to the principles of necessity and proportionality 
(2009, 10). 
In contrast, the culpability account of liability considers the criterion of 
liability to be that of culpability for an unjust threat. Generally speaking, it is possible 
to distinguish between a narrow and a broad version of the culpability account. This 
chapter focuses on the broad version which holds that culpable responsibility for an 
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unjust threat determines liability to defensive force. In contrast to the narrow account 
which only allows for the actual attacker to be targeted, the broad account holds that 
“a person may be liable to killing now if that is necessary to avert an unjust threat for 
which he is responsible through past culpable action, even if he is now no part of the 
threat” (McMahan 2005a, 390). McMahan (2005b, 7) criticises St Thomas’s just 
cause in this regard for being “too narrow” while generously conceding that the 
Angelic Doctor was “close to the truth.” According to McMahan, Aquinas’s desert-
based account is too narrow because St Thomas held that it is necessary that those 
who are attacked deserve it on account of some wrongdoing. Following from that, the 
culpability account of liability is more restrictive regarding the use of force as the 
liability account “can extend beyond culpability for an unjust threat” (McMahan 
2005a, 392). In consequence, the culpability account, in contrast to the liability 
account, does not allow the intentional use of force against what McMahan (2005a, 
393) labels innocent or non-responsible threats. 
Interestingly, McMahan (2005b, 7) states that his reasoning refers back to the 
classical just war. And, in fact, his emphasis of ad bellum concerns over in bello 
questions is more in line with Aquinas’s just war than, let’s say, Walzer’s 
conceptualisation. At the same time, however, McMahan’s thinking deviates from 
classical just war thinking in that he makes no distinction between killing in war and 
killing in everyday life (2009, 158). In other words, Aquinas’s careful distinction 
between public and private employments of force is of no concern for McMahan. 
Moreover, McMahan’s sole focus is on defensive killing. He explicitly states (2005a, 
386) that he will not consider retributionist rationales. In a later piece, McMahan 
(2012a) has upheld this stance with regard to targeted killing. He is thus very much 
relying on the modern legalist paradigm with its stress on self-defence as the only just 
cause. In a way this seems quite surprising as McMahan’s analytical philosophy takes 
pride in illuminating issues from different angles and in great detail.  
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Specifically looking at McMahan’s understanding of culpability, his 
conceptualisation emerges as an ideal-type version which, at times, is hard to 
reconcile with St Thomas’s idea of culpability. For example, the Angelic Doctor is in 
fact able to justify the killing of innocent and non-responsible threats through his idea 
of non-intentional killing which later became known as the doctrine of double effect. 
If it is necessary to defend against an unjust attack, even if that attack is carried out 
by innocent or non-responsible threats, Aquinas would allow such action if the intent 
is not the killing of the wrongdoer but the stopping of the attack. As Finnis (1998, 276) 
explains St Thomas’s thinking on this issue: 
Have I then no right to resist the vicious or insane killer’s attack? On the contrary, I 
can rightly resist the attack, preserving myself (or one or more others) by using 
whatever means are reasonably necessary for, and part and parcel of, repelling it. I do 
not lose this right just because I can foresee that these means will probably or even 
certainly have as their side-effect the assailant’s death. For in doing what I do, I need 
not – and must not – be intending to kill (or indeed to harm). I can – and should – be 
intending and choosing no more than to do what it takes to stop the attack [repellendi 
iniuriam]. That is the object [obiectum; finis] or purpose of my acting; and the effect 
on my assailant’s life is a side-effect, outside the intention [praeter intentionem] or set 
of intentions from which the action gets its per se character as morally accessible act.  
Apart from this difference, there is also considerable overlap between 
McMahan’s idea of liability and Aquinas’s culpability account. In the same way that 
McMahan thinks about a varying liability to defensive harm, St Thomas holds that 
unjust attackers are morally culpable to different extents. As Reichberg (2017, 232-
233) points out, culpability can also be a matter of degree: “The underlying 
assumption is that all who perpetuate a wrong are corporately responsible for that 
wrong, although obviously in unequal degrees, as he who initiates a wrong (the prince) 
is held to a much higher standard than those (abetters, i.e., subjects) who merely (yet 
freely, as they could have refused their consent) execute the wrong at his command.” 
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Aquinas’s Punitive Just Cause 
Commonly, most critics of punitive uses of force discuss various ends beyond 
retribution as, for example, deterrence and rehabilitation (see, e.g., Lang 2005, 53). 
Aquinas, too, as Finnis (1998, 279) points out, has a place for these rationales in his 
general theory of punishment. However, while the use of lethal force might, for 
example, also be imagined for deterrence purposes, this thesis, more narrowly, 
focuses on the retributionist aspect of punishment as it had been the “core” (Murphy 
2012, 178) of Aquinas’s punishment theory.  For St Thomas, “In punishment precisely 
as retribution, the restriction, pain, or other loss is chosen as the suppression of the 
offender’s will (which was indulged in the offence), and that suppression is not a mere 
means to some future good but rather is itself a good: the restoring of the order of 
justice disturbed in the offence. The choice to impose punishment is, then, ‘referred 
to’ the common good of justice, and as such is the choice of a good (and not of a bad 
as a means to that good)” (Finnis 1998, 279). 
As Calvert (1992, 272-273) notes, St Thomas’s account shows all main features 
of retributivism: Aquinas generally holds that a crime deserves to be punished and in 
order for that punishment to be just, a crime must actually have taken place and the 
criminal suspect must have committed the misdeed. In addition, the wrongdoer must 
have been a responsible agent at the time he committed the crime. These last two 
aspects are supposed to ensure that only the guilty are punished. Crucially for the later 
discussion, St Thomas also argues that besides the magnitude of the crime, the 
“degree of sinfulness” measured as the amount of voluntariness by which the crime 
was committed by the perpetrator must be taken into consideration when it comes to 
deciding which penalty to impose (1992, 272). Furthermore, Aquinas’s account of 
retribution holds that crime and punishment must be proportionate, meaning “that 
less serious crimes receive less severe penalties and that more serious crimes receive 
more severe penalties” (1992, 273). Last but not least, Aquinas follows retributive 
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theories in the assumption that a crime causes an imbalance in the order of justice 
which a justly imposed punishment aims to correct. Aquinas’s thought about 
punishment is the result of his natural law approach. Directly following from natural 
law’s metaphysics of the good natural law theorists consider retribution “not only a 
legitimate end of punishment,” but “the fundamental end” (Feser and Bessette 2017, 
46).  
Once war as punishment takes the form of lethal action, inevitably the parallel 
with capital punishment comes to mind. And, in fact, Aquinas’s just war has been 
compared to the imposition of the death penalty executed by the sovereign as part of 
her function as judge who has been instituted by God. For example, Finnis (1998, 285-
286), although he himself rejects Aquinas’s thinking in this regard, argues that the 
Doctor of the Church “highlights the analogy with punishment – capital punishment 
– and downplays, without eliminating, the analogy with private defence of self or 
others. Just as capital punishment involves the intent to kill, so too [he thinks] does 
waging war as ruler, general, or soldier.” Murphy (2012, 177), even more directly, 
argues that, for the Angelic Doctor, “killing in war derives its justification from the 
specifically public authority of the state to kill convicted criminals.” Undergirding the 
parallel between capital punishment and war is Aquinas’s understanding of sovereign 
authority. As Beestermöller (1990, 71-72) notes, only through her function as superior 
judge does the sovereign have the right to make judgements about the justice or 
injustice of acts which is the prerequisite of waging war licitly. In St Thomas’s (ST, II-
II, q. 66, a. 8) own words: “As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them 
that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence 
or coercion, save within the bounds of justice—either by fighting against the enemy, 
or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of 
this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice.” Moreover, with 
regard to the sovereign’s authority to employ lethal force Aquinas (ST, II-II, q. 64, q. 
197 
 
5) holds that: “One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-
doer, since he can pass judgment on him.”  
Consequently, in order to determine the justness of a targeted killing the 
question of whether the crime under investigation deserves the death penalty will 
have to be answered. This chapter must thus engage the natural law argument for the 
justness of the death penalty in principle which Feser and Bessette (2017, 52) 
summarise as follows: 
1. Wrongdoers deserve punishment. 
2. The graver the wrongdoing, the severer is the punishment deserved. 
3. Some crimes are so grave that no punishment less than death would be 
proportionate in its severity. 
4. Therefore, wrongdoers guilty of such crimes deserve death. 
5. Public authorities have the right, in principle, to inflict on wrongdoers the 
punishments they deserve. 
6. Therefore, public authorities have the right, in principle, to inflict the death penalty 
on those guilty of the gravest offenses. 
Importantly, as Calvert (1992, 261) notes, Aquinas’s thinking on the death 
penalty does not constitute a consistent account. In particular, St Thomas does not 
see the death penalty as a cure all. While he believes “that some people are incapable 
of reform, and that such people pose too great a danger to public well-being to be 
permitted to live” (1992, 279), his overall concern is not the imposition of punishment 
as an end in itself. Rather, for Aquinas, retributionism is subordinate to the public or 
individual good (1992, 266-269). As a practical consequence, he can imagine less 
severe penalties in cases where the death penalty would endanger the commonweal 
or where individuals are repentant. Having said that, however, it must be noted that 
the gravity of the crime committed, for Aquinas, is an indicator of the willingness to 
reform. In other words, repentant killers cannot simply evade capital or other types 
of punishment. In consequence, it makes sense to argue that the natural law approach 
to the death penalty can distinguish between its justness in principle and prudential 
and charitable questions concerning whether the punishment should actually be 
executed (see, e.g., Feser and Bessette 2017).  
198 
 
While undertaking this analysis, the issue of time will be of considerable 
importance. Traditionally, theorists have distinguished along temporal lines between 
defensive, punitive, and preventive modes of warfare. “Defensive warfare aims to 
repulse ongoing or imminent acts of aggression in the present, whereas punitive 
warfare (…) responds to past acts of aggression or ‘wrongdoing’, and preventive acts, 
of course, aim to thwart threats of future aggression” (Kaplan 2013, 236). St Thomas, 
however, does not allow purely preventive war. Although he never discussed the topic 
of anticipatory military action, Reichberg (2017, 203) points out how, for Aquinas, 
liability to attack depends on a prior determinable fault: “Attacking a party for what 
it might do, rather than what it has already done, would appear to contradict 
Aquinas’s fundamental premise that there is just cause for war only when ‘those who 
are attacked deserve attack on account of some fault.’” Having said that, however, 
following the concept of “inchoate wrongdoing,” St Thomas allows pre-emptive 
action, granting permission “to target wrongful actions that have been concretely 
planned, but whose accomplishment is still in the future” (2017, 203-204).  
6.1.2 The Criterion of Right Intention 
As Whetham (2011, 72) argues, the principle of right intention does not “necessarily 
sit well with us today” as it might be considered abstract and subjective due to its 
“internal character.” Right intention, for Aquinas, concerns “the social act of 
undertaking war. This intention is revealed by the concrete war aims sought as goals 
in a war, and by the actions undertaken to realize these goals. Right intention, 
therefore, gives concrete shape to the condition of just cause” (Boyle 2003, 164). 
Russell also (1975, 269) detects an inherent connection between the principles of just 
cause and right intention: “The just cause constituted some fault or sin committed by 
an adversary that needed to be punished, and the right intention was to suppress 
injustice, return the situation to order and assure peace.”  
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According to Johnson (1999, 32), the classical conception of right intention 
has both negative and positive meanings. In terms of negative aspects, he (1999, 33) 
quotes St Augustine’s call, which Aquinas embraced, to avoid bad intentions or 
motivations: “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an 
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like 
things, all these are rightly condemned in war.” With regard to positive right 
intention, again quoting St Augustine: “True religion looks upon as peaceful those 
wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the object 
of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” In a further 
reference, Johnson (1999, 33) quotes the Bishop of Hippo as follows: “We do not seek 
peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace.” St Thomas 
incorporated these Augustinian precepts into his just war thinking.  
Importantly, as Johnson (1999, 33) notes, St Augustine’s formula of right 
intention had been employed as a means to prevent soldiers from fighting with wrong 
intentions. Aquinas, going one step further, linked right intention directly to the 
criterion of authority of those who send the soldiers to war, thus tying right intention 
“especially closely” (1999, 33) to the objectives of justice and winning peace. St 
Thomas’s understanding of right conduct in war follows from this notion. As Johnson 
(1999, 50) explains: “Thus Thomas comments further: ‘Those who wage war justly 
aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace’ – that is, 
the tyrannical order that is imposed by the unjust. The aim of peace, he continues, 
also implies care in the way force is employed even against those who deserve it (…)“ 
According to Johnson’s interpretation (1999, 50), for Aquinas, right conduct during 
war is inherently connected to the “virtuousness of its purpose” and to the 
virtuousness “of those who fought in accordance with that purpose.” This way of 
reasoning implies restrictions on conduct in war, but Aquinas did not develop detailed 
rules as, for example, were present in the code of chivalry. It also explains why 
Aquinas did not develop what Johnson calls the “prudential tests” (1999, 34) of just 
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war thinking. Today’s jus ad bellum commonly accepts Aquinas’s three “deontological 
requirements” (1999, 34) of sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention plus 
the prudential criteria of overall proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of 
success. For St Thomas, these prudential criteria, although important, were 
subordinate to the deontological ones and, in addition, came naturally if one fought 
with right intention.  
Elaborating on the methodology chapter’s brief introduction, “the virtues are 
those dispositional character traits that allow us to act rightly” (Cole 1999, 59). Virtue 
is enacted by performing acts which are virtuous. In order to know what is virtuous 
and thus become capable of acting virtuously oneself, one has to rely on truly virtuous 
exemplars. In other words, virtuous behaviour needs training. For St Thomas, moral 
virtue is expressed in the ability to perform good acts repeatedly. Confronting 
situations that require instantaneous reaction, it is essential that a person’s passions 
are correctly ordered in accordance with the virtues. When the training in virtuous 
behaviour succeeds, it becomes natural for the virtuous person to subject his or her 
quick reactions to habit, not instinct (1999, 59-62). Simply put, a truly virtuous person 
does not need a fixed set of rules but will react appropriately as a matter of habit. If a 
person’s soul is rightly ordered through the virtues, if one’s soul is at peace in other 
words, one’s actions will naturally serve the common good (Gorman 2010a, 252). 
Given that St Thomas was first and foremost a theologian his just war thinking 
cannot be separated from his Christian faith. Thus, Aquinas distinguishes between the 
cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance, and the theological 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The most basic difference between these two types 
of virtue is that the cardinal virtues provide the necessary foundation for human 
action on earth, for imperfect happiness, while the theological virtues point mankind 
to its supernatural end of beatitude, or perfect happiness (Schockenhoff 2002, 244).  
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For the purpose of this chapter the cardinal virtues of prudence and fortitude 
and the theological virtue of charity are the most important ones. Crucially, this is not 
to say that the other virtues are insignificant. Aquinas operated from the doctrine of 
the unity of the virtues which holds that for true moral action, all the virtues must be 
exhibited. Having said that, the cardinal virtues like prudence and fortitude are 
transcended by the theological virtues as they lead human beings to their final end 
which is unity with God (Gorman 2010a, 255). It is this particular aspect that Johnson 
seems to de-emphasise in his secular reading of Aquinas. In Pope’s (2002, 50) words: 
“The deepening of our humanity proceeds through the graced process of becoming 
more and more like God, in whose image we have been created.” The most important 
theological virtue in this process is the virtue of charity. It is through charity that 
human beings can accomplish the final goal of their existence and it is the only virtue 
that continues to exist in heaven (2002, 38). For Aquinas (ST, I-II, q. 62, a. 4), 
“Charity is the mother and root of the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all.” 
In other words, charity is the “capstone virtue of the ethical life since it perfects and 
completes all of the other virtues” (Gorman 2010a, 256). Relevant to questions about 
when to refrain from using force although it would in principle be justified, “The 
primary act of charity gives rise to the virtue of mercy, a kind of sympathy or 
compassion, which is understood as the greatest of the virtues that unites a person 
with a neighbor” (McCarthy 2011, 282).  
While Aquinas’s main reason for treating war within the section on charity was 
to point out how unjust wars constituted a sin against the highest virtue it is also 
indicative of the teleology of his virtue ethics. As a result, his discussion of the just 
war, as all of his ethics, is finally directed toward the endpoint of unity with God, to 
life after death. Having said that, however, taking divine charity as the “necessary 
lodestar” (Gorman 2010b, 61) of human action does not deny the necessity of meting 
out justice during mankind’s time on earth; the telos of earthly just war reasoning has 
to be an approximation of the eternal kingdom imagined as peace on earth. Working 
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towards that goal may at times justify the use of lethal force. However, affirming the 
necessity of force in the temporal realm must not lead to a forgetfulness about the 
final goal which is to overcome violence. Put differently, Aquinas’s thinking on 
temporal government must be seen as an “interim ethic” (Weigel 1987, 358) in which 
government takes on the responsibility for establishing and maintaining the natural 
goods of earthly life, thus providing the basis for human beings so that they can strive 
for their supernatural perfection. 
Taking charity as the “lodestar” has arguably manifested itself in the evolution 
of the just war. For example, consider the Catholic just war doctrine which is indebted 
to St Thomas’s thinking. The change in Catholic teaching from a “presumption against 
injustice” towards a “presumption against war,” which Johnson (1996) criticises as 
breaking with the just war tradition, might in fact be considered as an, arguably 
praiseworthy (Hehir 2000, 33), alteration of Church teaching based on the theological 
virtue of charity. McCarthy (2011, 298) considers this development of Catholic Social 
Teaching as a consequence of a “re-appropriation of Thomistic virtue ethics in the past 
century and at Vatican II.” While the core of Aquinas’s natural law based just war has 
arguably never been abandoned modern popes have opted to emphasise prudential 
and charitable concerns through acting as “minister of peace” (Reichberg 2012, 1080).  
The same development can be detected with regard to the parallel between war 
and capital punishment. As Feser and Bessette (2017) argue, modern popes up until 
Pope Francis, often publicly perceived as opposed to the death penalty, did not rule 
out the death penalty in principle. What Francis’s predecessors did, the authors argue, 
is emphasise prudential concerns which seemingly advise against executing this type 
of punishment. It seems that concerns for prudence, as well as charity, were behind 
this distancing from the death penalty when, for example, Pope Francis (2015), at the 
time still following the interpretation of his immediate predecessors, stated that “The 
death penalty is contrary to the meaning of humanitas and to divine mercy, which 
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must be models for human justice.” Francis (2017), even more directly, spoke of “the 
primacy of mercy over justice.” This quote perfectly illustrates how the theological 
virtue of charity, in its form of mercy, shapes the cardinal virtues like justice. As Dulles 
(2001, 34) succinctly summarises: “In practice, then, a delicate balance between 
justice and mercy must be maintained. The State’s primary responsibility is for justice, 
although it may at times temper justice with mercy.” Given their recent remarks, it 
seems that modern popes have made the view that “punishment by the sword, like 
wars of conquest, represents a lesser stage of civilization than we aspire to” (Luban 
2012, 299) their own.  
To illustrate St Thomas’s account of virtue ethics vis-à-vis the use of force, 
Reichberg (2017) has provided an innovative interpretation of Thomistic right 
intention. Granted that St Thomas was very sparing in detail, Reichberg contributes 
an interpretation based on two cardinal virtues. For Aquinas, the criterion of right 
intention “served as shorthand for the set of underlying moral dispositions that are 
required for persons engaged in matters of war, whether political leaders and citizens, 
military commanders, or rank-in-file soldiers” (2017, 113). Importantly, while 
Reichberg grounds his discussion in the virtues of military prudence for commanders 
and battlefield courage for rank-and-file soldiers he does not forget to give due 
attention to the doctrine of the unity of virtues.  
Military Prudence 
Military prudence, according to Aquinas, is a virtue of commanders who regulate the 
decision-making about war (Reichberg 2017, 66). Prudence contributes to the overall 
goal of achieving justice. For Aquinas, the virtue of prudence had special significance 
among the intellectual virtues (2017, 68). Quoting St Augustine, Aquinas (ST, II-II, q. 
47, a. 1) states that “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid.” 
Prudence is meant to be a “choice – the inner act by which the will selects among 
alternative goods” (2017, 70). Departing from Aristotle and the Romans, St Thomas 
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did not use the terms of military art or science but that of military prudence (2017, 
67). In contrast to art, which only applies to extrinsic acts, prudence applies 
intrinsically as well. As a practical consequence, while for military conduct understood 
as art an immorally fighting but winning general is still a capable commander, this 
would not be the case for a prudently fighting general. For the latter, any intentional 
misconduct, either through direct intent or negligence, would be considered unjust 
(2017, 72).  
As military acts are carried out for the sake of the common good and the prince 
and commanders bear responsibility for that good, justice in war must be the prince’s 
main concern (2017, 78). As St Thomas (ST, II-II, q. 66, a. 8) puts it himself: “As 
regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians 
of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the 
bounds of justice (…)” It goes without saying that, following Aquinas’s thinking, purely 
consequentialist strategies would be deemed illicit (2017, 78). However, as Biggar 
(2013b, 57) notes, a Thomistic reading of the just war does allow for consequentialist 
considerations: “Thus, Christian just war thinking is realistic. It requires the 
prudential consideration of circumstances, even the ‘weighing up’ of goods and evils, 
albeit within the terms set by moral norms of conduct. When it is (as it should be) 
more Aristotelian than conventional-Kantian – and when it is more Thomistic than 
Augustinian – it recognizes that the prudent pursuit of genuine self-interest is, within 
the bounds of justice, not only permissible but also obligatory.” As St Thomas (ST, II-
I, q. 20, a. 5) puts it himself: “On the contrary, The consequences do not make an 
action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil.” Ignoring foreseeable 
consequences, however, makes a person morally culpable to some extent. Following 
the same train of thought, Johnson (1996, 29) argues that concerning the question 
whether prudential considerations may trump the presence of a just cause, St Thomas 
would leave it to the sovereign to decide.  
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Following Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of virtues, commanders also need to 
acquire the other complete virtues besides justice; they “are expected to be 
comprehensively good people” (Reichberg 2017, 79). In sum, the requirement of 
prudence asks the commander to do several things at the same time: “To maintain a 
moral posture amid the fear, confusion, and uncertainty of the battlefield, military 
professionals must learn how to conjoin reasoned judgment, technical skill, and the 
appropriate emotional dispositions” (2017, 81).  
Battlefield Courage 
Regarding courage, St Thomas developed a two-stage theory that distinguished 
between martyrdom and military heroism in which the former took central stage. 
Martyrdom represented the paradigm of infused fortitude whereas military heroism 
stood for acquired fortitude (2017, 82-83). For Aquinas, there were two particular 
passions that had to be regulated by the virtue of fortitude, namely fear and daring. 
Due to the fact that Aquinas’s account of these aspects is quite brief, this thesis follows 
Reichberg’s (2017, 84) interpretation of the dispositions reinforcing courage, namely 
“hope, anger, perseverance, and the like.” 
As Reichberg (2017, 89) points out, St Thomas’s take on battlefield courage 
rests on two pillars. First, he provides, “in thick normative terms, what might count 
as the appropriate setting for the exercise of this form of courage.” Second, relying on 
moral psychology, he analyses the emotional reactions of soldiers fighting virtuously 
in war. The first pillar falls under today’s category of jus ad bellum. In contrast to 
Aristotle, St Thomas linked the exercise of courage to the criterion of just cause 
defined as the protection of the common good against external threats. He thus denied 
the exercise of courage to those fighting in an unjust war (2017, 90). The second pillar, 
then, addresses questions that would fall under today’s jus in bello. Here, Aquinas 
discusses the emotional dispositions that should be upheld in war. In order to do this, 
Aquinas points to the “auxiliary role” of the virtues of courage and temperance in 
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particular. The function of these two virtues is “to ensure that virtue, as ordained by 
right reason, is not abandoned under peril of death” (2017, 91). Having said that, for 
Aquinas, relying on the doctrine of the unity of the virtues, the other virtues, both 
theological and cardinal, would also need to be taken care of (2017, 91).  
Given that the first pillar, namely a just cause, has been established, St Thomas 
points to the passions of fear and daring which must be regulated during war via the 
virtues (2017, 91-92). As Reichberg summarises Aquinas’s argument that these two 
passions arise at the prospect of future harm (2017, 92): “Fear is the impulse of flight 
in the face of an evil that seems superior to our power, while daring is the contrary 
impulse of attack, by which we thrust forward to eradicate the threatening object, 
confident in our ability to prevail over it.” Relating the virtue of courage to fear, St 
Thomas points out that courage triggers endurance, leading to the soldier’s 
acceptance that “we must sometimes ‘stand immovable in the midst of dangers,’ 
willingly enduring harm even to the point of death” (2017, 92). Relating courage to 
daring, courage triggers restraint or moderation. Courage thus pulls the breaks on a 
passion that, at the worst, might lead to atrocities being committed. “Feeling superior 
to the threat, we go on the attack (aggredi), offensively seeking victory over it. While 
this reaction can be morally appropriate, it may also happen that we act without due 
reflection, thereby underestimating the danger at hand to the detriment of the goods 
we wish to defend” (2017, 92-93). Concerning atrocities committed by individual 
soldiers who carry out crimes without sanction or following ignorance by their 
superiors, these crimes count as private sins and “do not necessarily flaw an otherwise 
justified war” (Boyle 2003, 164).  
Important to note is that the virtues work in collaboration. Consequently, the 
acts of endurance and attack are “complementary” (Reichberg 2017, 93). The goal of 
virtue is to achieve excellence, “so that where attack is called for, courage will 
stimulate daring; inversely, should a man be inclined to endure harm needlessly, 
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holding his own life cheap, courage validates fear so that he flees from a harm the 
endurance of which will bear no fruit” (2017, 93). Having said that, however, 
endurance and attack are no equals. For St Thomas, endurance takes precedence over 
going on the attack: “Although daring becomes virtuous when it is tempered by reason 
and choice, the very propensity of our sentient nature supports this office of 
moderation, for ‘to lash out against that which promises harm’ is spontaneously 
curbed by the contrary ‘fear of receiving harm from that source’” (2017, 94). Still, as 
Reichberg (2017, 95) points out, although endurance is the “primary act” of courage, 
this does by no means discount daring. As demonstrated above, in contrast to some 
authors (see, e.g., Miller 2002), Aquinas does not start from a “presumption against 
war,” but from a “presumption against injustice.”  
Moving on to the dispositions supporting the virtues, for this thesis, the 
passion of anger is particularly relevant which concerns the act of going on the attack. 
Reichberg (2017, 97) quotes Aquinas that “’it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of 
sorrow (…) so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.’” However, as 
noted above, the right measure of anger must be found. The correct amount of anger, 
then, may even lead to withholding the use of force. In Reichberg’s words (2017, 97-
98): “Although the function of virtuous anger is to penalize wrongdoing, it never aims 
purely and simply at harming the evildoer, who, despite his offense, remains a worthy 
target of charitable concern. Enemies of the polity (reipublicae hostes) who are in 
danger of death should not be deprived of succor.” This aspect also concerns the 
question of how severe a punishment should be. As Finnis (1998, 214-215) points out, 
for Aquinas, the severity of punishment should depend on the extent of the offender’s 
fault, not on the harm that happens to have been done. Consequently, it might at times 
be more prudent not to impose a punishment even if it is deserved. Likewise, as 
Gorman (2010a, 254) notes, for Aquinas, “not every sin merits the penalty of death, 
and the wicked should be allowed to live if killing them would inordinately endanger 
innocent people.” 
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6.2 Liability to Small-Scale Force and Just Cause 
While there had been a punitive aspect in the deliberation leading up to the Yamamoto 
mission, this operation was explicitly justified as an act of self-defence. Reflecting on 
the legitimacy of the mission, one scholar noted that the operation was justified 
exactly because it was not an act of punishment. Thus, the contemporary limitation of 
just cause to self-defence which international law as well as both Walzerian just war 
theory and revisionists uphold re-appears. The just cause of self-defence is inherent 
to Aquinas’s just war, too. That is why the Angelic Doctor did not even mention self-
defence in his discussion of just war. There is consequently no disagreement between 
the Thomistic just war and contemporary just war reasoning with regard to the justice 
of self-defence.  
Despite the broad contemporary consensus on self-defence as only legitimate 
just cause, however, the Obama administration challenged what self-defence actually 
means. St Thomas and the just war tradition generally advocate an understanding of 
self-defence built around the qualifiers of proportionality and immediacy. This 
understanding allows pre-emptive action against imminent threats, but denies the 
morality of purely preventive uses of force. In contrast, the Obama administration 
proposed a re-conceptualisation of the imminence qualifier to self-defence so that 
imminence is perceived of as permanent in the face of the absence of evidence that a 
potential assailant has no intention to carry out an attack now or at any point in the 
future (see, e.g., Erakat 2014; Trenta 2018). As a result of this break with the 
traditional understanding of self-defence such uses of force turn into preventive 
action. From a moral perspective which includes the Walzerian, revisionist and 
Thomistic just war such an interpretation seems clearly wrong and unworthy of a 
casuistical investigation.  
Given the broad consensus on self-defence as subject to the qualifiers of 
proportionality and immediacy it seems safe to conclude that the rationale of self-
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defence applies to targeted killing in the same way. Having said that, however, arguing 
that self-defence is a just cause for targeted killing does not end the debate about the 
overall justness of such operations. Rather, as will be investigated later, the criterion 
of right intention also has to be met.  
6.2.1 Targeted Killing as Retribution 
Having argued that there are no second thoughts in principle about the justification 
of self-defence targeted killings if those are based on the criteria of proportionality 
and immediacy the discussion now turns to an aspect which merits a casuistical 
analysis. Looking at the contemporary limitation of just cause to self-defence, the 
Thomistic casuist who follows the retributive reading of Aquinas will detect a possible 
moral conundrum as he or she considers a just use of force as essentially punitive. As 
a result, restricting the use of force to self-defence only would potentially allow for the 
continuation of a state of injustice.  
Consequently, from a Thomistic point of view it seems questionable that 
Yamamoto was only targetable as long as he was contributing to the Japanese war 
effort. What matters is not only his current role in contributing to an ongoing 
aggression but also his past culpable wrongdoing. Importantly, however, arguing that 
Yamamoto was morally culpable for previous wrongdoing and thus deserved 
punishment in principle does not necessarily mean that his punishment should be 
executed; prudential and charitable concerns are also part of the calculus whether a 
deserved punishment should be carried out. As discussed in the authority chapter, a 
change in the understanding of sovereignty enshrined the self-defence rationale as the 
primary just cause for war. Several factors contributed to this change one of which 
was the dreadful experience of the Thirty Years’ War. Limiting just cause to self-
defence, from a Thomistic perspective, can be considered a prudential judgement 
aimed at reducing the occurrence of war. Put differently, for natural law theorists not 
every injustice beyond a sovereign authority’s border, although deserving of 
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punishment in principle, should actually be rectified. While Yamamoto deserved 
punishment in principle the argument made here is that, due to prudential reasons, it 
would have been unwise to execute the punishment. The potential result of a policy of 
retributive targeted killing of state representatives would be a morally catastrophic 
return to punitive warfare between states, an opening of Pandora’s Box. It should be 
noted at this point that Yamamoto’s role as member of the armed forces, from the 
Thomistic point of view, does not change the moral calculus. Following natural right 
(ius naturale), the legalist paradigm’s argument that in war members of the armed 
force are generally targetable, irrespective of the just cause criterion, seems ethically 
indefensible. Of course, the demands of human positive law, similar to the scenario of 
the legal equality of combatants, may affect the judgement of whether certain types of 
state representatives can be legally targeted irrespective of the justice of their side’s 
cause, but such a conclusion stands somewhat removed from what is morally right.  
Given that the official justification of the Yamamoto operation was based on 
self-defence this particular case is a valid paradigm for retributive targeted killing. 
The reason for this is that there is room for questioning whether the prudential 
concerns against retributive killing of state representatives also advise against the 
targeted killing of culpable non-state actors. More specifically, the task for the 
casuistical analysis is to assess whether the maxim “the use of force short of war is 
only morally justifiable in self-defence” is ethically defensible with regard to the threat 
of non-state terrorism. If the intuition that the limitation to self-defence is not just 
morally questionable in principle but should also be no longer upheld with regard to 
prudential reasons in the “war on terror” the casuist will then have to decide whether 
and how to replace the above mentioned maxim.  
Starting with the taxonomy of cases, the obvious differences between the 
Yamamoto case and the cases from the “war on terror” must be emphasised. Admiral 
Yamamoto was the representative of a political community and thus an agent of a 
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sovereign authority. This clearly sets him apart from Islamist terrorists who fail the 
authority test. However, what matters only for the purpose of this casuistical 
investigation is whether Yamamoto was morally culpable for wrongdoing. Given what 
is known, it seems reasonable to conclude that he was in fact morally culpable for 
grave injustice as his key role in the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor as well as 
his general involvement in the Japanese war effort testifies. Of course, there still is the 
question as to the extent of his moral culpability given that he was part of the military 
chain of command. However, given his senior position, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that he was morally culpable to an extent that, from a natural law 
perspective, justifies the death penalty in principle. Arguing that he was liable to 
defensive targeted killing in his current role, while also true from a natural law 
perspective, constitutes a further just cause. Only allowing for self-defence, however, 
is to deny an ethically defensible just cause. The reason for this is that all natural law 
based moral principles follow from the very first precept which St Thomas identifies 
as “good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided” (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2). As 
a consequence of this most general demand, the classical Christian just war 
determined that its “paradigm was the defence of the innocent against injustice” 
(Biggar 2013a, 159). The logical result of this interpretation is that the killing of enemy 
combatants is justified paradigmatically by their being culpable of objective injustice 
(2013a, 212). Having said that, arguing that there is just cause in principle for 
retribution does not amount to the argument that such uses of force should be carried 
out. These are matters of prudential judgement which is not the concern of the just 
cause criterion. The criterion that carries this weight is the principle of right intention.  
Going through the post-9/11 cases, the one that emerges as the least 
questionable with regard to retribution are both bin Laden accounts. Although 
Secretary of Defence Gates used the term vengeance which connotes excessive 
violence (Biggar 2013a, 65), one might still look at the case through the prism of 
retribution. Bin Laden had been culpable for several terrorist attacks against the 
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United States which cost thousands of innocent lives. For this wrongdoing he 
deserved punishment. Through his hiding, he actively opposed the re-establishment 
of justice his punishment would bring. Had he not been opposed to justice, he could 
have turned himself in and stood trial. Furthermore, although there was a high 
likelihood that the bin Laden operation would cause serious diplomatic irritation 
between the US and Pakistan the threat of war between the two countries seemed 
remote.  
Rivalling the bin Laden cases in clarity is the case of Anwar al-Awlaki. There 
seems to be sufficient evidence against him to argue that, in both his inspirational and 
operational roles, he had made himself deserving of punishment. The main difference 
between the bin Laden and al-Awlaki case is one of magnitude. It seems that bin 
Laden’s culpability was greater than that of al-Awlaki if measured by the deaths of 
innocent people the two terrorists brought about or inspired. Moreover, as with 
Pakistan, the danger that Yemen would go to war with the US over al-Awlaki did not 
exist at any time.  
Slightly less clear is the case of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan whose moral culpability 
for past wrongdoing equals that of bin Laden in neither clarity nor magnitude. As the 
account of Nabhan’s case demonstrates, he was considered to be connected to several 
terrorist attacks although it seems that questions about his actual involvement 
remain. In addition, the central government of Somalia was arguably the weakest one 
in all cases considered and there was thus no danger of a confrontation between 
Somalia and the US in the aftermath of this particular operation.  
The al-Kazemi case is even less clear. Important to stress here is that al-Kazemi 
had already served a prison sentence for his wrongdoing. As he had served his 
punishment, the balance of justice had arguably been restored and killing him for the 
misdeeds for which he had been imprisoned was arguably unjustified. Having said 
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that, even in this instance there was no major diplomatic irritation between Yemen 
and the US as the leaked diplomatic cable testifies.  
Next on the spectrum is the strike at Datta Khel. Not only did the US 
apparently not know who they were striking at, there are indications that the assault 
was a mere demonstration of power by the CIA in response to the Davis affair. It seems 
that the strike at Datta Khel, following this reading, was no act of just retribution but 
an act of illicit vengeance. What makes Datta Khel worse in moral terms is that, in 
contrast to the unofficial bin Laden account, the act of vengeance was directed at 
people who bore no guilt of prior wrongdoing. Quite the contrary, it seems they were 
randomly chosen for vengeful execution. In this light, it is unsurprising that this illicit 
strike caused a serious deterioration of US-Pakistani relations. However, again, this 
deterioration was entirely justified due to the unjustness of the operation and does 
therefore not contradict the argument that retributive targeted killing can be justified. 
Furthermore, even despite this diplomatic irritation, there was no danger of war 
between the two countries.  
Vengeful execution, likewise, might have been the rationale behind the last 
strike on the spectrum, in case Abdulrahman al-Awlaki was no mere “collateral 
damage,” but specifically targeted. This interpretation flows from the interpretation 
that he was killed solely for being the son of his father. Considering the circumstances 
of the case there is nothing the son of Anwar al-Awlaki was culpable of. The only 
possible justification one might derive is that he had joined AQAP in order to seek 
revenge for the targeted killing of his father. However, even if one accepts this theory, 
he had not yet committed any wrong besides potentially considering future unjust 
action. 
6.2.2 Discussion and Verdict 
There are a few noteworthy exceptions to the general rejection of punitive force 
besides the obvious case of Johnson, but most of them either fail to go beyond a 
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general embrace of the concept (see, e.g., David 2003; Elshtain 2003; Statman 2004) 
or propose their own version which seems hard to reconcile with Thomistic just war 
thinking (see, e.g., Biggar 2013a; O’Donovan 2003).  
To begin with, Elshtain (2003, 108), advocating an Augustinian account of just 
war, supported a retributive take that, unfortunately, remains unspecific: “Usually, 
when a true tragedy occurs – a flood roars through a canyon, for instance, and kills 
vacationers – there is no one to punish. When acts of terror destroy lives, however, 
there are specific persons we do, rightly, punish. It is this task of punishment, essential 
to any workable vision of political justice, that many contemporary Christians shun.” 
David (2003, 122), discussing Israel’s policy of targeted killing, approves of the use of 
lethal force as retribution if the action employed serves no utilitarian purposes and is 
not motivated by vengeance. David’s account, although vague as well, supports St 
Thomas’s general idea that wrongdoing deserves to be punished. Statman (2004, 188-
189) embraces David’s take while adding a defence of retributive killing against the 
objection that punishment can only be imposed by legal institutions, not by 
governments.  
O’Donovan provides an account that, in line with St Thomas, portrays war as 
the extension of government responsibility to the international sphere. As pointed out 
above, Aquinas saw the task of government to work towards a tranquillitas ordinis, 
internally as well as externally. O’Donovan (2003, 6) builds on this conceptualisation 
and characterises a government’s decision to wage war as “an extraordinary extension 
of ordinary acts of judgment.” Having said that, however, O’Donovan (2003, 53) goes 
on to claim that for an act of war to be just, all of St Thomas’s just causes have to be 
met simultaneously: “So understood, it is plain that while these forms of judgment 
can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. Any concrete act of armed force will 
depend in some measure upon each of the three, and will combine defensive, 
reparative and punitive objectives, though with different weightings, depending on 
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what the truth of the particular judgment requires.” This amounts to an innovative 
interpretation of just cause which seems hard to reconcile with its classical 
understanding.  
Likewise, Biggar (2013a, 65) includes retribution in his account of the just war, 
stressing that retribution properly understood cannot include vengeance as it would 
make any punishment disproportionate. Biggar proposes a model of war between the 
two poles of compassion and absolution, with retribution situated somewhere in 
between. Apart from being overly broad as Reichberg (2017, 144) notes, Biggar’s 
account seems difficult to reconcile with St Thomas’s thinking because of his take on 
moral culpability. While Biggar, in contrast to McMahan, does allow for retribution, 
he (2013a, 190) adopts the latter’s liability account, explicitly rejecting Aquinas’s 
notion of desert: “We have argued that the victim’s moral guilt is not necessary for 
killing to be duly respectful and therefore justified; and that his objective wrongdoing 
– together with right motive and intention, last resort and proportion – is sufficient.” 
Most contemporary critics generally rule out punitive just causes and, in 
particular, take aim at the objective of retribution. Boyle (2003, 163), for one, claims 
that today’s legalist paradigm with its concentration on self-defence constitutes a 
laudable development of just war thinking. As Luban (2012, 304) demonstrates, 
however, three of the four standard justifications for criminal punishment, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and prevention, have been incorporated in today’s 
accepted legalist paradigm. The only justification that has been abandoned is that of 
retribution. It thus seems that although retribution has mostly been ruled out, the 
other aspects of punishment have only been re-labelled as acts of defence. Having said 
that, as this section explicitly looks at retribution, an overview of the arguments of the 
concept’s critics must be provided.  
Luban (2012) provides arguably the most comprehensive critique of 
punishment as just cause for war which any concept of retributive targeted killing 
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needs to address. He (2012, 305), distinguishes between “proportional retribution,” 
defined as the “meting out ‘the measure that they meted out to us’” and “sheer 
revenge,” defined as the “meting out ‘more than the measure that they meted out to 
us.’” What both approaches have in common is that, in contrast to self-defence, they 
aim at responding to past misdeeds. Luban concludes that war as punishment cannot 
be justified because of five particular reasons: “(1) It places punishment in the hands 
of a biased judge, namely the aggrieved party, which (2) makes it more likely to be 
vengeance than retributive justice. (3) Vengeance does not follow the fundamental 
condition of just retribution, namely proportionality between punishment and 
offense. (4) Furthermore, punishment through warmaking punishes the wrong people 
and (5) it employs the wrong methods.”  
McMahan (2008, 83-84), in essence, embraces Luban’s critique, calling 
retributive war “the worst sort of vigilante action” (2008, 83).  Specifically addressing 
targeted killing, McMahan (2012a, 135) rules out a justification based on either 
vengeance or retribution, sticking to his account of liability to defensive killing. 
Interestingly, he (2012a, 135-136) does not base his rejection on moral, but 
consequentialist grounds: “But even if some wrongdoers deserve to be killed, the 
importance of giving them what they deserve is, on its own, insufficient to justify the 
risks that a policy of targeted killing imposes on innocent people – most notably, the 
risk of misidentifying the intended victim and the risk of harming or killing innocent 
bystanders as a side effect.” In addition, McMahan (2012a, 136) argues that if 
retribution was the goal, capture, not killing, would have to determine policy as 
retributive justice requires a trial that determines punishment according to desert. 
Due to the conciseness of his argument, this thesis will focus on Luban’s account, 
taking for granted that rebutting Luban, at the same time, means criticising 
McMahan. 
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Starting with Luban’s sovereignty objection, retributive targeted killings 
should be based on St Augustine’s parental model. Underlying Luban’s objection, in a 
nutshell, is the idea that in an era of sovereign states and a largely dysfunctional UN 
system, no one state can act as unbiased judge. This thesis acknowledges this dilemma 
for relations among states but argues that retribution can play a role in the relation 
between states and non-state actors because the legitimacy inherent to the state as the 
defender of the common good privileges the latter over non-state actors when it comes 
to the use of force. It is noteworthy that even Luban (2012, 316) acknowledges the 
potential viability of retribution in asymmetric conflict: 
Evidently, the punishment theory of just cause declined with the consolidation of the 
nation-state system, because it seems inconsistent with the theory of sovereign 
equality. One corollary of this point of view is that the sovereignty objection to the 
punishment theory of just cause does not apply when the adversary is a nonstate actor. 
Thus, the sovereignty objection leaves open the possibility of resurrecting the 
punishment theory in the War on Terror or other asymmetrical wars against militants 
and nonstate organizations, at least if the states of these militants and nonstate 
organizations consent to outsiders using force on their territory, as Pakistan and 
Yemen have reportedly consented to U.S. drone strikes.  
In addition, Luban’s last point that retributive action against non-state actors 
on foreign soil requires the consent of the respective state also is not necessarily 
accurate. The bin Laden case seems to be the prototypical example of a state that is 
either unable or unwilling to establish justice. Depending on one’s reading there are 
two possible interpretations of Pakistan’s behaviour with regard to bin Laden. Either 
Islamabad did not know that bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad or it was unwilling 
to prosecute him, potentially even using him as an asset against the US. Having said 
that, despite serious diplomatic irritation in the aftermath of bin Laden’s demise, if 
one follows the official account, there was never a danger that the operation would 
trigger a broader conflict between the United States and Pakistan. After all, bin Laden 
was no leading Pakistani general similar to the position Admiral Yamamoto held. 
Rather than being a representative of a political community who was attacked by a 
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foreign power on its own soil, bin Laden was something close to the personification of 
Islamist terror.  
Of course, one issue that immediately arises is the argument that Pakistan was 
by far the lesser military power compared to the US. Some might argue that, had 
Pakistan been the US’s equal, the threat of war would have loomed larger in the 
aftermath of the night time raid. In other words, such action is likely to only take place 
in third world countries which are unable or unwilling to take the risk of confronting 
the great power which carried out military action within its own territory. And in fact, 
looking at the cases all operations took place within such countries. In response, such 
concerns are certainly not without merit. None of the countries in which the Obama 
administration carried targeted killings could have risked going to war with the US. 
In addition, new technological means like the use of drones adds a further problem 
which Brunstetter and Braun (2013, 92) describe as follows: “Technology that permits 
jus ad vim actions, if not governed appropriately, empowers strong states to use force 
in ways to further their own security and interests, while placing weak states at their 
sufferance.” However, this argument does not affect the judgement that culpable 
terrorists who hide in these countries deserve punishment and are either supported 
by these countries or they fail to meet their obligation to bring the terrorists to justice. 
As the danger of war between the intervening party and the host country seems 
remote it seems reasonable to conclude that allowing for retributive targeted killing 
in such cases is licit and does not amount to an opening of Pandora’s Box which leads 
the natural law casuist to rule out retributive targeted killing against state 
representatives on prudential grounds.  
Importantly, while the question of war seems to be the most important one, 
there are further prudential considerations decision-makers will have to grapple with 
before undertaking a retributive targeted killing. A non-comprehensive list of such 
further prudential tests would include the weakening of alliances and, for example in 
the case of Pakistan, tribal loyalties. Moreover, public fear and the possibility of a 
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backlash against the intervening state must be calculated. The Thomistic argument 
for targeted killing thus already includes the idea for which Brunstetter and Braun 
suggest a distinct new principle of “probability of escalation.” Having said that, of 
course, the preferable option would be that states who fall under the unable or 
unwilling category take care of their responsibilities and prosecute hiding terrorists 
themselves. Only in cases where it is reasonable to judge that a state of non-state 
responsibility exists would retributive targeted killing be justified. St Thomas can be 
read as supporting this position. In the Summa, Aquinas distinguishes between 
“general war” (bellum publicum) and “particular war” (bellum particular). As 
Reichberg (2013, 188) explains, the former St Thomas 
(…) contrasted to a ‘particular war’ (bellum particular), which designated force that 
was used by or directed against private individuals. It could be just or unjust, 
depending on the case. Individuals engaged in gang violence (rixa), or criminals 
resisting arrest would be waging an unjustifiable ‘private’ war; inversely, ‘a judge who 
does not refrain from giving a just judgment despite fear of an impending sword’ is 
cited in the same passage (q. 123, a. 5) as an instance of an individual undergoing a 
just private war. The same could be said of any private individual who made 
proportionate use of force in defending himself from the attack of thieves or other 
malefactors. Bellum generale, by contrast, designated the condition whereby one 
‘multitude’ (that is to say, the fighting force of an independent polity) contends against 
another such multitude on the battlefield, and in the process each considers the other 
its external enemy. For Aquinas, this was bellum in the most proper sense of the term. 
The question that arises from this distinction is how Aquinas would have 
classified the retributive targeted killing of a culpable unjust individual on foreign soil 
by a sovereign authority. At first look, given Aquinas’s definition, it seems that such 
violence would constitute an act of bellum particular. After all, the use of force carried 
out in response to the unable or unwilling judgement is explicitly executed against an 
individual and not the state in which she hides. However, for the author of this thesis, 
Aquinas can be read as considering such violence as bellum generale nonetheless. The 
reason for this is that the use of force is undertaken by a sovereign authority for the 
benefit of the common good, namely to re-establish a state of justice which the 
culpable unjust individual had disrupted through her unjust deeds. Interestingly, 
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Reichberg, although warning against an anachronistic reading of Aquinas because he 
did not employ the distinction between the two types of war “in a precise technical 
manner,” agrees. He (personal communication, December 4, 2017) told the author 
that 
If Aquinas were to entertain the situation that you have in mind, I think he would agree 
that force justly used by public authority against individuals of another polity could 
count as an instantiation of bellum generale. He actually comes close to using this 
example in his discussion of just cause in q. 40, a. 1, where he cites Augustine as saying 
that a just war is one that avenges wrongs that have been perpetuated by individuals, 
i.e., subjects of a neighboring polity. In this example, the war is directed by one polity 
against another, because the latter has neglected to make amends for wrongs done by 
its individual subjects, who have presumably acted on their private initiative, against 
the other polity. The US military initiative against Afghanistan in 2001 (retaliation for 
the Taliban’s failure to hand over Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders who had acted 
with impunity on Afghanistan’s territory) fits the sort of case seemingly envisioned by 
Augustine.  
This argument similarly applies to the cases where the targeted person arguably 
deserved punishment from a natural law perspective, namely Anwar al-Awlaki and 
Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. Again, arguing that these persons deserved punishment does 
not say whether it should be carried out. These are additional prudential judgements 
which are assessed by the right intention criterion. 
It needs to be said that Luban makes a distinction between what he calls the 
“sovereignty objection” and the “biased judgment objection.” While he can, as the 
above quotation demonstrates, imagine retributive action against asymmetric threats 
despite the general sovereignty objection, he stresses that the biased judgement 
objection must also be upheld in state-non-state-conflict (2012, 318). In Luban’s eyes, 
the punisher cannot escape the slippery slope that is the temptation of showing 
vengeance in response to wrongdoing; punishment as retribution will always fail the 
proportionality test. While acknowledging that it is difficult to find the right 
proportion between crime and punishment, and vengeance can indeed be tempting, 
this thesis argues that it is nonetheless achievable. Following St Thomas’s account of 
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virtue ethics, it is possible to act as unbiased judge if the person ordering or executing 
the punishment acts virtuously.  
Furthermore, the biased judgement concern can be eased through a concrete 
government action that should constitute a core principle of targeted killing. As 
pointed out above, war as retributive punishment invokes the concept of capital 
punishment. In contrast to (ideal) domestic legal punishment which is preceded by a 
fair trial during which the accused can defend themselves, however, most asymmetric 
threats actively try to evade trial and punishment. Terrorists in hiding seek to escape 
from justice and thus shun the opportunity provided by sovereign authorities to 
defend themselves. Put differently, only because of the terrorists’ hiding are sovereign 
authorities forced to resort to the, borrowing O’Donovan’s (2003, 6) phrase, 
“extraordinary extension of ordinary acts of judgment,” which the policy of targeted 
killing constitutes.  
It goes without saying that for justice’s sake a fair trial before the execution of 
any punishment is the preferable option. In other words, the best case for targeted 
killing would be that it is not needed, that the accused would turn themselves in and 
stand trial. Alas, as the cases demonstrate, voluntary surrender of Islamist terrorists 
is unlikely and thus the sovereign authority will not be able to fully address the biased 
judgement concern. What it can and should do, however, is conduct a trial in absentia. 
Such a procedure would constitute the closest available approximation of a fair trial. 
Fortunately, the great advantage of targeted killing as retribution is that in such cases 
the respective person is prosecuted for something she did in the past. That is what 
distinguishes this form of targeted killing from its self-defence variation which often 
takes place in times of great urgency. Of course, in reality there will often be overlap 
between the just causes of self-defence and retribution. Having said that, however, 
this overlap must not lead to justifying an action in terms of self-defence while what 
really drove the decision was a concern for retribution.  
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It might then be that the trial in absentia concludes that the culpability of the 
accused is so grave that only the death penalty would be proportionate as a matter of 
justice. Naturally, sentencing a person to death will be rejected by opponents of the 
death penalty which seems, from today’s perspective, like an outdated form of 
punishment. Nevertheless, one should not forget two important aspects. First, the 
death penalty following a trial is much more discriminate than the current laws of war. 
One should recall that the Obama administration justified its policy of targeted killing 
not just in terms of self-defence but also in terms of the United States being engaged 
in armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated forces. As a result, Al Qaeda members 
were considered to be targetable in terms of group membership alone. In contrast to, 
for example, the case of Datta Khel where the United States attacked a group of people 
based on patterns of behaviour, targeted killing as retribution requires a trial which 
proves the guilt of the suspect(s). More importantly still, as the next section on right 
intention demonstrates, concluding that a person deserves the death penalty in 
principle does not necessarily mean that this sentence should be executed.  
Finally, Luban (2012, 325-326) argues that even if the biased judgement 
objection could be resolved, retributive war would still not be justifiable as war, by its 
nature, cannot be discriminately waged. “War is a blunt instrument. Despite easy talk 
about ‘surgical’ strikes and ‘precision’ attacks, the fact is that warmaking wreaks 
damage across entire towns, cities, and territories. Wars are the equivalent of natural 
disasters such as floods and hurricanes, and even the most discriminate war breaks 
whatever it touches. Thus, if war is retributive punishment, we must acknowledge that 
it is collective punishment, indeed collective corporal punishment.” After briefly 
considering and rejecting the potential objection that lethal force could be employed 
against culpable individuals only, perhaps allowing for some foreseeable but 
unintended collateral damage, Luban quickly returns to his argument that wars 
between nation-states can never be discriminate even stating that “Operations such 
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as the killing of Osama bin Laden by the United States are the rare exception” (2012, 
326).  
Accepting Luban’s point that conventional wars between states, more often 
than not, employ disproportionate and indiscriminate force, this thesis, however, 
explicitly considers what he calls the “rare exception.” Targeted killing can, if carried 
out justly, be both proportionate and discriminating. A proper retributive targeted 
killing does not resemble an act of collective capital punishment, but the use of 
individual capital punishment in response to a heinous past act of wrongdoing. 
Moreover, the means most often used in targeted killings like, for example, drone 
strikes or commando raids, can be used much more discriminately than most of the 
capabilities associated with traditional state-against-state conflict. 
 
6.3 Liability to Small-Scale Force and Right Intention 
Having established that targeted killings can have defensive and retributive rationales 
the thesis has not yet considered the criterion of right intention which gives concrete 
shape to just cause. The nature of targeted killing conceived as either commando raids 
involving ground troops or strikes from the air raises difficult questions for right 
intention. For St Thomas, right intention was supposed to make sure that virtue is not 
discarded under the peril of death. However, air strikes, through unmanned aerial 
vehicles in particular, essentially reduce the risk of death for the attacking party to 
zero. It thus seems that Aquinas’s division of labour for virtuous behaviour in war 
between the command level and the rank-and-file level can no longer be upheld in the 
era of drone warfare. The remoteness of drone and cruise missile strikes simply do 
not compare to the courage soldiers must exhibit on the actual battlefield. As a result, 
only for commando raids that actually involve ground troops and for air attacks that 
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expose pilots to a certain amount of risk does it make sense to uphold Aquinas’s 
distinction. 
6.3.1 Targeted Killing as Defence 
Starting with the Yamamoto paradigm, there had been some considerable 
deliberation at the command level before green-lighting the operation. Possible 
advantages and disadvantages of killing the admiral were weighed in a process that 
seems to deserve the characteristic of prudence. In particular, what foremost seems 
to have contributed to the decision to kill Yamamoto on self-defence grounds was his 
status as a seemingly irreplaceable military leader. This conclusion was assessed in 
the light of possible negative consequences of the mission such as, for example, that 
the Japanese would discover that the US could listen in on its secret communication. 
Executing the strike was a judgement call in line with the responsibility of the 
sovereign authority for the common good which the Roosevelt administration 
answered in the affirmative. It should also be mentioned that the Yamamoto 
operation was meticulously planned involving multiple government agencies, a 
prudent decision reminding of the “convergence issue.”  
Likewise, it seems that the Yamamoto mission passes St Thomas’s virtue test 
on the operational level. It took significant courage for the pilots to undertake the 
mission. In Aquinas’s terms, their courage triggered endurance which helped them 
overcome the passion of fear. There was plenty of uncertainty extending from whether 
there would be enough fuel to whether Yamamoto would actually be present in the 
targeted aircraft, leading to questions about the mission’s likelihood of success.  
Moreover, a mission like this had never been attempted before. In other words, the 
pilots did not know whether they would come back and, in fact, one aircraft would be 
lost in the fight. Last but not least, it might be argued that the virtue of courage also 
helped to regulate the passion of daring as it seems that the pilots closely followed 
their orders. 
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Moving on to the cases from the “war on terror,” the official bin Laden account 
provides most details for a discussion of the virtues. Starting with military prudence 
with regard to the command level it seems that the Obama administration did not 
only meet the criterion but went beyond what was necessary. In the months before 
the raid, a considerable effort was made to critically consider all available options. 
Obama asked for stronger efforts in order to obtain intelligence as well as for further 
strike options, apparently resisting pressure from the CIA to act quickly. The 
underlying rationale in the deliberations seems to have been the common good; 
defensive force was used to stop a threat to the nation. There are no hints that 
considerations of political gain played a significant role in the decision. Bin Laden had 
demonstrated in the past that he was capable of directing terrorist plots that could kill 
thousands of innocent people. Based on intelligence that he was still actively plotting 
it would even have been justified to accept some collateral damage. In other words, 
while the massive bombing option against the compound would have been excessive 
and Obama prudently rejected this option, a drone strike that did not intend but 
foresaw the killing of a limited number of innocent bystanders, would have been 
legitimate. Thus, Obama’s decision to send in SEAL Team 6, with the risk that just 
combatants could be harmed by unjust threats, went beyond what was morally 
required. Having said that, ordering the commando raid was, in retrospect, the 
prudent thing to do. Having proof that bin Laden was actually killed was, at least at 
the time, considered to be a significant step in bringing the conflict with Al Qaeda to 
an end. Finally, it should be noted that the president asked all of his principals to put 
forward their final calculus, prudently taking their advice seriously. 
At the same time, however, the command level, in order to act virtuously, 
should have made clear that if bin Laden was not resisting, if possible without too 
great a risk for the SEALs, he should not have been denied succour. While it would 
have been legitimate to kill him if there was any hint that he would resist, it would 
have been unethical, as some sources suggest was the case, that the mission was 
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planned as a kill operation no matter what. In addition, the administration, either 
through Obama himself or his subordinates, should have made clear that mutilating 
bin Laden’s body was unacceptable. SEAL Team 6 had a known history of such 
practices (see, e.g., Cole 2017) and by not explicitly prohibiting such behaviour, the 
administration failed to lead by example which, in addition, illustrates the importance 
of providing proper training to soldiers. Having said that, however, following St 
Thomas, the mutilation of bin Laden’s body does not deny the overall justice of the 
mission. The crimes committed by the individual soldier, if not ordered from above, 
remain first and foremost her individual misdeeds.  
Regarding rank-and-file soldiers, it seems that SEAL Team 6 showed 
considerable courage in response to the passion of fear. The commandos had to 
assume that they would encounter armed resistance by bin Laden and his company, 
potentially losing their lives. Given that they willingly stormed the compound, in 
Aquinas’s terms, the virtue of courage triggered some considerable endurance which 
let the SEALs carry out their mission as planned. However, with regard to the passion 
of daring, the picture is more mixed. In addressing daring, courage should have 
caused the SEALs to show restraint or moderation in their conduct. Arguably, they 
showed restraint during their storming of the compound. The shedding of innocent 
life, according to the official narrative, was minimal and one SEAL even risked his life 
when he did not kill bin Laden’s wife although there was a suspicion she might wear 
a suicide vest.  
However, the killing of bin Laden is more complicated. It would have been 
morally acceptable to take no risk and shoot him at first sight had there been an 
indication that he was armed. After all, as argued above, it would have been justified 
to hit the compound with a drone strike in the first place, probably killing all of its 
inhabitants. That is why the ethics of small-scale force is unlike policing. There is no 
demand of a minimal use of force. President Obama, however, prudently made the 
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decision to take the additional risk of the raid which led to the final confrontation in 
bin Laden’s bedroom. As the official account suggests, bin Laden had been unarmed 
and did not show signs of resistance. In this light, had there been a way of neutralising 
him in a non-lethal way, not to deprive him of succour would have been the right thing 
to do. If reasonably possible, he should have been captured and taken to the US to 
stand trial. Having said all that, in the end, if there was no clear sign that bin Laden 
did not pose a threat, it was licit to kill him. After all, he was liable to self-defence 
targeted killing and the risk the justly fighting SEAL should have taken was minimal. 
However, no matter whether he was resisting or not, mutilating his body is a clear sign 
of unvirtuous behaviour.  
The case of Anwar al-Awlaki compares to the bin Laden case in several aspects. 
Al-Awlaki was an ongoing threat who was both an inspirational and operational leader 
of AQAP. Arguably, during the days when he only had an inspirational role he was not 
liable to targeted killing, but this changed when he started to actively plot terrorist 
attacks. As far as the virtue of military prudence is concerned it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the virtue was exhibited by the Obama administration. There had been 
a sophisticated intelligence effort leading up to the drone strike and, due to the 
remoteness of al-Awlaki’s hiding place, there was no reasonable chance of capturing 
him. Consequently, Obama did not face a weighing of different options such as, for 
example, the use of ground troops. It must also be noted that there was high time 
pressure as al-Awlaki could have again vanished from the eyes of intelligence services 
any time.  
Similar and yet slightly different to that of Anwar al-Awlaki is the case of Saleh 
Ali Saleh Nabhan. Based on the rationale of self-defence Nabhan was considered to 
be an ongoing threat as he was involved in running terrorist training camps and 
functioned as a liaison between Al Qaeda and al Shabab. As was the case with all 
justifiable acts of self-defence targeted killing time pressure was high. Likewise, there 
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was a deliberation process leading up to the strike which considered alternative 
means. As far as the virtues are concerned, Obama had to weigh potential intelligence 
gains in case Nabhan could be captured against the risk to his soldiers of getting 
harmed. Why the president decided the way he did is unknown. However, it can be 
useful to speculate about his rationale based on what has been reported. In case the 
president put the latter aspect first it seems to have been a prudent decision to kill 
Nabhan by missile strike as such a strike would not expose any just combatants to 
mortal danger. If, however, it would have been possible to capture Nabhan with only 
reasonable risk to US servicemen, opting for the missile strike only because there was 
no detention policy in place seems to have been imprudent. This would mean that 
possible military gains in a war waged for the common good were sacrificed on the 
altar of domestic political gains.  
The case of al-Majalah raises several points with regard to right intention. To 
begin with, the US, apparently, had obtained intelligence about an imminent threat 
to its embassy which required a quick response. Acknowledging that less urgency 
might have brought arguments of caution to the fore, any verdict about the exercise 
of prudence must factor in this time constraint. In other words, the judgement about 
the exercise of prudence as the “right reason about things to be done” will have to be 
a modest one. The case of al-Majalah seems to be one of those where, following St 
Thomas, one must leave it to the sovereign authority to decide whether prudential 
considerations may trump the consideration of just cause. Having said that, there 
were several aspects that called for caution. First, the US knew it was overly dependent 
on Yemeni authorities with regard to intelligence. With few of their own resources on 
the ground, the Obama administration had to rely on Yemeni sources and its own 
signals intelligence. The danger of “getting played” by Yemeni authorities or the 
misidentification of targets was thus always a possibility which had to be reckoned 
with. In addition, the options available to the administration were limited; there was 
neither a raid nor a drone strike option.  
229 
 
Furthermore, it is unknown whether the Obama administration foresaw the 
death of civilians in the strike but, given the nature of the assumed threat, it does not 
seem unreasonable to consider some collateral damage to have been justified. In 
addition, the administration had to calculate a public backlash in case innocent people 
died, especially if it turned out that the intelligence on which it based its strike 
decision was false. However, the use of highly indiscriminate cluster ammunition, 
given the uncertainties, seems to indicate that the Obama administration acted, at 
least partly, in an imprudent manner. Instead of firing missiles armed with cluster 
ammunition, a more discriminate payload should have been employed. In other 
words, the virtue of prudence should have triggered some restraint in the choice of 
weaponry, not turning the village of al-Majalah into a minefield of sorts.  
6.3.2 Targeted Killing as Retribution 
The Yamamoto case is not applicable to the following discussion as targeted killing as 
retribution, due to prudential considerations, should only be employed in 
confrontations between sovereign authorities and culpable unjust non-state actors. 
Starting with the official bin Laden account and how it relates to the virtue of military 
prudence, it seems that the Obama administration, in killing bin Laden, aimed at 
peace through re-establishing the tranquillitas ordinis which had been disrupted by 
Al Qaeda’s activities generally and those of its leader in particular. Relatedly, the idea 
of achieving “closure,” to bring relief to the American psyche after almost a decade of 
conflict, seems to have been a powerful argument during the deliberations.  
Having said that, however, in contrast to the defensive account of targeted 
killing there are two particular aspects which seem morally problematic and which 
seem to contradict the virtues of military prudence and battlefield courage as well as 
the theological virtue of charity. Firstly, while bin Laden deserved the death penalty 
for his grave wrongdoing from a natural law perspective, he deserved it in principle 
only. The question whether the punishment he deserved should be executed needs to 
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be subject to prudential and charitable concerns. In contrast to the self-defence 
account, there is no consideration of military necessity involved in retributive targeted 
killing. There is thus room to question whether it would be virtuous to kill a person 
who is not posing a threat. Such considerations come even before thinking about 
succour in a scenario like the one of bin Laden standing in front of the SEALS 
unarmed and non-resisting. Of course, decisions about succour are hard to make as 
these take place in the heat of battle. In addition, due to the fact that bin Laden was 
an unjust combatant the SEALs, as just combatants, were right in case they did not 
accept any greater risk of being deceived by an only seemingly surrendering bin 
Laden.  
Secondly, while targeted killing as self-defence allows for some collateral 
damage in order to stop an aggression there seems to be no such necessity in case of 
retribution. Following from the culpability account, bin Laden alone was targetable as 
an act of retribution. This would mean that striking bin Laden’s compound would 
seem morally wrong as an act of retribution as nonculpable individuals like his family 
could be harmed. The same issue arises with the Nabhan and Anwar al-Awlaki cases. 
Even if one accepts the argument that these individuals deserved death in principle 
for their past wrongdoing this does not mean that they should be killed. In addition, 
there are serious moral questions concerning the individuals who were with Nabhan 
and al-Awlaki when they were attacked. It seems that for targeted killing as retribution 
only Nabhan and al-Awlaki themselves were licit targets. Furthermore, from a 
retributive perspective it seems to have been wrong to target al-Kazemi at al-Majalah. 
The reason for this is that he had already served time in prison for his past wrongdoing 
and, on top of that, had sworn off his life as a terrorist. In consequence, the 
equilibrium of justice his past wrongdoing had disrupted was already restored at the 
time the US struck.  
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Last but not least, before attempting a verdict, one must distinguish the 
seemingly licit use of targeted killing as retribution from illicit vengeance. In order to 
do that, consider the unofficial bin Laden account. As pointed out above, the US had 
just cause to punish bin Laden for his past wrongdoing. Considering the virtue of 
prudence, it seems that the Obama administration did, initially, exhibit this virtue in 
the run up to its arrangement with Pakistani authorities. Surveilling the compound, 
trying to obtain as much intelligence as possible was the prudent thing to do. Mistrust 
with regard to Islamabad was warranted. Not only had Pakistan, an official US ally, 
apparently been hiding America’s foremost public enemy for years, the nation had 
also had a proven track record of playing double games regarding the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. One problem which cannot be resolved here is whether bin Laden was a 
“voluntary prisoner” of the ISI in the sense that he did not try to escape or whether he 
was actually being held against his will. Had the latter been the case the Obama 
administration would have faced a scenario not unlike the one which led to the war in 
Afghanistan when the Taliban regime was unwilling to extradite senior Al Qaeda 
members. Had the Obama administration, before it made the deal with Pakistan, 
decided to send in the SEALs without informing Islamabad, the discussion of right 
intention would essentially be the same as the one for the official account. The only 
exception would be that domestic political gain, according to Hersh, played a role in 
ordering the raid. However, the Obama administration, based on the Hersh account, 
decided, on insistence by Pakistan, to carry out the premeditated killing of an 
individual who was not only not resisting but also gravely ill. In addition, the SEALs 
did not find out about bin Laden’s state during the heat of storming the compound. 
Rather, they had held meetings with Pakistani officials telling them exactly what to 
expect.  
Thus, while bin Laden deserved the death penalty in principle from a natural 
law perspective, prudential and charitable considerations were disregarded; the 
targeted killing of bin Laden became an act of vengeance, not an act of retribution. 
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Further supporting this conclusion is the allegation that the Obama administration 
had made a plan to announce a cover story which would essentially sell its act of 
vengeance as a legitimate act of self-defence. It goes without saying that the presence 
of vengeance unescapably violates the criterion of right intention and is thus 
irreconcilable with the just use of small-scale force. Furthermore, there is no need to 
discuss the virtue of battlefield courage here as the SEALs did not encounter a combat 
situation in Abbottabad. They simply acted as hitmen who, on top of that, mutilated 
the body of the person they had been ordered to assassinate. Finally, the killing of 
Abdulrahman al-Awlaki constitutes a prototypical example of an illicit act of 
vengeance if the allegation is correct that he was only killed for being the son of his 
father. 
6.3.3 Verdict 
The above discussion concentrated on the two virtues St Thomas singled out for 
military conduct, namely military prudence and battlefield courage. As Reichberg 
points out, Aquinas considered these two especially relevant during war although, in 
line with the doctrine of the unity of virtues, they do not constitute the complete 
picture. In particular, divine charity and its derivative of mercy must also contribute 
to understanding the just use of force.  
Making this rather abstract argument, which practical conclusions can be 
drawn for targeted killing and the criterion of right intention? Starting with targeted 
killing as self-defence the virtue of charity does not seem to be applicable toward the 
targets of such action. As the cases have demonstrated, self-defence targeted killings 
most of the time take place under great urgency. Withholding a justified act of self-
defence targeted killing would essentially amount to disregarding the demand of love 
of neighbour out of which such uses of force are conducted in the first place. In other 
words, the virtue of charity with regard to self-defence targeted killing is carried out 
by protecting the innocent from an attack that is ongoing or about to happen in the 
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immediate future. It is an act of pre-emption that is only carried out as a matter of last 
resort. It goes without saying that purely preventive uses of force such as arguably the 
Datta Khel strike are illicit. Related to Datta Khel, signature strikes, due to the 
unestablished culpability of those targeted, are inherently immoral. In cases when 
self-defence targeted killing is justified, in order to pre-empt the act of injustice from 
happening, it might be justifiable to allow some collateral damage. In such cases, the 
intention of targeted killing is not to target persons whose culpability has not been 
established, but to prevent a grave injustice from happening. That is why, arguably, 
some collateral damage was justified in the Yamamoto case as well as in the official 
bin Laden case. Likewise, in the Nabhan and al-Awlaki cases it was arguably justifiable 
to kill individuals in the respective terrorist’s surroundings without having 
established either their culpability or even their identity.  
Regarding targeted killing as retribution, arguing that retribution can be a 
legitimate just cause for targeted killing, that culpable unjust individuals, depending 
on their guilt, may deserve the death penalty in principle does not mean that this type 
of punishment should be executed. Whenever it is possible to capture culpable unjust 
individuals this should be a matter of first resort. If captured, these individuals who 
have been sentenced to death by trial in absentia, will be subject to life imprisonment 
instead of capital punishment. The reason for this is the foremost virtue of charity. 
This thesis adopts the argument of modern popes that the death penalty, while 
justified in principle, fails the test of mercy. Arguably, humankind has changed its 
attitude toward capital punishment, a praiseworthy development flowing from divine 
love.  
Therefore, in cases without the greatest necessity, lethal force must have strict 
limits. Having said that, the risk soldiers must take in capturing culpable unjust 
individuals should be minimal. If there is credible reason to believe that soldiers, as 
just combatants, may be harmed there is no moral obligation for them to take this 
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risk. In other words, had it been possible to take out bin Laden with a drone strike 
such a strike would have been justified on moral grounds. Crucially, however, flowing 
from the moral culpability account, bin Laden alone would have been targetable. As it 
was only him whose culpability had been established, the account of retributive 
targeted killing would not have allowed an air strike which could have killed other 
individuals. In case it had been impossible to strike at bin Laden without harming 
others the use of force could not have been justified morally on retributive grounds, 
no matter how grave his wrongdoing. The same rationale applies to the other cases 
this thesis presented. Without further commenting on the guilt of Nabhan and al-
Awlaki, if the judgement had been that they deserved death on retributive grounds 
and capture without risk to soldiers had been considered to be impossible, exclusively 
killing them would have been justified. Given these very strict restraints on retributive 
targeted killing occasions in which such action is morally justifiable will be rare. As 
the cases demonstrate, most times culpable unjust individuals will either resist arrest 
or will be surrounded by people who do not deserve the death penalty in principle. 
Having said that, however, following from a Thomistic perspective, retributive 
targeted killing can meet, at least in principle, all of the three so-called deontological 
just war criteria of sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention. 
 
6.4 Capital Punishment, War, and Contemporary Catholic  
       Just War Thinking 
In the light of a very recent development in Catholic Social Teaching an interesting 
question arises with regard to the historical parallel between the death penalty and 
war: Does the Catholic just war require an update now that Pope Francis does no 
longer object to the death penalty on prudential and charitable grounds as his 
immediate predecessors used to do, but rules out this form of punishment as a matter 
of principle?  
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On 2 August, 2018, Francis (as cited in Ladaria 2018) asked for the following 
revision of the Catechism: “no matter how serious the crime that has been committed, 
the death penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and the 
dignity of the person.” Inevitably, a decision of this magnitude has caused mixed 
reactions within a Church that has long been divided between reformers and 
traditionalists. On one side of the debate one finds supporters such as Ivereigh (2018) 
who defends Francis’s decision as in line with prior Church teaching. On the other, 
the pope’s critics have been outspoken against what they see as a position that 
contradicts two millennia of Church teaching. For example, in an appeal to the College 
of Cardinals (Arkes et al. 2018), forty-five scholars and clergy asked them to correct 
the pope regarding this “scandal.”  
At first look, the answer to the question raised above might be that, given the 
close connection between the two forms of violence, a change in doctrine on the death 
penalty necessarily requires a change to the teaching of just war, too. Having said that, 
however, as Reichberg (2012, 1096) notes, no modern pope since at least Pius XII has 
advocated the conceptualisation of war as a means to inflict punishment on an unjust 
adversary. Likewise, taking a look at the Catechism’s treatment of just war (§2307-
2317) the emphasis of the rationale of self-defence as just cause for war is immediately 
apparent. In addition, the first “condition for legitimate defense” reads as follows: “the 
damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be 
lasting, grave, and certain;” (§2309). There thus seems to be a focus on objective 
wrongdoing and, moreover, one is struck by the absence of any reference to the 
adversary’s subjective guilt.  
As a result, rather than being in need of changing the Catechism as a 
consequence of the death penalty decision the Church seems to have already adopted 
a liability account to defensive harm for which important neo-Scholastics such as de 
Vitoria and de Molina paved the way by focusing on objective wrongdoing rather than 
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culpability. Interestingly and ironically perhaps, the official Catholic just war thus 
exhibits curious parallels with revisionist just war theorists such as McMahan. As a 
result, opposing the death penalty in principle seems irreconcilable with the punitive 
reading of Aquinas’s just war this thesis has followed, but is in line with the other 
camp of the Thomistic just war which advocates a liability-based theory of just war. 
As far as the policy of targeted killing is concerned abandoning the analogy between 
the death penalty and war necessarily rules out the use of targeted killing as a means 
of retribution, no matter how much it would be circumscribed. Targeted killings 
would only be justifiable in cases the targets have made themselves liable to defensive 
harm.  
 
Conclusion 
The employment of small-scale force as represented in the policy of targeted killing 
can flow from two possible just causes, defence and retribution. The first just cause is 
unlikely to cause much controversy given that defence is sacrosanct in international 
law as well as in contemporary just war thinking. However, the classical just war 
accepted just causes that went beyond defence, retributive punishment being one of 
them. As the casuistical analysis demonstrated, following one reading of St Thomas, 
the practice of targeted killing can accept retributive punishment as its second just 
cause. This argument is likely to attract criticism from those emphasising the merits 
of pure defence but, given the circumstances of today’s asymmetric conflict, allowing 
the retributive targeted killing of non-state actors seems morally justifiable.  
In addition, it is possible for both defensive and retributive types of targeted 
killing to meet the criterion of right intention. This chapter has pointed to some moral 
conundrums arising from the Obama administration’s conduct and has suggested 
ways of addressing them. Moreover, the discussion concluded that it does not make 
sense to rule out particular means like, for example, drone strikes, as their virtuous 
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employment rules out any abuse in the first place. Additionally, with remote warfare 
it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between the command and rank-and-
file level. As a direct consequence, leaders acting as exemplars of virtuous behaviour 
have great responsibility and must not tolerate misconduct. This way, subordinates 
have a chance to internalise the virtues and become virtuous themselves. Moreover, 
the necessity of a proper training in the virtues needs to be stressed. Both military 
leaders and lower-rank soldiers must receive the appropriate training.  
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis has made a contribution to both methodological and substantive debates 
in contemporary just war thinking. In terms of methodology, it made an argument for 
the historical approach of Thomistic casuistry which not only parts with the methods 
of Walzer and his revisionist critics, but also deviates from Johnson’s historical just 
war. In terms of its substantive contribution, this thesis made a two stage argument. 
Firstly, based on conventional textual assessment and logic, the chapter on sovereign 
authority identified who has the authority to conduct targeted killings and made an 
argument about how that authority should be exercised. It concluded that a partial 
recovery of the classical understanding of sovereign authority is the most ethical way 
of regulating small-scale uses of force. Secondly, based on the method of Thomistic 
casuistry, the chapter on liability assessed who is liable to that practice. 
“Renegotiating” the principles of just cause and right intention the chapter concluded 
that, besides the uncontroversial just cause of self-defence, the targeted killing of 
culpable unjust individuals can also be just on retributive grounds. However, the 
virtue-based right intention criterion sets up hurdles that are very difficult to jump 
over which makes the use of retributive targeted killing morally justifiable in 
exceptional circumstances only. 
 
7.1 The Methodological Contribution 
Contemporary just war thinking has mostly been split into two competing camps 
which disagree about both method and substance. The methodology chapter pointed 
out that, due to the two camps’ different approaches and an ensuing lack of 
engagement with each other’s work, Walzerians and revisionists have opposed each 
other in a ”war of ethics within the ethics of war” (Vaha 2013, 183). Walzerians employ 
a casuistical method which seeks to reflect on historical cases. Taking the “legalist 
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paradigm” as their starting point for moral reflection they investigate when and how 
that paradigm should be disregarded in order to be morally just.  
In contrast, most revisionists use Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. 
They take Walzer’s approach as the reigning theory and seek to contradict it and 
thereby build a better theory. In order to reveal the logical flaws in Walzer’s theory 
most revisionists prefer to rely on far-fetched thought experiments. Such analytical 
construction, they hope, helps isolate the moral principles which should guide ethical 
decision-making in war. Considering real-world uses of force, they believe, is a 
hindrance to identifying those principles. Furthermore, the chapter discussed how 
Walzerians and revisionists clash over their starting point of moral analysis. 
Walzerians are “collectivists” in that they mostly see the phenomenon of war as one 
that occurs between political communities. Revisionists, in contrast, consider 
themselves to be “reductive individualists,” who, as individualists, start their moral 
analysis from the individual as unit of analysis, not from the political community. At 
the same time, most revisionists are reductivists who, in contrast to Walzerians who 
distinguish between different moralities for war and peace and, most recently, one for 
jus ad vim, deny that that there are different moralities. For them, the rules for killing 
in war are the same as those for killing in everyday life.  
Taking the “confusingly polarized” (Clark 2017, 331) state of contemporary 
just war as jumping-off point the methodology chapter presented the historical 
approach to just war as a “third-way” in-between Walzerians and revisionists. It was 
argued that the use of a perspective which sides with neither camp all the time can 
help overcome what seems like a narrow intra-disciplinary divide. The historical 
approach, it was pointed out, like Walzerians, argues casuistically in the sense that it 
reflects on historical cases. However, unlike Walzerians, who have a limited interest 
in the thought of previous just war thinkers, the historical approach seeks to enter into 
debate with past scholars. Pointing to the difference between Walzerians and the 
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historical approach it goes without saying that the revisionist method, which ignores 
both historical cases and the thought of past thinkers, is even more alien to the 
historical approach.  
Demonstrating the position of the historical approach as in-between 
Walzerians and revisionists the methodology chapter considered the substantive issue 
of moral symmetry from a historical perspective and vindicated the revisionist 
argument. Importantly, however, the chapter also noted that in order to arrive at this 
judgement it is not necessary to employ the revisionist method. Instead of resorting 
to far-fetched hypotheticals, a thorough engagement with the just war tradition can 
also provide this conclusion. 
The chapter went on by arguing that the historical approach can have more 
than one interpretation. It was noted that Johnson’s particular reading of Aquinas de-
emphasises the transcendental aspect of the Angelic Doctor’s just war and Thomistic 
casuistry, which gives due attention to Aquinas’s virtue ethics, was introduced as a 
means to overcome this imperfection in Johnson’s work. Thomistic casuistry, the 
chapter explained, employs casuistry as it was understood historically. In contrast to 
Walzer’s and Johnson’s lax type of casuistry, traditional casuistry follows a set of fixed 
steps which the chapter pointed out in detail. Moreover, one of the main advantages 
of traditional casuistry vis-à-vis Walzer’s casuistry is that it not merely considers real-
world circumstances but also fully engages with the work of previous thinkers in its 
use of moral principles.  
Not forgetful about the downsides of the traditional casuistical method which 
contributed to its historical disrepute the chapter made an argument to, again, rely on 
St Thomas by bolstering the casuistical method with a virtue ethics element. This 
virtue approach, it was argued, can also be helpful in assessing the intellectual merit 
of thought experiments. Furthermore, the chapter sought to address critics of the 
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historical approach by pointing out how the general critique against the historical 
approach does not succeed against Thomistic casuistry.  
 
7.2 The Substantive Contribution 
Making a two-stage argument, this thesis “renegotiated” the established jus ad bellum 
in light of the novel circumstances of a morally worrisome increase in the use of small-
scale force post-9/11. Entering into a conversation with the philosophy of St Thomas 
its textual assessment as well as its casuistry reflected on the Obama administration’s 
conduct and provided an argument for how uses of small-scale force should be 
regulated.  
With regard to sovereign authority, Aquinas’s first just war criterion, the 
chapter used a recent conversation between Coates and Steinhoff as point of 
departure. It was pointed out that the former thinker, who employs a historical 
approach, was subjected to a rigorous revisionist critique by the latter. Essentially, 
Steinhoff denies the viability of the authority criterion which Coates defends and 
argues that each and every individual can have the right to wage war. Tracing the roots 
of their disagreement back to their different starting points of analysis, namely, for 
Coates, the common good of the political community and, for Steinhoff, the 
individual, their particular face-off was then put on a broader basis by introducing 
Fabre’s cosmopolitan just war.  
With that background in mind, the thinking of St Thomas with regard to 
questions of authority was spelled out next. Presenting Aquinas’s thinking as 
undergirding the pre-Westphalian understanding of sovereignty this position was 
contrasted with the Westphalian understanding which underpins Walzer’s just war 
and, as a result of revisionists’ concentration on Walzer’s work, has been the focus of 
revisionists, too.  
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Returning to the conversation between Coates and Steinhoff the chapter, then, 
provided an assessment of Steinhoff’s critique. As it turned out, his critique partly 
succeeds against Coates, but fails against the just war of St Thomas. Adding a 
reflection on the broader revisionist argument against the authority criterion the 
chapter concluded that the main underlying aspect behind the clash over authority is 
the difference between collectivist and individualist approaches. Taking the political 
community as starting point, both the historical and Walzerian just war part with the 
reductive individualism of revisionists. In its final section, the chapter then turned to 
the issue of small-scale force. Engaging in a “renegotiation” of the legalist paradigm, 
a partial return to the pre-Westphalian understanding of authority was advocated, for 
both external and domestic conduct.  
The chapter on liability to small-scale force “renegotiated” Aquinas’s 
remaining just war criteria of just cause and right intention by employing Thomistic 
casuistry. Discussing both criteria in a single chapter was meant to be a testament to 
the inter-connectedness of St Thomas’s just war criteria. As in the authority chapter, 
an effort was made to contrast the historical approach with both the Walzerian and 
revisionist schools of just war.  
In the discussion of just cause it was pointed out that the prototypical just 
cause of the Thomistic just war is retribution as Aquinas took the rationale of self-
defence for granted. It was argued that for St Thomas, based on his account of natural 
law, retributive just war had a domestic parallel, namely that of capital punishment. 
This emphasis of retribution, it was noted, deviates from a reading which presents 
self-defence as the only just cause for war as upheld by revisionists and, granted that 
they allow for exceptions in case the UN Security Council so decides, Walzerians, too. 
In particular, the chapter distinguished Aquinas’s moral culpability account from 
McMahan’s account of liability to defensive harm.  
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The following discussion of right intention concentrated on Aquinas’s virtue 
ethics approach built around the cardinal and theological virtues. In line with the 
argument that the criterion of right intention “gives concrete shape to the condition 
of just cause” (Boyle 2003, 164), the complex interplay of these two sets of virtues was 
illustrated by the example of recent developments in Catholic Social Teaching. 
The actual casuistical analysis of liability to small-scale force then, concluded 
that the practice of targeted killing can have the just causes of self-defence and 
retribution. However, both just causes must also meet the right intention criterion 
before such action is morally justified. Building on papal thinking up until 2 August, 
2018, which held that the death penalty, although justified in principle, should not be 
carried out due to a demand of the highest theological virtue of charity it was argued 
that retributive targeted killing, too, is subject to the demand of divine love and thus 
only morally justifiable in very rare circumstances. This thesis’s argument on targeted 
killing thus slightly deviates from St Thomas who, being a thinker of his time, was less 
restrictive with regard to the death penalty. At the same time, it also “renegotiates” 
the consensus within contemporary thinking that only self-defensive uses of force are 
morally justifiable. 
 
7.3 Limitations and Potential for Future Research 
Having summarised this thesis’s contribution to knowledge it goes without saying that 
there are also limitations to it. Besides the general potential shortcomings of the 
historical approach and the particular ones of casuistry which have been discussed in 
the methodology chapter this final section takes a look at some additional limitations 
and, when possible, argues that they can function as encouragement for further 
research.  
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To begin with, the most obvious limitation of this thesis with regard to parts 
of contemporary just war debate is its Thomistic approach. While, as this thesis 
argued, St Thomas’s just war starts from the consensus position on just war of his day 
which integrated various non-religious influences he was, first and foremost, a 
Christian thinker. While this Christian pedigree is also present in his idea of sovereign 
authority and just cause his transcendental orientation can most directly be found in 
his account right intention. Arguing for an ethics of war which is built around a 
religious conviction will, unsurprisingly, cause uneasiness with secular thinkers. After 
all, as Brown (2018, 205) suggests, Walzer’s secular approach might have been one of 
the reasons why he does not fully engage with the just war tradition as this tradition 
has historically been developed, to a significant extent, by Christian thinkers. 
Likewise, revisionists will object to a transcendental orientation to just war as such 
thinking evades their rigorous analytical scrutiny. Even Johnson, who is a theologian, 
seems to neglect the transcendental element in Aquinas’s just war.  
Having said that, while there seems to be no way to reconcile this fundamental 
difference between religiously-oriented and secular thinkers this thesis made an effort 
throughout to portray the just war tradition as broad enough to have a place for 
different streams; in O’Driscoll’s (2008a, 109) words: “many just war theories, one 
just war tradition.” Following from that, as this thesis’s discussion of small-scale force 
sought to demonstrate, even when there are fundamental methodological 
disagreements between various approaches just war thinkers can and should take the 
other side’s substantive work seriously. Taking it from there, one’s own argument will 
most likely benefit as substantive disagreements can at least function as a reminder 
to think more deeply about the grave questions related to the ethics of war. 
Besides this methodological issue, one substantive limitation of this thesis was 
deliberately brought about and noted in the introductory chapter, namely this thesis’s 
focus on the practice of targeted killing. In contrast, for example, the broad account 
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of jus as vim, introduced by Walzer and developed by Brunstetter and his co-authors, 
goes beyond targeted killing. Besides small-scale uses of force against states such as 
in the imposition of no-fly zones the broad account is supposed to also deal with 
actions such as trade embargoes. This thesis, due to the decision to concentrate on 
targeted killing, has nothing to say about the actions just mentioned. Consequently, 
critics might point to this limitation. However, in response to this criticism, this 
ostensible shortcoming could be part of a future research agenda. There seems to be 
no reason why the Thomistic casuistry this thesis advocates cannot be employed to 
investigate those aspects, too. One example that immediately comes to mind is that of 
trade embargoes. While, of course, the historical circumstances were different, there 
seem to be interesting parallels between today’s trade embargoes and earlier modes 
of siege warfare. In both actions, blocking the access to essential goods is used as a 
means to break the will of the opponent and bring about a change in behaviour. 
Interestingly, St Thomas argued about the morality of siege warfare (see, e.g., ST, II-
II, q. 96, a. 6). As a result, it seems perfectly possible to assess the morality of trade 
embargoes from a Thomistic casuistical perspective. In order to do this, the other 
ingredients needed would be a paradigm case as basis for comparison as well as cases 
of contemporary trade embargoes. Moreover, demonstrating the potential of 
Thomistic casuistry beyond targeted killing there seems to be no reason why further 
issues such as no-fly zones or cyber warfare cannot be morally assessed in this way.  
More generally, going beyond the debate about the morality of small-scale 
employments of force, Thomistic casuistry has the potential to illuminate further 
research projects within contemporary just war. While this thesis focused on one 
specific moral problem in contemporary world politics the approach it advocates is of 
a universal nature. For example, despite an increased interest in jus post bellum, the 
framework has not yet been looked at from a Thomistic perspective. While for the 
Thomistic just war jus post bellum, like jus ad vim, is part of jus ad bellum the latter 
framework might need a “renegotiation” with regard to post-war justice.  
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Without going into detail it seems that the Thomistic just war can make a 
valuable contribution in this regard through its emphasis of the right intention 
criterion as it connects right intention directly to the political goal of peace. Starting 
from there, the contemporary issue that immediately comes to mind is the refugee 
crisis the international community has been facing over the last few years. One 
argument made in public debate in Germany, the EU country that welcomed most 
refugees, has been that today’s refugees should become a permanent component of 
the German workforce. That way, the German economy could address the difficulty to 
recruit enough workers which is the result of an ageing society. However, given the 
enormous loss of young people countries such as Syria have suffered, post-war 
reconstruction seems to be in danger if most of today’s refugees were to stay in their 
host countries permanently. Put differently, the act of charity Germany’s liberal 
asylum policy constitutes would, if the rationale mentioned above was driving its 
policy, be an act of narrow self-interest which threatens Syria’s post bellum 
reconstruction.  
Employing Thomistic casuistry to the moral problem of just refugee 
repatriation could not only make a valuable contribution to this question, but also 
bring together just war thinking and forced migration studies in an interdisciplinary 
project. It seems fair to argue that just war thinking has not given due attention to the 
moral issue of forced migration which oftentimes follows the outbreak of war. While 
some prominent just war thinkers (see, e.g., Elshtain 2009; Walzer 1984, 31-63) have 
argued about the morality of migration they have done so without employing the 
language of just war. A few exceptions notwithstanding (see, e.g., Banta 2008; 
Davidovic 2016; Kling 2016; Pattison 2015), the issue of forced migration has 
consequently not been in the centre of attention as far as questions of jus post bellum 
are concerned. The just war’s silence on such an important issue amounts to a curious 
shortcoming as normative forced migration studies have long paid attention to 
questions one might list under jus post bellum. In particular, normative forced 
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migration scholars (see, e.g., Barnett 2001; Bradley 2008, 2013; Gibney 2014; Long 
2013; Weiner 1998) have argued about the question of under what conditions refugees 
should return to their countries of origin and whether there is such a thing as a “just 
return.” There is thus potential for the Thomistic just war to bring together diverse 
approaches and thereby advance debate about one of the most pressing moral issues 
of our time. 
 
7.4 Final Thoughts 
One of the objectives of this thesis was to trigger debate between the two competing 
camps of contemporary just war thinking. Questions of war and peace are far too 
serious to deliberately avoid an engagement with each other’s work solely because one 
does not like the other’s method. One negative consequence of such a refusal to take 
part in debate is that it can lead to a defence of positions which, upon close 
investigation, turn out to be morally indefensible as is the case in Walzer’s moral 
symmetry thesis. At the same time, presenting the Thomistic just war as a third-way 
in-between Walzerians and revisionists this thesis sought to remind contemporary 
thinkers of the very core of the just war as it has historically been understood, namely 
its practical function as a guide to statecraft. Therefore, most revisionists, too, lose 
something by concentrating on far-fetched hypotheticals which are of little use to 
decision-makers. The Thomistic casuistry this thesis advocates provides both 
historical awareness and analytical rigour and demonstrates that neither Walzerians 
nor revisionists have it right all the time. At the same time, this thesis willingly 
concedes that its own method is by no means flawless either. Rather, in line with the 
venerable virtue of humilitas, this thesis should be read as a call to just war thinkers, 
no matter their particular background, to appreciate that the just war tradition is far 
greater than one’s own narrow approach and only functions well if the various schools 
are willing to debate with each other. 
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